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MINOR CHANGES:
EMANCIPATING CHILDREN IN MODERN TIMES
Carol Sanger*
Eleanor Willemsen**
Graze where you will, you shall not house with me.
Capulet to Juliet'
Parents and their teenage children don't always get along.
At some time during adolescent development, parents may
turn into embarrassments 2 and teenagers into domestic
terrorists.3 For most families this is a phase. Adolescence is
endured, the child accomplishes some degree of separation
from parents, and the transition to adulthood advances.
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Olson, Nancy Ota, and Robert Lohrbeer for their research assistance. The study also
benefited from comments received from participants at presentations of this research
at meetings of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, the University of Arizona
Law School Faculty Workshop, and the Society for Research on the Development of
the Child. Finally, special thanks are given to Valerie Houghton, J.D., M.M.C.C.,
who conducted the interviews with exceptional skill.
** Professor of Psychology, Santa Clara University. B.A. 1960, M.A. 1962, Ph.D.
1964, Stanford University. Principal responsibilities in this collaborative project
were as follows: the design and statistical analysis of interview data were supervised
by Eleanor Willemsen; the Article was written by Carol Sanger.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 3, sc. 8.
2. As the teenage narrator of Julian Barnes' Metroland explains: "Every
morning, at breakfast, I would gaze disbelievingly at my family. They were all still
there, for a start-that was the first surprise. Why hadn't some of them run off in the
night, wounded beyond endurance by the emptiness I divined in their lives?" JULIAN
BARNES, METROLAND 39 (1980).
3. Alison Lurie presents a parental view of the morning scene:
Standing by the toaster, Erica contemplates her children....
... Jeffrey and Matilda were beautiful, healthy babies; charming toddlers;
intelligent, lively, affectionate children. There are photograph albums . . . to
prove it. Then last year, when Jeffrey turned fourteen and Matilda twelve, they
had begun to change; to grow rude, coarse, selfish, insolent, nasty, brutish, and
tall. It was as if she were keeping a boarding house in a bad dream, and the
children she had loved were turning into awful lodgers-lodgers who paid no
rent, whose leases could not be terminated.
ALISON LURIE, THE WAR BETWEEN THE TATES 4, 6 (1974).
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In some families, however, the period is more like a siege
than a phase. Conflict may last longer and be more strifeful,
more intense. If the family is incapable or unwilling to resolve
the tensions, an intractability may set in. In these cases,
domestic tranquility seems attainable only when the child is not
at home. In recent years, parents have employed various
approaches to bring about their child's absence. Depending on
family history, temperament, and resources, frustrated parents
have removed frustrated teenagers by sending them to private
schools and camps,4 hospitalizing them,5 relinquishing custody
to the state,6 pushing them out as runaways,7 or by cutting
the child loose, as recommended in the Tough Love programs.'
This Article reports on the use of still another mechanism for
removing children in conflict with their parents: statutory
emancipation, the process by which minors attain legal adult-
hood before reaching the age of majority. Statutorily emanci-
pated minors can sign binding contracts, own property, keep
4. In addition to private residential schools, parents are beginning to send their
children to programs that advertise a more "camp-like" experience, often based on the
Outward Bound model of rigorous outdoor activities. Whether these places are
schools, camps, or quasi-hospitals offering therapy is not clear. Many, such as the
Summit Quest and Challenger programs, use severe discipline as the organizing
principle. Martha Matthews, Wilderness Programs Offer Promising Alternative for
Some Youth; More Regulations Likely, YOUTH L. NEWS, Nov./Dec. 1991, at 12, 12
(describing state efforts to increase licensing standards for wilderness programs
following the deaths of two girls in 1990).
5. Lois A. Weithorn, Note, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An
Analysis of Skyrocketing Admissions Rates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 773, 773-74 (1988).
6. Sandra Evans, Desperate Parents Cast Unruly Children into Hands of a
Burdened Government, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1991, at Al (describing relief for custody
petitions filed in Virginia by parents who "can no longer cope"). Custody petitions
account for 11.5% of children in foster care in Virginia and are filed most frequently
for teenagers. Id.
7. See SENATE SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, HOMELESS YOUTH: THE SAGA
OF "PUSHOUTS" AND "THROWAWAYS" IN AMERICA, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980).
8. The Tough Love programs advocate "unorthodox responses" to teenagers'
'outrageous behavior":
Through a sequence of small action steps parents make their acting-out young
person responsible for the consequences of his or her unacceptable behavior.
TOUGHLOVE does not encourage parents to "throw their kid out of the house."
Only after other alternatives are attempted is an acting-out youth faced with
a structured choice to change his or her behavior or leave.
PHYLLIS YORK ET AL., TOUGHLOVE 18-19 (1982). The term "tough love" is now
sometimes used to describe any stern parental action taken in the child's interest.
See, e.g., David Gonzalez, Behind Girl's Chaining, Siren Call of the Streets, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1991, at Al (describing parents who chained crack-addicted daughter
to keep her off the streets as using "tough love").
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their earnings, and disobey their parents.9 Although under
eighteen, they are "considered as being over the age of majority"
in most of their dealings with parents and third parties.' °
Thus, while emancipated minors can sign contracts and stay
out late, their adult status also means that their parents are no
longer responsible for the minors' support. To understand why
minors choose to restructure their relationships with their
parents and to redefine their status within society through the
mechanism of emancipation, we undertook an empirical study
on the use of emancipation in two northern California counties.
The results of that study are reported here.
The study was prompted by an offhand remark. During a
social conversation with one of the authors, a fifty-year-old
woman volunteered that in order for her and her new husband
to begin their marriage without the complicating presence of
stepchildren, they "had to emancipate" her sixteen-year-old
daughter. The phrase was striking. Emancipation, a subject
rarely discussed even in family law classes, seemed an unusual
lay topic. Moreover, in twentieth-century English, emancipate
is not used as a transitive verb; the California legislature
intended emancipation to be a legal status that minors request,
not a legal imposition to be thrust upon them by someone
else. 1
The remark suggested the possibility that emancipation was
being used not to empower mature adolescents through official
recognition of their actual independence, but as a means to
alter parent-child relationships for parental advantage.
Informal pilot courthouse interviews of minors seeking emanci-
pation supported this hypothesis, immediately revealing several
cases where the minor's petition for emancipation had come
about through parental suggestion and effort. This initial,
informal information suggested three central inquiries for a
more systematic investigation:
1. To what extent is emancipation used for purposes other
than legitimizing the de facto status of independent
9. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 63 (West Supp. 1992).
10. Id. Emancipated minors are not treated as adults for the purposes of
compulsory education, child labor laws, consent to marry, criminal liability, statutory
rape, or parental vicarious liability under the vehicle code. Peter Bull, Representing
Status Offenders and Their Parents, in 2 CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE:
DEPENDENT MINORS, STATUS OFFENDERS 217, 252 (1981).
11. One purpose of the Emancipation of Minors Act was "to permit an
emancipated minor to obtain a court declaration of his status." CAL. CIV. CODE § 61
(West 1982).
WINTER 19921
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minors, purposes such as resolving intrafamilial
disputes or dissolving parental liability or support
obligations?
2. What is the relation between emancipation procedures
and the extent and purpose of their use?
3. How well do emancipated minors negotiate their
emancipated lives?
To explore these questions, we examined all emancipation
petitions filed over a two-year period (ninety) and interviewed
a smaller group of emancipated minors (eighteen) from two
San Francisco Bay Area counties in which emancipation was
routinely granted. The object was to find out from emancipated
minors themselves how their decisions to seek emancipation
had come about, how their lives had been affected, and
something about their relationships with their families at the
time of emancipation. Through the interviews, we sought to
identify and correlate characteristics of the emancipation
process with relevant characteristics of the minors and families
who use it. Our findings reveal that while in some cases
emancipation provided independent teenagers with legal
authority appropriate to their life situations, in many others it
was used by parents to end responsibility for more ordinary
teenagers who lacked the experience, resources, or desire to
live independently.
How did this use of emancipation come about? Early
enthusiastic reviews welcomed the new legislation as a
practical, easy means of promoting the interests of mature
minors, 2 not as a method of resolving intrafamilial disputing
or conflict. California's emancipation statute arose in response
to the needs of teenagers to be freed from the burdens of
minority, not from the complications of modern family life. 3
The use of emancipation to do much of anything is some-
thing of a surprise. Emancipation is disdained in the leading
domestic relations treatise as a "peculiar and, fortunately,
unimportant corner of the law,"' 4 and for most of its history,
12. Francis C. Cady, Emancipation of Minors, 12 CONN. L. REV. 62 (1979) (urging
wider enactment of emancipation statutes like California's); Priscilla Brown, Note,
The Emancipation of Minors Act: A California Solution for the Mature Minor, U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 283 (1979).
13. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
14. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 9.3, at 548 (2d ed. 1987).
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this has been the case. Emancipation was granted now and
then to solve some specific problem caused by a child's
minority status, such as to circumvent intrafamilial tort
immunity or to protect a child's wages from an overreaching
parent. 5
But legal relationships among family members as well as
emancipation law have changed. Children can now sue their
negligent parents, 6 and children's earnings are now better
protected. 7 Indeed, parents are often more concerned about
being sued by someone else on account of their child's
behavior-driving, in most cases-than about being sued by
the child. The structure of family life and family composition
is also different. More households and their occupants experi-
ence parental divorce and remarriage.'" Teenagers have
somewhat more autonomy, as over the last twenty years
courts and legislatures have increased their decision-making
authority in certain areas; consenting to birth control services
is a familiar example. 9
15. See generally Sanford N. Katz et al., Emancipating Our Children-Coming
of Legal Age in America, 7 FAM. L.Q. 211, 219-25 (1973). Recently, the instrumental
use of emancipation has been re-introduced to deal with the problem of homeless
youth. Runaways (who are in fact homeless despite the fact they share legal
residence with their parents) are ineligible both for foster care (because they have
parents) and for shelters and services available to adults (because they lack legal
capacity to consent to anything). As a result, homeless teenage youth often receive
inadequate public services. See Rorie Sherman, Suit Claims Teens Left to Streets,
NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1991, at 13 (describing lawsuit filed against New York City on
behalf of runaways and destitute teenagers). Minnesota has invoked common-law
emancipation as a means of dealing with this problem. In 1991, the legislature
amended its law so that destitute adolescents could be classified as common-law
emancipated minors and then be eligible for assistance benefits. Id.
The use of emancipation to overcome problems of homelessness is the opposite of
the central problem suggested by this study: homelessness as a possible consequence
of emancipation. But the two circumstances illustrate a common problem: teenagers
without familial or other support can rarely function independently in this society.
16. See generally CLARK, supra note 14, § 11.2, at 640-47 (discussing when a
child may bring a tort action against her parent).
17. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 202 (West 1982) ("The parent has no control over
the property of the child.").
18. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLEY, SURVIVING THE
BREAKUP 5-6 (1980); David Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic Parents, and the Law's
Perceptions of "Family" After Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 102,
102-03 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
19. Such statutes have been called "partial statutory emancipations" because for
specific and limited purposes, such as consenting to certain kinds of medical care, the
minor is treated as an adult. Katz et al., supra note 15, at 215. See infra note 398
for a list of other statutes that grant minors limited authority to act as adults and
thus might be considered "partial emancipations." This Article uses the term
statutory emancipation to refer to the newer and more comprehensive removal of
disabilities.
WINTER 1992]
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Emancipation has changed too. Its criteria are now more
uniform, set by statute rather than determined judicially case
by case, and its consequences are more comprehensive.
Emancipation is also more accessible. The California emanci-
pation statute, for example, provides a simple procedure by
which fourteen-year-olds can for most purposes terminate
their entire minority.
Statutory emancipation is an extraordinary grant of author-
ity to minors in a legal system where even older children are
permitted to decide very little for themselves. While adoles-
cent minors have more legal authority than they used to have,
for the most part they still must follow the direction of their
parents with regard to the central features of teenage
life-residence, association, and conduct.2 °  Within the
family, an uncomplicated legal regime still applies, with
occasional exceptions, to minors of all ages. Parents control
and provide care for their children; children obey parental
direction. In these respects, the legal status of adolescents
differs little from that of all other children. Everyone under
eighteen, now the common age of majority, is lumped together
as minors or, adding insult to incapacity, "infants." Their
distinguishing legal characteristic is the inability to make
decisions on their own behalves." Minors are "a group of
individuals with few responsibilities, many restrictions, and a
20. Residence provides a straightforward example of the arrangement. Parents
have traditionally been required to provide minor children with a place to live and
children are required to live there. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 213 (West 1982).
Courts accept the proposition that "[flamily life and parental guidance would cease
if each child could choose her place of residence for herself." In re L.A.G. (Hennepin
County Dist. Ct. (Juv. Div.) Minn. Aug. 11, 1972) (concerning 15-year-old daughter
who refused to accompany parents on a round-the-world yacht tour). Thus, with few
exceptions, children live where their parents say they will. Children who refuse may
be disciplined with the state's help; running away from home has been a common
basis for juvenile court intervention, usually upon parental request. See BEYOND
CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT (Lee E. Teitelbaum & Aidan
R. Gough eds., 1977).
21. Restrictions on minors extend beyond the hearth to interactions within civil
society generally. See Restrictions on a Child's Freedom to Participate in Activities
in the Community, in DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., THE LEGAL STATUS OF
ADOLESCENTS 1980, at 109-53 (1981) (providing a comprehensive list of restrictions
by state on minors' activities). The most economically disabling are limitations on
contractual capacity and restrictions on child labor. See Robert G. Edge, Voidability
of Minors' Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine in a Modern Economy, 1 GA. L. REV. 205
(1967); Note, Child Labor Laws-Time to Grow Up, 59 MINN. L. REV. 575, 583-96
(1975) (summarizing state child labor laws). Other common restrictions include
curfews and limitations on driving.
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complex legal status that maintains a dependency on adults
for privilege and access to resources.
" 22
Statutory emancipation unsettles this scheme. Unlike
traditional judicial emancipations granted at the court's
discretion for specific purposes such as protecting a minor's
wages from parents or establishing a residence separate from
parents, 23 statutory emancipation achieves a more compre-
hensive promotion into adulthood.24
What is going on? Did California and the sixteen other
states with similar emancipation statutes 25 decide to codify
the common parental observation that "my daughter is fifteen
going on twenty-seven?" To some extent the answer is yes.
Apparently living apart from one's parents and managing
one's financial affairs, the statutory prerequisites for emanci-
pation, were satisfactory indicia to justify early promotion to
22. Judith Worell & Fred Danner, Adolescents in Contemporary Context, in THE
ADOLESCENT AS DECISION MAKER 1, 3 (Judith Worell & Fred Danner eds., 1989). The
Supreme Court has affirmed this dependency: "The law's concept of family rests on
a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions." Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
23. See Katz et al., supra note 15, at 231-32; CLARK, supra note 14, § 9.3, at
548-52.
24. Such comprehensiveness is a central difference between statutory and
common-law emancipation:
As a common law doctrine applied according to the circumstances of each case,
emancipation is not coextensive with removal of the disabilities of minority
defined by statute. Minors, through their own and their parents' actions, may
be completely emancipated as regards reciprocal obligations of support and
service, but if they are under age according to the relevant statute, they still
will not be authorized to vote, drink, obtain a driver's license, or contract for
goods or services without a cosigner.
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS PROJECT 22 (1980).
25. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.590 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-150 (West
1986 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-15.7 (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 38-108 to -110 (1986 & Supp. 1990); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts.
3991-3994 (West 1961 & Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 3506-A (West
Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 722.1-.6 (West Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-408 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 129.080-.140 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN.
88 28-6-2 to -8 (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-717 to -726 (1989); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10 §§ 91-94 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.550-.565 (1987); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 31 (West 1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-331 to -334 (Michie 1950 &
Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 49-7-27 (1986). Three other states have statutes that
codify common-law discretionary judicial emancipations: ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-26-104
(Michie 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2201-2211 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp.
1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-31-101 to -105 (1980).
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adulthood. 26 A minor who was physically and economically
separate from parents had demonstrated a self-sufficiency that
made traditional requirements of parental support and control
not only unnecessary, but problematic in practical, everyday
sorts of ways. Unemancipated teenagers, even when living
independently, cannot consent, rent, or borrow, and still can
be picked up by the police as runaways." Removing these
impediments and risks from daily life was central to the
legislative decision enabling teenagers to turn themselves into
adults with an uncomplicated tap of a procedural wand.2"
Such procedural simplicity made sense. Emancipation was
supposed to ratify, not reorder, an existing state of
affairs-the minor's financial and physical independence from
her parents.
But identifying legislators' motivation for enacting the
emancipation statute does not explain why minors themselves
decide to use it. Certainly there is convenience in being able
to work overtime without a work permit and satisfaction in
staying out as late as one wants. Such advantages are
accompanied, however, by other less convenient, less glamor-
ous, and less immediately apparent consequences of majority,
such as the inability to require parental financial assis-
tance.2" Minors seeking emancipation may not grasp the
complete meaning of adult legal status, but most understand
and intend emancipation to be a big deal. They know that it
results in a dramatic reordering of their civil and familial
entitlements and obligations, though they describe the change
less formally:
[Emancipation means that e]ven if I want to go back home
and abide by the rules they don't have to let me back
in.30
As that participant understood all too well, emancipation
ends significant aspects of the legal relationship between
26. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 64(a)(2), (3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
27. In re Nancy C., 105 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Ct. App. 1972) (upholding constitution-
ality of Sacramento's curfew ordinance).
28. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
29. CAL. CIv. CODE § 63(d) (West 1982).
30. Interview with Courtney 12. Compare Robert Frost's description of home as
"the place where, when you have to go there, / They have to take you in." ROBERT
FROST, The Death of the Hired Man, in COLLECTED POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 53
(1930).
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minors and their parents. In that regard, it is like other
legal processes that reorder familial relationships such as
termination of parental rights or the surrender of a child for
adoption by a birth parent. But emancipation differs from
those procedures in that termination and adoption are
surrounded by procedural elaborations that require levels of
deliberation by the participants-appropriate requirements
in light of the significant restructuring of family that
termination or adoption effect.
Emancipation, in contrast, is a procedural snap. Declara-
tions of emancipation are obtained with stunning ease and
speed; the ones we studied typically took less than a week
from formal start to finish. When parents sign their child's
petition, as they did in each of the ninety petitions examined,
the parents consent to a declaration of emancipation without
a hearing.3 ' The few hearings that were held were perfunc-
tory, often taking only five or ten minutes. Thus, despite the
statutory requirement that the judge determine that emanci-
pation is not contrary to the minor's best interests, exchange
between the judge and minor was minimal at best. 2
In this Article we pursue the idea that something more
profound than the California location explains the laid-back
judicial approach to the emancipation process. We suggest
instead that courts and legislatures have assumed a unity of
interests between the parents and teenage children who seek
emancipation. Faced with a petitioning minor and consent-
ing parents, a court's assumption that all is as agreeable as
it appears may not seem unreasonable. Yet our data show
that the emancipation petitions do not always accurately
portray the status or desires of many of the petitioning
minors, and they do not at all reveal the motivations or
extent of participation by the minors' parents.
This study suggests that at times emancipation may
facilitate an abdication by parents of caretaking responsi-
bilities, an abandonment of sorts. Viewed this way, emanci-
pation may raise much the same concern more classical
abandonments raised during the Middle Ages, that "close
attention must be paid ... to determine whether parents are
forfeiting responsibility for a 'child' or simply forwarding a
31. CAL. CIV. CODE app. § 64 (West 1982).
32. See infra notes 185-200 and accompanying text.
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young person to the ordinary next stage of life according to
contemporary expectations.
Statutory emancipation, the near overnight legal transfor-
mation of minor to adult, tests current cultural notions about
childhood's last official outpost-adolescence-and its place
within American families and American law. The 1980s were
a period in which trends to enrich and lengthen childhood
were in tension with competing practices and preferences to
shorten it.34 Childhood itself as a legal category was short-
ened, as states lowered the age of majority from twenty-one to
eighteen." At the same time, traditional markers used to
measure adulthood, such as completion of an education, the
acquisition of skills, or participation in the labor force, are
now often missing at age eighteen. What then does it take
and what does it mean to be a grown-up in modern times?
3
To understand whether today's emancipated minors are
being "forwarded" or abandoned, we begin in Part I by looking
at the history and content of the California Emancipation of
Minors Act: Why was it enacted? How does it work? Part II
then describes the Act's actual use as understood through
interviews with emancipated minors.3 7  We present our
findings here both through numerical summaries-how many?
33. JOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS 35 (1988).
34. See DAVID ELKIND, THE HURRIED CHILD 1-46 (rev. ed. 1988); EDA J. LESHAN,
THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST CHILDHOOD (1967); NEIL POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE
OF CHILDHOOD (1982). The difference between extending and compressing childhood
is sometimes blurred. As an example, children are sometimes "held back" in school,
not so much to allow them to be children longer, but to strengthen their academic or
physical skills so that they will be mature and thus more competitive in future
grades. See Carol Lawson, Studying Vivaldi and Art, In Diapers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
1989, at Cl (reporting on the drive to improve the academic and athletic prowess of
toddlers).
35. In 1971, the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18. U.S. CONST. amend.
XXVI. Subsequently, 45 states lowered the age of majority to 18. CLARK, supra note
14, § 9.1, at 530.
36. The question is being asked on several fronts. See, e.g., Janet Ainsworth,
Reimagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing
the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1101-04 (1991) (arguing within the context
of criminal law that "the child-adult distinction is a false dichotomy that can no
longer support disparate justice systems").
37. We recognize that "case studies can be misleading for the same reasons they
are revealing. There are no truly representative cases .... [S]ingling out one case
and reporting specific factors about it may encourage unwarranted generalizations,
when in fact its significance can be understood only in terms of its unique configura-
tion of factors." MICHAEL S. WALD ET AL., PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED
CHILDREN 145 (1988). In the present project, we are not offering clinical case studies
so much as presenting vignettes and narratives in order to connect real lives to the
numbers.
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how old? how soon?-and through the accounts of the minors
themselves-how hard? what next? who cares? We include
quotations from emancipated minors not so much to prove
particular substantive points, but rather to convey the tone
and quality of the experiences reported by those for whom the
law was made.3"
Part III then discusses the reasons why emancipation is
sometimes granted to minors who are neither financially, nor
physically, nor emotionally independent from their parents.
Judicial implementation of the process is only one factor
contributing to emancipation's unexpected and unintended
consequences. Other factors include the procedural simplicity
of the emancipation process, the use of legal processes by
families in conflict, 39 popular and official misconceptions
38. We studied emancipation from the primary perspective of emancipated
minors in part because, as Wald and others have pointed out in their study of foster
children, "the child is the best source of information concerning the subjective impact
of separation and living in a new family." Id. at 29. Because emancipated minors
have not only separated from their parents but initiated the separation (at least
officially), they are the best source for recounting both the separation and its
consequences.
39. The identification of emancipation as a mechanism for negotiating family
conflicts reassigns the process from the humdrum regime ofjudicial rubber stamping
to the more complex category of disputing. Many of the issues explored within
sociolegal research on disputing-the identification of a 'triggering event," the role
of third parties (audience, intervenors, supporters), the personality types of the
parties, the nature of the arena, the "rephrasing" of a problem from lay to legal, and
the development of a "dispute trajectory"-also underlay the present study. See
Jeffrey Fitzgerald & Richard Dickins, Disputing in Legal and Nonlegal Contexts:
Some Questions for Sociologists of Law, 15 LAw & Soc. REV. 681 (1981) (summarizing
central themes of sociolegal research on disputing). But the research reported here
differs in an important way from earlier work on dispute development and resolution:
emancipation is not designated within the legal system as a means of dispute
resolution. Although the process is billed as nonadversarial, it is in fact used to
resolve disputes between teenagers and the adults with whom they live. This
suggests a new spin on the use of deliberately accessible legal processes, especially
by intimates. At best, one might see emancipation as a peculiar illustration of the
trend toward informal justice or "delegalization"; it was, after all, enacted to provide
more formal procedure for minors than the discretionary system existing at common
law. See Richard Abel, Informalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law?, 19 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV. 375 (1985). But the consequences of the process are like those
observed in other less formal legal procedures such as divorce mediation: the
powerful, here the parents, can dominate the process.
Even here the emancipation script has a curious twist. Criticism of informal
justice has centered on the ways in which relaxed judicial processes have strength-
ened the hands of the party advantaged at the outset, such as landlords and
divorcing husbands. Emancipation takes the unintended consequences of delegaliza-
tion a step further by benefiting parties (parents) not intended to be much involved
in the process at all, let alone participating with superior position. To the extent an
adversary or opponent was identified by proponents of statutory emancipation,
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about what emancipation does, and the failure to anticipate or
predict the relationship between emancipation and other law
reforms directed at teenagers. Each of these is considered
more fully in Part III to explain why legislation enacted in the
interests of children, like litigation brought on their behalf,4"
does not always work or work as well as intended.4
The predictable upshot of all this might be a call to repeal
the California Emancipation of Minors Act or to drastically
restrict its availability. But that is not our conclusion. Not all
emancipated minors, not even all badly emancipated ones, are
unhappy or unhinged on their own. If the statute is being
used, even crudely, to remedy problems undiscerned or
unattended to by policy makers, attention might be given to
the problems emancipation has been co-opted to solve and to
the availability of other, more fitting solutions. Moreover, we
cannot know if emancipated minors who leave home for the
partial or primary benefit of their parents are less well-off on
their own than they would have been had they remained at
home. We can, however, identify certain ways in which
emancipation unacceptably compromises their interests and
suggest remedies for these unnecessary compromises. This is
the subject of this Article's final section, Part IV.
I. THE CALIFORNIA EMANCIPATION OF MINORS ACT
A. History
1. The Need for Reform-The California Emancipation of
Minors Act was the result of dissatisfaction felt by several San
Francisco public interest lawyers in the late 1970s over
restrictions on minority from the state, not parents, were the problem they sought to
correct. Yet because emancipation is as much about intrafamilial difficulties as about
legal ones, the process uncannily reinforces the power of parents.
40. The complex interrelation of factors at work in test case litigation brought
on behalf of children is examined in the case studies presented in IN THE INTEREST
OF CHILDREN (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985).
41. See WALD ET AL., supra note 37, at 4-6. As Wald explains, policy formation
occurs at two levels: first through the creation of substantive rules; and second, in
the implementation of those rules through formal and informal procedures and
practices. Id. The present study focuses on unintended consequences during the
second, or implementation, phase of legislation.
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persistent and seemingly unnecessary problems faced by
teenage clients on account of their minority.42 The problems
were of two varieties. The first was the minors' inability to
negotiate the basic contracts necessary to maintain their
independent lives, such as contracts for rent, work, or sale.
The second concern was the vulnerability of just being on the
street, a precariousness brought about by the possibility of
being picked up and detained by the police as a person in need
of supervision under California's incorrigibility statute.43
Police in several Bay Area communities were then using the
statute as a general loitering statute; round-ups of teenagers
"hanging out" were not uncommon." As then Youth Law
Center attorney Peter Bull explained, a central motivation in
drafting an emancipation statute was "to get kids out from
under 601. I thought people shouldn't be arrested just for
being a kid standing on a corner." 41
Existing emancipation law and procedures in the mid-1970s
were utterly inadequate to remedy the problems of independ-
ent minors. No statutory guidelines or standards existed to
determine if a minor was "emancipated," and the common law
meaning of emancipation and its consequences was haphazard.
As one California court explained, "The phrase 'emancipation
of a minor', as applied to agreements of parent and child,
appears to have been rather loosely used."46 One explanation
for such "loose use" is that courts have traditionally used the
42. Telephone Interview with Peter Bull, Former Director, National Center for
Youth Law and principal drafter of the Act (July 18, 1989); Telephone Interview with
Peter Behr, former State Senator and sponsor of the Act in the California Legislature
(August 2, 1989).
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 601 (West 1982). In a letter urging former Governor Jerry
Brown to sign the emancipation bill, a juvenile justice task force of social service
providers explained that "[iun our work, we have seen that mature adolescents living
on their own have not been able to conduct the fundamental personal business
necessary to survive. Even minors living away from home with parental consent, for
example, have been held as runaways by police." Letter from Diane Takvorian, Chair
of the Juvenile Justice Task Force, to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. (Sept. 11,
1978) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
44. Telephone Interview with Bernie Bergesen, attorney representing detained
minors in Berkeley, California (Aug. 10, 1989). Such practices are long-standing. See
Note, Curfew Ordinances and the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 107 U. PA. L.
REV. 66, 85-86 (1958); see also Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental
Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1163 (1984)
(criticizing the courts for failing to articulate specific rationales for upholding juvenile
curfew ordinances, while striking down curfews affecting adults).
45. Interview with Peter Bull, supra note 42.
46. County of Alameda v. Kaiser, 48 Cal. Rptr. 343, 344 (Ct. App. 1965).
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doctrine of emancipation not so much to bring about or verify
a child's independence, as to work around other legal doctrines
in which minority was an impediment. The Juvenile Justice
Standards Project explained the effect of such manipulation:
A [judicial] conclusion regarding emancipation may be
made in the course of determining a variety of very
diverse legal issues: notice to parents that a minor is
involved in criminal proceedings; the child's or a third
party's liability for a contract; intrafamily tort immunity;
the scope of parental support obligations; establishment of
residence for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction,
voting, or state benefits such as welfare or state college
admission. Because the courts are looking not to the
meaning of the family's actions in terms of continuing
interdependence but to a desirable result on the merits of
litigation, determinations of emancipation have been
inconsistent and unpredictable.47
County of Alameda v. Kaiser48 demonstrates the problem
well. The issue was whether the emancipation of a minor by
agreement with his mother relieved her of liability for his
support. Twenty-year-old Philip Kaiser (a minor in 1962)
had received medical attention from the county hospital
following a car accident. When the county sued Philip's
mother for reimbursement, she argued that because at the
time of the accident Philip "'was living on his own, apart,
permanently,' ""4 she was not liable for the services provided
to him. The trial court agreed that Philip, who lived with his
aunt, had been "'emancipated', and thus must be treated as
an adult."5" The appellate court reversed, expressing doubts
about the emancipation: "[T]he record does not show the
amount of his earnings or whether [Philip] paid ... for board
or room."5' The court also clarified that "'emancipation' by
agreement [between parent and child] does not terminate the
[child's] right to support."52 As a result, it concluded that
"Philip must be deemed a minor."53
47. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note
24, at 30.
48. 48 Cal. Rptr. 343 (Ct. App. 1965).
49. Id. at 344 (quoting Philip's mother).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 345.
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The reason for Philip's reclassification as a minor is not
clear from the opinion. Was there insufficient proof that he
was living independently (or whatever other unarticulated
standard the court was using to determine Philip's status)?
Or was Philip declared a minor because even if he were eman-
cipated, his mother would be liable for his support so that his
status meant nothing? Or was the court here annoyed that
shortly after the mother had applied for county aid for her
son's hospitalization, she "had withdrawn a large amount
from a bank account not listed in her financial statement"?
54
Thus, while the case clarified certain consequences-parents
are not freed from support obligations by an "emancipation
by agreement"-it added little to what constitutes an
emancipation.
The proposed emancipation legislation sought to remedy the
procedural as well as definitional limitations of common-law
judicial emancipations. Because one limitation of minority is
the inability to bring a legal action on one's own behalf,
minors could not initiate emancipation proceedings. The
legislation removed this procedural obstacle by allowing
minors themselves to petition for emancipation.
2. Legislative History-The emancipation bill, SB 1473,
was introduced by State Senator Peter Behr.55 Its sponsors,
primarily a coalition of private social service agencies for
children and families,56 stressed the need for a clearer and
more available legal mechanism to uncomplicate the lives of
54. Id. at 344.
55.- SB 1473, 1977-78 Reg. Sess., 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 1059. Statutory emancipa-
tion had first been introduced in 1975 by Assemblyman Alan Sieroty as part of a
massive bill, AB 1819, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. (1975), that sought to revise the entire
juvenile court system by consolidating in the juvenile court jurisdiction over minors
'who are truants, runaways, in need of placements outside the home, and who desire
to be judicially declared emancipated." Id.
56. The Enrolled Bill Report from the Department of Health and Welfare
explained that:
[the bill is sponsored by the California Coalition of Child, Youth, and Family
Services .... [which] represents 400 small agencies and individuals.... Many
of the member agencies of the Coalition have independently expressed support.
Further support has been expressed by the State Public Defender, the Youth
Law Center (whose attorney, Peter Bull, drafted the bill), and the California
State PTA.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, REPORT ON ENROLLED SB 1473, at 1 (1978).
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independent, self-supporting minors.57 As Social Advocates
for Youth, Inc. put it:
In this agency we see, from time to time, young people
who are de facto emancipated but who are impaired in
their day to day functioning because their status is not
recognized and clear.... They are teenagers who are
trying to make a life for themselves despite the obstacles
they confront as minors. This legislation would do a great
deal to remove these obstacles and acknowledge that they
are "on their own and making it.""8
Senator Behr detailed the nature of the impairment, explain-
ing that "minors who are technically emancipated often
encounter difficulties in such matters as renting apartments
under their own names or entering into business or retail-
purchase contracts."59 The inadequacies of the existing
emancipation process to remedy such difficulties were under-
stood. The legislature found point blank that "the case law of
this state is unclear as to the definition and consequences of
emancipation of minors." °
The supporting agencies made clear that emancipation
would not benefit all teenagers, but rather the right kind of
teenagers: "Within our experience, requests for emancipation
come from the 'good kids' ..... These minors are usually the
brighter, more industrious self-reliant youngsters who have
matured earlier than the arbitrary eighteen year designation
which serves as the age of majority. Most of these young
people have good relationships with their parents."6  That
57. An additional reason advanced in support of the legislation was the
protection of private sector participants: "[SB 1473] was introduced in order to
provide such minors with a means of obtaining a judicial declaration of their
emancipation which can then be relied upon by the world at large in its dealings with
the minor." ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SB 1473 BILL DIGEST 2 (1978)
[hereinafter BILL DIGEST]. The argument overstated the concern of business. Few
business people or lenders are disadvantaged in their transactions with minors; in
most cases they protect themselves from the possibility of contract avoidance by
requiring adult co-signers.
58. Letter from Mark Pearlman, Executive Director, Social Advocates for Youth,
Inc., to Senator Alfred Song, Chairman of the California Senate Judiciary Committee
(March 16, 1978) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
59. BILL DIGEST, supra note 57, at 2.
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 61 (West 1982).
61. Letter from Linda Gollober, President of Youth Advocates, Inc., to Governor
Jerry Brown 1 (Sept. 4, 1978) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
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emancipation might be used by some young people who did not
have good relationships with their parents-indeed, might be
useful because they did not-was acknowledged by a few of
the agencies." But the general message was that even
where the home situations were "inadequate," the teenagers
were not: "[t]hese are teenagers . . . who have the emotional
and financial capacity to live independently of parental and
state assistance."63
These statements were intended to provide several assur-
ances. First, emancipation would not result in bunches of wild
teenagers being loosed upon the community; these were the
"good kids."' Focusing on the good character of prospective
emancipated minors likely was related to concurrent political
activity in the area of status offenders. 5 In 1977 and 1978,
there was substantial opposition to the deinstitutionalization of
status offenders.66 In addition, public attitudes in California
in the mid-1970s reflected strong law and order preferences,
which extended to those under juvenile court jurisdiction. 7
For example, bills were introduced to try minors as adults, to
require state prison sentences for some minors, and to reduce
the role of probation officers.' Public concern about bad
teenagers being returned to their communities may have made
it particularly important to separate emancipated minors from
the rest of the pack.
62. "[Emancipation] can free a youth from inadequate or irresponsible parents."
Letter from Terry Moriarty, Director, Youth Services, to Senator Alfred Song,
Chairman of the California Senate Judiciary Committee (Feb. 27, 1978) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
63. Letter from Mark Pearlman to Senator Alfred Song, supra note 58, at 1.
Another attorney representing youths who live outside their parents' home noted that
"[w]ithout exception, they have remained in school, some holding a part-time job, and
have no contact with the criminal justice system. They exhibit to me an adult level
of maturity and responsibility." Letter from Neil Gould, Staff Attorney, Solano
County Legal Assistance, to the California Assembly Judiciary Committee (June 23,
1978) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
64. See Letter from Neil Gould to California Assembly Judiciary Committee,
supra note 63.
65. Status offenses are acts for which only minors can be detained.
66. See generally David Steinhart, The Politics of Status Offender Deinstitution-
alization in California, in NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES: STUDIES IN DEINSTITU-
TIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS 784 (Joel F. Handler & Julie Zatz eds., 1982)
[hereinafter NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES].
67. Id. at 797-98 (explaining that dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system
wis sparked in part by several events in 1975: two attempts on Gerald Ford's life
in California, the Patty Hearst trial, the San Quentin Six trial shoot-out, and the
suspension of death row executions by the Supreme Court).
68. Id. at 798.
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The second assurance was that there would not be too many
emancipated minors, even of the good kind: "By all indica-
tions the number of young people who would make use of
SB 1473 is small." 9 One agency estimated that emancipa-
tion would be "an appropriate alternative for about 5% of the
600 youth we serve a year. "70
A third point was that emancipation would not cost the state
any money. Indeed, proponents suggested that emancipation
might save money because as "current law provides no
procedure for emancipation, many of these responsible young
people are placed in extremely expensive foster care situations
until they reach the age of eighteen."71 This last argument
was surprisingly candid and to some extent undercut the "good
kid" message. But mental health professionals knew that
emancipation would be both useful to and used by families for
whom separation between parents and children in conflict was
likely.72 As one agency described, "[i]n the process of provid-
ing [counseling] services situations where an emancipation
process would have been helpful to the resolution of a family
crisis have occurred." 73
The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), concerned with
the integrity of California driver's licenses, raised a meager
69. ASSEMBLY COMMIrrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SB 1473 BILL ANALYSIS 2 (1978).
70. Letter from Terry Moriarty to Senator Alfred Song, supra note 62, at 1.
Youth Advocates, Inc., reported that 4% to 5% of their 11,000 adolescent clients over
eleven years "would have made use of an emancipation procedure if one existed."
Letter from Linda Gollober to Governor Jerry Brown, supra note 61, at 1.
71. Letter from Senator Peter Behr to Governor Jerry Brown 3 (Sept. 8, 1978)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). "Support for this
bill is strong from youth agencies throughout the state who see emancipation as a
viable alternative to providing costly foster care for those responsible minors who, for
a variety of reasons, can no longer remain with their parents." Id. at 2.
72. Letter from Richard Gordon, Coordinator, South County Youth & Family
Services, to Senator Alfred Song (March 21, 1978) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
73. Id. Emancipation statutes in other states have been even more forthright
in identifying and accepting family conflict as a reason to use emancipation. Until
1980, the Connecticut statute, for example, included the irretrievable breakdown of
the parent-child relationship as grounds for emancipation. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-150b historical note (West 1986). The statute now authorizes emancipation
if "for good cause shown, it is in the best interest of either or both parties." Id.
§ 46b-150b(4). The minor may be living independently with or without parental
consent. Id. § 46b-150b(3). The minor or the parent alone can file for emancipation.
Id. § 46b-150. Similarly, in North Carolina the court may consider "the extent of
family discord." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-721(5) (1989). And in Maine a petition can
be filed when a child "refuses to live in the home provided by his parents." ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3506-A(1) (West Supp. 1991).
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opposition to the bill. To provide emancipated minors with a
means of proving their new status,74 an early version of the
bill had provided that the fact of emancipation would be
recorded on a minor's driver's license. The DMV opposed
"placing [any] additional information on the driver's license
that does not relate specifically to the driving privilege."75 In
deference to this objection, the bill was amended so that
emancipated minors would receive a separate emancipation
card, identical in appearance to a driver's license, from the
DMV.
76
The DMV also expressed concern with the expense of
processing declarations of emancipation into its computer
system,77 despite the Department of Finance assessment of
costs to the DMV as "unknown although they should be
minor. " " Potential costs were also noted by the Depart-
ment of Finance which expressed concern that the petitions
could "increase[] workload for the superior courts."79 The
Department admitted, however, that this would occur only if
emancipation were used so widely that additional judges
were required.8 ° Although the Finance staff believed the.
number of petitions could be significantly more than the 200
a year predicted by Senator Behr's office, it conceded that the
costs to the superior courts, like those to the DMV, were
"unknown."8 ' Eventually, both the Department of Finance
and the DMV recommended the bill, and in its final form
"there [was] no known opposition to the bill." 2 The bill
74. The Act would "provide an emancipated minor with documentation of that
fact, which will aid the individual and other persons doing business with the
individual in verifying the legality of transactions." CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL,
REPORT ON ENROLLED SB 1473, at 2 (1978).
75. Letter from Leonard M. Bleier, Legislative Liaison Officer, Cal. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, to Senator Peter Behr 1 (Apr. 18, 1978) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
76. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL NO. 1473 AS AMENDED IN
ASSEMBLY (1978).
77. Letter from Leonard M. Bleier to Senator Peter Behr, supra note 75, at 1.
78. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPORT ON ENROLLED SB 1473, at 2 (1978).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, REPORT ON ENROLLED SB 1473, at
1 (1978). There was one piece of postenactment opposition. The District Attorney of
Sacramento County complained that the Emancipation Act had "[gotten] through
without anyone being aware of its existence or significance." His main concern was
that the Act violated the spirit of Proposition 13, California's voters' tax reform
referendum, by encouraging welfare dependence by "permit[ting] a parent to place
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passed, was signed by Governor Jerry Brown, and went into
effect on January 1, 1979.83
B. Purpose and Procedure
1. Content-The Act establishes three categories of
emancipated minors. The first two, married minors and
minors on active duty in the armed forces,' codify existing
and traditional common law. The third category are minors
emancipated under the Act's new procedures.8 5 All three
categories are premised on a social status inconsistent with
parental control.
Whether the emancipation occurs by reason of marriage,
enlistment, or petition, its consequences are the same." A
Declaration of Emancipation entitles the minor to be treated
as an adult for the following purposes: consenting to medical
his pregnant daughter on welfare and walk away from any responsibility for her
support." The District Attorney therefore urged emergency legislation "to eliminate
welfare dependence as a method of managing one's own financial affairs ... under
[section] 62(c). . . ." Letter from John M. Price, Sacramento County District Attorney,
to Allen Sumner, Office of the Governor 1 (Dec. 26, 1978) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Although the Act provided from the outset that
statutory emancipation created no eligibility for public benefits other than those the
minor might already be entitled to, CAL. CIV. CODE § 67 (West 1982), in response to
the kind of concern raised by the District Attorney, the Act was amended in 1983 to
require notice to the District Attorney of all emancipations. CAL. CIv. CODE § 64(b)
historical & statutory notes (West Supp. 1992).
83. 1978 Cal. Stat. 1059.
84. CAL. CIrV. CODE § 62(a), (b) (West 1982).
85. Id. § 62(c). Other states use different terms. In Michigan, this category is
called "emancipation by court order"; marriage and enlistment produce "emancipation
by operation of law." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.4 (West Supp. 1991).
86. While the consequences of emancipation from whatever source are uniform,
statutory emancipation differs from emancipation by marriage or enlistment in two
regards. First, no parental permission is required when a minor petitions for
emancipation on the new statutory grounds but parental permission is necessary for
a minor to marry or to enlist. 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (1988); CAL. CIrV. CODE § 4101(b)
(West 1988). A second difference is permanence. Statutorily emancipated minors
remain emancipated unless they petition for rescission on the grounds that they have
become indigent or the emancipation is set aside on the grounds of fraud. Id. § 65(c).
Minors emancipated by marriage or enlistment, on the other hand, have sometimes
reverted to minority status when the marriage or enlistment ended before their
reaching the age of majority. See Fauser v. Fauser, 271 N.Y.S.2d 59, 61 (1966)
(stating that the question of whether, for purposes of support payments, son remains
emancipated after discharge from military depends on whether he returns to parental
control). But see Meyer v. Meyer, 493 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that
a subsequent divorce of a minor girl does not reinstate father's support obligation).
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care; entering contracts; suing and being sued; ending paren-
tal support; controlling earnings; establishing a residence;
dealing in real property; obtaining a work permit; ending
parental vicarious liability; enrolling in school; owning stock;
buying insurance; making a will or an estate plan; creating or
revoking a trust; and authorizing other probate and estate-
related activities.87
Certain of these acts, such as suing (particularly one's
parents) and taking control of earnings (particularly from
one's parents), codified the kinds of protections typically
sought in the earlier, single-purpose, judicial emancipations.
Others, such as consenting to medical care, broadened certain
rights already granted to unemancipated minors in other code
sections. For example, while an unemancipated minor in
California could consent to birth control services without
parental permission,8 her authority to make health care
decisions was not coextensive with an adult's. She could not,
for example, consent to an abortion without parental involve-
ment.89 Emancipation is thus one method, if a drastic one,
to overcome limitations on a minor's medical decision-making
authority.
By consolidating, codifying, and extending authority,
emancipation removes a fairly comprehensive bundle of civil
disabilities based on minority. Its purpose is to enable
emancipated minors to function as adults in the central
avenues of daily life without parental consent, notification, or
participation. ° To be sure, emancipated minors are not
87. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 63, 63.1, 63.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992). As the California
Law Revision Commission explained in recommending the additions, "[t]he existing
rule precluding an emancipated minor from making a will is particularly undesirable
... where a minor becomes emancipated as a result of a valid marriage." CALIFORNIA
LAW REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO EMANCIPATED MINORS
188 (1982). In such a case, the minor's spouse would take the estate only if a long
list of immediate blood relatives had predeceased. Id.
88. CAL. CIv. CODE § 34.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
89. Id.
90. The states differ in the degree to which emancipated minors are freed from
such ties to parents. In Oregon, for example, emancipated minors are not given the
power to obtain work permits and driver's licenses without parental consent, two areas
closely related to the ability to support oneself. See OR. REV. STAT. § 109.555(1), (2)
(1987). One commentator, alert to the familial tensions commonly underlying the
emancipation decision, was concerned with the possibility that parents might withhold
such consent. "[Wihere the parent-child relationship is strained before emancipation,
... it is unrealistic to expect that a child will be able to obtain consent to work from
a parent, and without a work permit it is unlikely that an emancipated child will be
able to remain self-sufficient for long." Karen M. Holt, Recent Developments,
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completely adults. The Enrolled Bill Report emphasized that
"[b]y limiting the list to these [eleven] purposes, several other
provisions of law treating such persons as minors would
continue."9 Emancipated minors who commit criminal acts,
for example, remain within juvenile court jurisdiction, a
limitation which surprised and disappointed several minors in
the present study.92 Minority status is also officially retained
for purposes of school attendance laws, laws restricting the
purchase and possession of alcohol, and application of certain
child labor laws. 3 Nevertheless, taken in its entirety,
statutory emancipation recognizes substantial autonomy in
spheres both economic (ownership rights, contractual capacity)
and familial (ending parental duties of support control).
2. Process-The minor begins the emancipation process
by filing a "Petition for Declaration of Emancipation of
Minor" with the superior court in the county where he or she
resides. 94 A filing fee (of between $100 and $140 in the Bay
Area Counties) must accompany the petition unless the court
waives the fee.95 On the Petition the minor verifies the four
Emancipation: New Legislation for Oregon's Children, 57 OR. L. REV. 573, 576
(1978). Our findings suggest this is an unlikely outcome. Rather than thwart the
child's ability to live independently, parents seem willing to facilitate emancipation.
See infra notes 160, 175-79 and accompanying text.
91. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, REPORT ON ENROLLED SB 1473, at
3 (1978). But see Gore v. Stowe, 231 Cal. Rptr. 492 (Ct. App. 1986). Gore was
emancipated at age 17. Two weeks later she was hit by a car. She did not bring an
action until 15 months after the accident, three months after the statute of limita-
tions had expired. Gore argued that she could still claim the disability of minority,
tolling the statute of limitations until she was 18 years of age. The court disagreed:
"[Emancipation] removes the disability of minority for the purposes stated in the Act,
but it also burdens the emancipated minor with new disabilities, which he shares
with other adults. These include being subject to the statute of limitations when
filing a lawsuit." Id. at 494.
92. See infra notes 136, 146-48 and accompanying text. The only juvenile court
jurisdiction removed by the Act other than that for status offenses is that based on
abuse and neglect. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 63(c) (West Supp. 1992).
93. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, REPORT ON ENROLLED SB 1473, at
3 (1978).
94. CAL. CIV. CODE § 64(a) (West 1982). Identifying the county of residence is
sometimes manipulated by canny minors or their advisors. For example, a minor
living in a county where declarations of emancipation are infrequently given, such as
San Francisco County, may file and claim residence with his parents in a county
where emancipations are more liberally granted. Indeed, attorneys aware of this
study have called the first author to ask whether one or another county would be
more advantageous for purposes of obtaining an emancipation.
95. Telephone Interview with Shannan Wilbur, Director, Legal Advocates for
Children and Youth of Santa Clara County (March 20, 1992). In San Mateo County
the filing fee is $118 and in Santa Clara County, $127. LEGAL SERVICES FOR
CHILDREN, INC., EMANCIPATION MANUAL 66 app. C at 68 (1991) [hereinafter
EMANCIPATION MANUAL].
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statutory prerequisites: being at least fourteen,96 willingly
living apart from one's parents with their consent or acquies-
cence,97 managing one's own financial affairs,9 and having
an income not derived from criminal activities. 99 Finally,
the minor affirms on the petition that emancipation "would
not be contrary to my best interests."100
Parental involvement is required only to the extent that
parents must be given notice of the petition before it is
heard.' By signing a separate section of the petition,
parents, however, may waive their right to further notice and
consent to the emancipation without a hearing. 102 Notice to
parents also can be excused for a reason set out by the minor,
most commonly that the parents' address is unknown.1 3
Once satisfied that notice to parents or guardians has been
given, waived, or excused, the court may issue the declaration
of emancipation if it finds that the minor has met the four
statutory requirements and that "emancipation would not be
contrary to the best interests of the minor."0 4 The court
may decide the statutory issues on the basis of the petition
alone; no evidentiary hearing or probation department report
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 64(a)(1) (West 1982). Only California explicitly authorizes
emancipation for 14-year-olds; the minimum age in all other states is 16. See ALASKA
STAT. § 09.55.590(a) (1983); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-26-104(a) (Michie 1991); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-150 (West 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-15.7 (West Supp. 1991);
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, para. 2203-1 (Smith-Hurd 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-109
(1986); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 3991-3994 (West 1961 & Supp. 1992); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3506-A(1) (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.4c(2)(b) (West Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-408(1) (1985); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 129.080 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-6-4 (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-717 (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 91 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.565(1) (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-31-01 to -105 (1980); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 31.01(2) (West 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-331 (Michie 1950); W. VA. CODE
§ 49-7-27 (1986).
97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 64(a)(2) (West 1982). The term "acquiescence" was included
in the legislation to cover cases where the minor had moved out and, while the
parents had not exactly consented, they had made no effort to have the child return
home. Interview with Peter Bull, supra note 42. A parent who refuses to let the
teenager live outside the family home can, in effect, prevent an emancipation by
thwarting one of its required conditions.
98. CAL. CIV. CODE § 64(a)(3) (West 1982).
99. Id. § 64(a)(4).
100. Id. app. § 64.
101. Id. § 64(b).
102. Id. app. § 64.
103. Id. § 64(b).
104. Id. § 64(c). If the court denies the petition, the minor can petition for a writ
of mandate. Id. § 64(e). If the court approves a petition over the opposition of
parents, the parents may petition for a writ of mandate. Id. § 64(f).
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is required by the statute. 0 5 After the judge signs the
declaration, the newly emancipated minor applies to the
DMV for a special identification card to use as proof of
emancipation.
0 6
The California emancipation process relies on three
assumptions. It assumes that emancipation is legitimizing,
child-initiated, and nonadversarial.
10 7
a. Legitimizing-Emancipation was intended to conform
a minor's legal status to his actual independence. The statute
states that the process was enacted so that "emancipated
minors can obtain an official declaration of their status,"0 8
a status predicated on the minor's "liv[ing] separate and
apart" from parents and "managing his or her own financial
affairs."0 9 Thus legal emancipation was intended to recog-
nize and validate, but not to create, physical and financial
independence between minor and parents."0
b. Child-initiated-In California only a minor-not
parents or the state-can petition for emancipation."' The
restriction has procedural and substantive importance. First,
the minor alone initiates the formal process. To facilitate
this, the Legislature instructed that emancipation proceedings
"be as simple and inexpensive as possible" and asked the
Judicial Council "to prepare ... appropriate forms ...
suitable for use by minors acting as their own counsel."" 2
105. Id. § 64(c). Compare this with the emancipation statute of Virginia, which
provides that the court may require a social service investigation and report. VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-332 (Michie 1988).
The failure to authorize social service reporting as a required part of the California
process was deliberate. The attorneys who drafted the legislation disapproved of the
San Francisco Probation Department's treatment of minors with regard to other
juvenile proceedings. They intended the emancipation process to work unimpeded by
a hostile agency. Interview with Peter Bull, supra note 42.
106. CAL. CIv. CODE § 64(d) (West 1982); Bull, supra note 10, at 251. The DMV
then registers the emancipation in its law enforcement computer network.
107. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 61 (West 1982) (emphasis added).
109. Id. § 64(a).
110. See id. § 64. Not all states follow this approach. In several states, legal
emancipation can create or authorize the physical independence of a minor. In
Indiana, for example, a child can be emancipated who "wishes to be free from parental
control and protection." IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-16 (West 1979) (emphasis added).
In such states the requirements for emancipation are future-oriented; the child must
have "an acceptable plan for independent living," rather than declare or prove such
independence already exists. See id.
111. CAL. CIV. CODE § 64(a) (West 1982). In contrast, Connecticut authorizes
either the minor or parent or guardian to petition for a determination of emanci-
pation. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-150 (West 1986).
112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 70 (West 1982).
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The Judicial Council complied, and like the old Castro
convertible couches, emancipation was made "so easy, even a
child can do it." The Petition requires the minor to write his
name, address, county, and the date he began living in the
county.113 The rest of the form, except for the minor's signa-
ture, is completed by checking boxes. 1
The second aspect of the term "child-initiated" is that
emancipation is for the benefit of the minor. The fact that it
is the child who files, the child who is empowered by the
statute, makes this not merely a procedural rule. It conveys
something of substance: that emancipation is initiated by the
child, for the child. The idea-at least in theory-is that in
deciding to become emancipated, the minor's interests will be
uppermost in his mind and his interests therefore will
dominate the proceedings.
c. Nonadversarial-Emancipation is a nonadversarial
process. It appears overtly uncontentious. The minor files a
petition, not a complaint. No lawyers are required. If the
petition is signed by both parents and the child, no hearing is
required. While parents may oppose the proposed emancipa-
tion, they rarely do. In our study parents had signed, and
thus consented to, each of ninety petitions filed over a two-
year period. These numbers seem to support the notion that
emancipation reflects a mutual, cooperative decision agreed to
by parents and teenager.
So much for legislative intentions. The next section exam-
ines the extent to which these three intended characteristics
of the emancipation process-legitimizing, child-initiated,
and nonadversarial-are reflected in real life. The section
examines the ways in which the emancipation process
actually is implemented by courts and the ways it is experi-
enced by minors.
II. THE STUDY
The immediate purpose of this study was to understand the
operation of the statutory emancipation process in people's
lives. Because only skeletal demographic information-the
113. Id. app. § 64.
114. Id.
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petitioner's age, address, and the parents' address-is avail-
able from the petitions themselves, and because no written
decisions or memoranda accompany the court's declarations,
information about why minors become emancipated seemed
most sensibly obtained by talking to the minors themselves.
This section first describes the study's design and method-
ology. Particular attention is given to problems encountered
and tactical decisions made on such practical matters as
choosing jurisdictions and locating members of a highly mobile
class of subjects.
Part B presents our central findings. The data are organized
around the trio of characteristics introduced earlier: emancipa-
tion as legitimizing, child-initiated, and nonadversarial. It
suggests that in few cases do these characteristics accurately
describe the process of emancipation as experienced by the
minors interviewed. To be sure, in some cases emancipation
was chosen by the kind of independent, capable teenagers
originally envisioned by the drafters. In these cases, emanci-
pation advanced the minors' interests by making the negotia-
tion of independent life easier. But while some minors-four
out of eighteen-were doing very well, other participants were
not, their lives marked by a precarious dependence on welfare
and nonparental adults for income, housing, and emotional
support.
A. Methodology and Design
1. Selecting the Jurisdiction-Strategies for locating
participants began in the courthouses of six counties in the
San Francisco Bay Area. The authors made initial investiga-
tions in San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Alameda,
Santa Cruz, and Napa Counties. The investigations began
with a "walk-through" of the different courthouses as we
sought to replicate the steps a minor seeking emancipation
would follow: Where are the forms? Who do you ask to find
out? What do you do with completed forms? We also investi-
gated the availability of emancipation files in each of the six
counties. The information in this section is drawn from these
early investigations.
To begin with, disparities in the availability of records
uncovered during the initial archival phase revealed wide
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differences in procedures among the counties, differences
that resulted in significant variations in the numbers of
emancipation petitions filed and the numbers granted.
Comparisons of several Bay Area counties illustrate the
connections between emancipation procedure and its avail-
ability. An initial problem, the confidentiality of emanci-
pation records, relates both to practical access to files115 and
to conceptual tension regarding the status of emancipated
minors. Is an emancipated minor a child or an adult for
purposes of privacy of records? In San Francisco County,
emancipation petitions are considered confidential juvenile
records, available only upon court order. In contrast, most
other counties include emancipation records among all other
publicly available civil pleadings.
The counties also differed in their implementation of the
emancipation process. San Francisco County has consoli-
dated most county services for children in one location, the
Youth Guidance Center. The Center is physically separate
and distant from City Hall where all other non-juvenile
courts and court services are. Until the San Francisco
procedures were recently changed,"' a minor seeking
emancipation who could find her way to the Youth Guidance
Center".7 was referred by the clerk there to a social worker
who interviewed, advised, and screened the minor for
"suitability," something different from eligibility. The minor
was informed that the court in San Francisco required a
probation department report on her life situation and that
petitions were rarely granted. Few minors continued the
process after the interview with the social worker. The few
petitions that were filed were assigned to the Family Law
Division of the Superior Court.
115. A second technical problem was literally finding the emancipation petitions
within the filing systems of the various courts. In Alameda County, for example,
emancipation petitions are not distinguished by case caption or in any other way from
other civil pleadings. Because finding emancipation petitions in Alameda would have
required looking at every civil filing, we abandoned the county. In other counties,
emancipations were designated by an "E" as part of a civil action number. This made
locating emancipation petition file numbers somewhat easier; once the civil action
numbers were identified the files could be pulled. In only two of the six Bay Area
counties were the pleadings computerized. While this system would have made the
archival work simpler, these counties were geographically distant, and would have
made finding and traveling to the minors more expensive and time-consuming.
116. The process described here was in effect at the time our data were collected.
117. One source of referral to the Youth Guidance Center was Legal Services for
Children, a public interest law firm representing children.
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In Santa Clara County, by contrast, emancipation petitions
are available from the regular office of the clerk of the court
along with all other standard legal forms. 118 At the time of
this study, minors were not screened, interviewed, advised, or
referred to any other agency or department; they simply were
handed the forms." 9 The petitions were assigned to the Law
and Motion calendar, the division of the Superior Court which
rules on all civil pre-trial motions. 21 Petitions were calen-
dared immediately and generally heard within a week of filing.
As a result of these differing procedures, five petitions for
emancipation were filed in San Francisco County between 1981
and 1986; three were granted. The probation reports filed on
the three successful minors made clear that they exceeded the
minimum requirements of the statute.' 2' In Santa Clara
County, on the other hand, thirty petitions for emancipation
were filed in 1985 alone; all were granted.
The disparity in the number of emancipations granted in
neighboring counties might indicate varying demands for
emancipation from county to county. But over one-third of all
calls received by Legal Services for Children in San Francisco
are from teenagers from the Bay Area wanting to know how to
become emancipated. 22  This suggests an even greater
demand for emancipation in San Francisco and the surround-
ing areas. The needs of counties also may explain the differ-
ences in volume and outcome. The San Francisco model, for
example, worked as a disincentive to prevent the already
attractive city from becoming an even greater lure to runaway
children, who then may require public shelter and other
services. Because emancipated minors cannot be returned to
their parents, the city cannot seek parental reimbursement for
their care in already crowded shelters.'23
118. Even this more open system requires some degree of savvy or persistence.
Most of the courthouses we visited had signs above clerks' counters indicating which
forms were available from which counter (Divorce, Real Estate, Name Change). None
listed Emancipation.
119. The principal difference now is that the clerk requires the signatures of the
parents to be notarized. EMANCIPATION MANUAL, supra note 95, at 68-69.
120. Emancipation proceedings have since been moved from Law and Motion to
Probate in Santa Clara County. Interview with Judge Donald Clark, Law and Motion
Division, in Santa Clara, Cal. (Mar. 20, 1992).
121. The petitions were obtained through a court order authorizing their release
for research purposes.
122. Interview with Marta Vides, former Managing Attorney, Legal Services for
Children, in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 16, 1988); Telephone Interview with Shannan
Wilbur, supra note 95.
123. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 63(c) (West Supp. 1992).
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Issues regarding the impact of comparative implementation
practices are intriguing and must be considered for a more
complete understanding of the emancipation process. We
chose, however, in this phase of our investigation, to focus on
counties in which access to the emancipation process was open;
that is, where no additional requirements such as screening
interviews or probation reports are added to those provided for
in the statute. In these counties, the factors inspiring deci-
sions to petition for emancipation had maximum opportunity
to operate and thus could be more easily observed.124 We
selected Santa Clara and San Mateo Counties, jurisdictions in
which emancipation petitions were granted as a matter of
course.
2. Locating Participants-After obtaining the ninety
petitions, we began an extensive, systematic process to find the
petitioners. We first sent a letter describing the study and
requesting a confidential interview to each minor at his or her
custodial parent's address as stated in the petition.125 A few
days after the letters were mailed, the project interviewer, a
savvy young woman who was a licensed marriage and family
counselor and a third-year law student, telephoned each minor
at the phone number listed on the petition. If the interviewer
learned that the minor was no longer at that number, she next
called either the number given to her by the person who
answered the initial call or called the parents' home telephone
number. If the minor was not available at the second tele-
phoned location, the interviewer asked for another number at
which the minor might be reached-a work phone, a friend's
house, or a new number, and this process of telephoning
continued until either she made contact or ran out of sugges-
tions and still was unable to find the minor.
From the ninety petitions filed in a two-year period, we
located eighteen minors. The relatively small number of
124. The counties also are similar in demographic factors. THE STANFORD CENTER
FOR THE STUDY OF FAMILIES, CHILDREN, AND YOUTH, THE STANFORD STUDIES OF
HOMELESS FAMILIES, CHILDREN, AND YOUTH 11, fig. 3 (1991) [hereinafter THE
STANFORD STUDIES].
125. Our decision to contact the child rather than the parent was based on pilot
interviews where the hint of tension between adolescent and parents suggested that
the minors might not participate if parents were identified as "on our side." The
letter sent to each minor is attached as Appendix A. If the letter was returned or no
response was received within 10 days, a similar letter was sent to the minor's
parent(s), which described briefly our research interest and requested their child's
new address. There were no responses to these second mailings.
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minors located was disappointing but no surprise. 12  Fifteen
letters sent to the parents' addresses were returned to us
unopened, and a few had hostile comments written on the
outside ("Wouldn't tell you where he is if I knew"). From the
information available from the petitions, we know that the
minors we could not find mirrored the same ratio of girls to
boys and were of the same median age as the minors inter-
viewed. We also know that the interview participants were the
most locatable among the petitioners. It therefore may be
reasonable to assume that those interviewed were better off
because they at least had sufficient connection to the commu-
nity to have a network of friends, family, or co-workers who
knew their telephone numbers or addresses.
While the number of participants located was small, every
minor contacted agreed to participate. The low ratio of minors
interviewed to petitions filed may reflect the difficulty in
locating these minors, but it does not reflect difficulty in
obtaining cooperation. 127 Moreover, despite the small size of
the sample, a number of steady themes emerged from the
stories told.
3. The Interviews-During the initial telephone conversa-
tion with the minor the interviewer reviewed our general
research interests and requested an appointment for an hour-
long, taped interview. She explained that the tape would not
be given to anyone other than research staff and that the
minor would not be identified in any report of the
research. 12  All eighteen minors contacted made and kept
interview appointments.
The actual interviews were held in two kinds of locations,
either the minor's room or apartment or, more frequently, a
relatively quiet corner of a nearby fast-food restaurant-Denny's
126. The Stanford Center for the Study of Families, Children, and Youth
encountered similar problems in attempting to locate and interview homeless youth
in Santa Clara and San Mateo counties in 1990-1991. THE STANFORD STUDIES, supra
note 124, app. 1 at 41 (obtaining only 26 interviews of homeless street youth over a
year-long period). See also Eloise Dunlap et al., Studying Crack Users and Their
Criminal Careers, 17 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 121 (1990) (discussing problems of
interviewing and techniques for locating hard-to-reach subjects).
127. When the searches reached dead ends it was never because someone refused
to come to the phone but because the trail to the person had ended. If we had been
able to offer a $25 stipend for participating in the interview, perhaps the response
would have increased. We doubt this is the case, although we wish we had been able
to pay the participants something for their time.
128. In this Article the minors have been assigned and are referred to by fictitious
first names. Transcripts of the interviews are on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform.
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in San Jose was the favorite. Prior to the formal interview,
the interviewer again explained the procedure for audiotaping,
for transcribing, and for maintaining confidentiality. These
provisions were summarized in an informed consent form
which all the participants signed. In addition to taping the
discussions, the interviewer made notes of nonverbal behavior,
such as crying or laughter.
Each interview lasted between one and two hours. The
interviewer followed a semi-structured interview procedure,
working from a specific set of questions arranged in a
sequence. When the respondents' conversation moved sponta-
neously to a later topic or when the interviewer judged it
advantageous for rapport, she varied the order of questions.
She also gave encouraging responses and made small talk as
needed to maintain a comfortable atmosphere with each
participant.
Due to the nature of the experiences discussed, many
participants became unsettled during the interviews. Three
cried. In each such case, the interviewer spent considerable
time with the tape recorder turned off in order to help the
participant regain emotional control. In several instances, she
referred participants to places where they could find free
counseling services, health care, or support groups. At the end
of each interview, the interviewer continued talking with the
participant to restore a friendly but less intimate atmosphere.
She reminded all participants of her phone number on their
consent form and invited them to call if they had any ques-
tions or concerns. None of the participants contacted the
interviewer after the interview.
The interview questions covered five general areas: (1) the
minor's decision to seek emancipation (learning about and
choosing emancipation); (2) the emancipation process itself
(logistics and other details of becoming emancipated such as
getting forms, paying the fee, getting to court, and seeing the
judge); (3) the family climate before and at the time of
emancipation, including the extent and management of
conflict, communication patterns, and emotional and practical
support for the minor; (4) the consequences of emancipation
for the minor; and (5) the minor's evaluation of the legal
process.
129
129. The question guide is found at Appendix B. The interview transcripts were
coded by Eleanor Willemsen and her research assistant Lane Scott. Dr. Willemsen
is a psychology professor with training and extensive experience in interview-based
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B. Findings
1. Description of Participants and Their Families-
Eighteen minors, eleven girls and seven boys, were inter-
viewed. 3 ° This ratio mirrored the ratio of girls to boys in
the larger group of ninety. The minors' ages at the time of
filing for emancipation ranged from fifteen to seventeen,
although most were close to their seventeenth birthdays.'3 '
With the exception of one Pakistani immigrant, the partici-
pants were white. 3 2  The socioeconomic status of the par-
ticipants' parents ranged from very poor (one was a single,
nonworking mother) to affluent (dual professional couples).
Eight fathers (whether custodial or not) had work requiring a
college degree and ten had work of a blue-collar or shop-
keeping nature. The parents of twelve participants were
research. Mr. Scott was a senior honors student in psychology trained by Dr.
Willemsen. A coding booklet permitted the coders to summarize the data in the
interviews with respect to a number of variables ranging from factual information
(e.g., age, parents' marital status, people living in the family home) to presence-
absence categories to five-point ratings representing coder inferences. The two coders
first coded each transcript separately and then met to discuss it. Agreement between
the two was excellent (varying between 15 and 18 agreements for cases) for both
factual matters and for variables involving small numbers of categories. For the
latter variables, disagreements were used as the basis for revising the rating scales
and recoding. Eventually each participant was assigned a category or score for each
coded variable which represented either the consensus of the two coders after
conference (categorical variables) or the average of the two coders' ratings after the
second round of coding (quantitative variables). Summary statistics are based on
these final consensus scores. The six broad categories for coded variables mirrored
the six general question area categories.
130. In addition to the 18 minors interviewed, we include information concerning
the highly publicized emancipation of Tiffany, a "pop music mini-star" created by
agents who decided that the "millions of young and pre-teen girls who stalk the
nation's shopping malls had no role model younger than Madonna, now 29." Dennis
McDougal, Tiffany: The $5-Million Star of Stage and Court, L.A. TIMES, June 12,
1988 (Calendar) at 6, 7. While Tiffany's case appeared more glamorous and dramatic
because it was formally opposed by her mother, the issues of parental control and
authority underlying her emancipation were not unlike those of the more ordinary
minors we studied. Emancipation may be of particular use to professional children
who are more likely to have independent incomes. For example, at age 15, actress
Juliette Lewis "went to court to be designated in legal terms, an emancipated minor
so she could get her own apartment in Hollywood and devote herself to full time
acting." Sara Rimer, The Lonely Lolita of 'Cape Fear,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1991, § 2,
at 13.
131. This was also the most common age of the petitioners we were unable to find.
132. The racial demography of Santa Clara and San Mateo Counties is 70% non-
Hispanic White; 20% Hispanic; 4% African-American; and 6% other. THE STANFORD
STUDIES, supra note 124, at 11, fig. 3.
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divorced and one participant had a widowed mother. Five
participants had at least one remarried parent. All of the
participants with divorced but not remarried parents had at
least one parent with what the minor referred to as a boy-
friend or girlfriend. Two girls were adopted. At least one-
third of the participants had lived away from home-in foster
care, with friends, in juvenile hall, in a park"3 -at least
once prior to the departure associated with emancipation. Of
these, four had lived away from home two or more times
before emancipation.
Fourteen of the eighteen had dropped out of high school as
a consequence of becoming emancipated; one of these later
received a high school equivalency certificate. Five had jobs
at the time of the interview; the rest were unemployed. The
minors had a variety of living arrangements, with spouses,
friends, in-laws, and relatives, including parents. One
woman was receiving welfare.' One of the participants
told us of his arrest record. Two girls reported sexual abuse,
one by a stepfather, the other by a cousin. Three of the
eleven girls were either pregnant or had had a child prior to
their emancipations.
2. The Decision to Become Emancipated-As discussed
earlier, the emancipation process is intended to be child-
initiated in both letter and spirit. Granting this authority to
teenagers is not just a technicality. Like other legal proce-
dures that give rights to one party and not to another,
designating the minor as petitioner evinces a confidence in his
independent judgment. It assumes that the minor wants to be
emancipated, that he has calculated emancipation to be
advantageous to him.
The interview data challenge the operation of this principle
by revealing an unexpected level of adult participation in
almost all aspects of the decision-making process. While a
majority of the minors (thirteen out of eighteen) stated that the
decision to become emancipated was theirs, the data presented
in this section suggest that their responses are qualified by
later statements concerning how they found out about emanci-
pation, why they did it, and how they went about it.
133. One minor reported that she had been kicked out of the house because "my
stepfather and I got into an argument. So I ended up living in a park for three days
and a friend of mine offered me, if I'd be willing to share a motel room and I said
yeah. That way I could shower.' Interview with Jane 1.
134. This was the only emancipated minor of the 90 files studied whose petition
was rescinded. The grounds for the rescission were her receipt of public assistance.
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a. Initial Information about Emancipation-Two-thirds
of the participants reported that they learned about emancipa-
tion from adults. The adults included parents and step-
parents, boyfriends, teachers, counselors, social workers,
probation officers, and police. One participant learned about
emancipation from a movie; another knew about it "U]ust from
general knowledge, reading the paper, things like that."
135
Police or corrections personnel were the source of emancipa-
tion information in several instances. One officer recom-
mended emancipation to a minor who was already under
arrest and eager to avoid further dealings with the juvenile
court. 136 Another participant called the police to report that
her mother's boyfriend had hit her; the responding officer
suggested that:
I might consider becoming emancipated, and I said, "Well,
what's that?" And he explained that I would be able to
live my own life; my mother wouldn't, you know, wouldn't
be in charge. And I don't know, it seemed like a good
idea.3 7
Other adults "in the system," such as school or group home
counselors, sometimes initiated the idea of emancipation. For
example, one participant whose residence with a friend made
her ineligible for school attendance in her school district
explained that:
[O]ne of my counselors at school suggested [emancipation].
Said that it needed to be done in order to stay in
school. 3
8
135. Interview with Brian 1.
136. The officer's information was wrong; emancipation does not promote a minor
out of the juvenile justice system. See supra note 10. We focus here not on the
accuracy of what participants were told about emancipation, but rather on who
provided the information.
137. Interview with Judy 1. The girl did not press charges against her mother's
boyfriend because "I decided that I better not because I did have a little brother and
the officer said that he would probably be put in a foster home temporarily. But I did
file a report in case it ever happened again." Id. at 5.
138. Interview with Ann 1. Unfortunately, "by the time it [emancipation] was
finally able to be done, I had dropped out by then." Id.
272
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Several others learned about emancipation from counselors
while living at the Bill Wilson Youth Center, a residential
center in San Jose.
139
But parents were the primary source of emancipation
information. We learned this not only from the interviews, but
also from Legal Services for Children. 4 ° Legal Services for
Children estimated that nearly half the calls they receive for
information about emancipation come from parents wanting to
know how to go about emancipating their teenagers.' 4 '
b. Reasons for Becoming Emancipated-The concept of
a child-initiated process is not necessarily contradicted by the
fact that most of the participants initially learned about
emancipation from adults. Along with television and peers,
adults are a major source of information for teenagers. Many
of the adults introduced the idea of emancipation as a possible
solution to a variety of problems faced by the minors such as
school residency requirements, stopping domestic violence,
moving out of a tense family situation, or getting a scholar-
ship. But not all motivations for becoming emancipated were
child-centered. In addition to removing obstacles imposed by
the state on account of minority, minors' reasons for seeking
emancipation fell into two other categories: freedom from
parental control and meeting a range of parental objectives.
(1) Removing Legal Obstacles-The removal of the legal
disabilities caused by minority was the category minors
mentioned most frequently. This was exactly the kind of
problem the California legislature sought to cure in passing
the Emancipation of Minors Act in the first place: minors
acting as adults should not be limited by a legal status they
have outgrown.'42 Two of the participants, both male, fit
this prototype exactly. The first, who worked as a strutter
operator, was absolutely clear why he became emancipated:
At the job they were going to go to twelve hour shifts and
nobody under seventeen can work twelve hour shifts by
139. Many status offenders are placed at the Bill Wilson Center. The overlap in
populations between status offenders and emancipated minors is developed further
infra notes 347-53 and accompanying text.
140. Telephone Interview with Chris Wu, Director, Legal Services for Children
(March 27, 1992).
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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law, so I got emancipated to work those hours.... That
was the only reason I got emancipated.
14 3
The second young man, aged seventeen, was in a business
partnership with a forty-two-year-old man. His reasons for
becoming emancipated were also clear-cut:
No one really recommended [emancipation], it was me, I
needed to legally make a contract or any kind of business,
I needed to be eighteen. And I was going into business at
seventeen and that isn't really legal. My signature wasn't
binding, [the decision] was more of a technicality of
business....
... Going into business, getting my driver's license, and
all these things that took binding signature and the fact
that at the time I lived quite a ways from my parents, like
an hour, it's far, especially on a business day, and I had a
hard time catching them. And a lot of times it is inconve-
nient to go and get a form from somewhere, drive across
town and get it signed and get back.'44
In addition to removing restrictions on working and contract-
ing, emancipation also removes time and place restrictions on
a minor's whereabouts. Being stopped by the police for a
curfew violation was the triggering event for one participant,
who was then living alone in an apartment with his parents'
permission. He recalled,
I guess [the police officer] tried to say I was a runaway or
something.... [I]t was late at night, it was far after
curfew. I go, you can call my parents but they aren't
going to be too happy about it. 14 5
In many cases, the kinds of legal disabilities the participants
sought to remove were not in fact cured by emancipation. Two
disappointments prevailed. The first was emancipation's
failure to remove the minor from juvenile court jurisdiction.
While an emancipated minor is not subject to the juvenile
143. Interview with Tim 1.
144. Interview with Brendan 1, 12.
145. Interview with Brian 18.
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court for status offenses, juvenile court jurisdiction is retained
for criminal offenses. 4" Many of the participants were quite
annoyed by this exception:
[L]ike I told you before, the main thing I was trying to
protect myself by getting emancipated, in case I get
arrested I don't want ... to have to go back and put up
with this juvenile bullshit anymore. 147
Well, in my opinion being an emancipated minor meant
instead of going to juvie, you would go to jail.'48
Perceived disadvantages of"juvie" or juvenile hall included the
inability to be released on bail and the unfairness of being
treated as a juvenile for purposes of incarceration, but not for
liability for medical expenses incurred while incarcerated.
The second common misunderstanding concerned the ability
to get a driver's license without a parent's signature. The
purpose of the parental signature is to make parents liable for
the negligent driving of their children. The Emancipation Act
provides that emancipated minors shall be treated as adults
"for the purpose of ending all vicarious liability" of their
parents.'49  There is, however, an important exception:
"[N]othing in this section shall affect any liability of a parent
... imposed by the Vehicle Code, or any vicarious liability
which arises from an agency relationship." ° The Vehicle
Code states that whoever signs the minor's license application
shares liability for the minor's negligence in driving.' 5 '
Thus, an emancipated minor can obtain a license without an
additional adult signature so long as she files proof of her
ability to respond in damages, in most cases proof of insur-
ance. "'52 The result of all this is that minors can obtain
146. As in most other states, minors in California may be tried as adults
depending on the severity of the crime committed, but not by virtue of their
emancipation. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992).
147. Interview with Jake 16-17.
148. Interview with Vicki 3.
149. CAL. CIV. CODE § 63(h) (West Supp. 1992).
150. Id.
151. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17707 (West 1971).
152. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 16430-16436 (West Supp. 1992) (stating that proof of
ability to respond in damages can be given by certificates of insurance, by bond, by
deposit of money, and by proof of self-insurance).
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driver's licenses "on their own" only if they can afford their
own insurance. This was not understood by and not likely for
most of the teenagers in our sample.'53
A final misunderstanding about emancipation was that two
participants thought they would be able to tend bar after
emancipation. This also was in error.'54
(2) Freedom from Parental Control-Nearly all the
minors saw emancipation as a road to independence from
parental control:
Emancipation to me meant freedom, freedom from
authority, freedom to do what you want, support yourself.
After I had been emancipated that is when I started
learning all the little, you know, all the pros and cons of
it.' 5 5
I: [Why did you want to be emancipated?]
J: ... I didn't get along with my parents too well and I
was more independent than they wanted me to be. I
basically wanted more freedom. And we didn't get along
too well together.'56
Minors wanted "freedom" from parental rules on such issues
as staying out late, taking drugs, wearing make-up,
57
smoking, and driving. As the following exchange suggests,
153. There are two other ways the Vehicle Code holds parents of emancipated
minors vicariously liable. First, a parent who has signed for an unemancipated child
remains liable after the emancipation. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 63(h) (West Supp. 1992);
CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 17707-17708 (West 1971); see also Easterly v. Cook, 35 P.2d 164,
167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934). Second, liability remains under an agency theory when the
minor is driving on the parents' behalf. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 17708 (West 1971).
The court found agency-and liability-in a case where the minor drove her parents'
car while shopping for clothes for a sister. See Johnson v. Peterson, 113 Cal. Rptr.
445, 447 (1974).
154. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25667 (West 1985) (limiting even persons
between 18 and 21 to serving alcoholic drinks to customers only when "such person
is not acting in the capacity of a bartender and the service occurs in an area
primarily designed and used for the sale and service of food").
155. Interview with Courtney 2.
156. Interview with Jane 1.
157. See Interview with Andre 4 ("People would always tell me don't do drugs you
know, don't do drugs any more don't pierce your ears anymore or don't wear make-up,
or cut your hair, stop dying it.").
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minors sometimes described their own (objectively worri-
some) behavior in ways that presented parental objection as
unreasonable:
I: How many times did you run away... ?
J: It's not just running away, just leaving the situation
for the moment, for the night.
I: So it was just for the night?
J: Yeah. But it always recurred.'58
(3) Meeting Parental Objectives-Emancipation seemed
like a good idea to many of the minors because it met the
needs of the adults suggesting it. For example, the adult
boyfriend of one minor had urged her emancipation:
I: [Why did your boyfriend want you to get emanci-
pated?]
C: For him, so he doesn't have to worry about me taking
him. If I were to get upset with him one day and press
statutory rape charges and I had the power to do that.
Also known as jail bait. 5 9
In most cases parents, not boyfriends, were the significant
adult players urging the emancipation. Emancipation served
parental interests or needs in several ways. These needs were
sometimes stated by parents explicitly and sometimes gleaned
by the minors," ° In one case, emancipation resolved the
issue of custody between the minor's two natural parents.
After explaining that he chose emancipation because he was
"getting tired of bringing in those work permits" and to get "a
little more freedom at home,"' the participant added that:
[T]here was another reason. An immediate reason for me
to get emancipated. What was happening was my father,
he lives in Texas, was for some reason he gave my mom
the impression that he was going to try to win me in court
and get custody of me. I had forgotten about that and it's
158. Interview with Jane 2-3; see also infra note 168.
159. Interview with Courtney 7. This may be another misconception; the rape
statute provides no defense of emancipation. See supra note 10.
160. In five of the six cases in which there were significant adult players, parents
urged emancipation.
161. Interview with Steve 1-2.
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important. But ... my mom came up with the idea [of
emancipation], I mean I had thought about it for a while
but she brought it up at that time because she thought
that I might want to get emancipated and also my father
wouldn't be able to take custody of me and take me back
to Texas, where he lived.162
Conflict between adults over custody of the minor was also
a factor in the publicized Tiffany emancipation. Tiffany's
mother's opposition to the emancipation derived in substantial
part from her disagreement with Tiffany's manager over who
should have custody and control over Tiffany's career, con-
tracts, and profits.
163
A more common concern was relief from the financial
obligations of parenting. The discontinuation of child support
payments following divorce is a clear example:
I: What was your dad's goal... ?
P: Just not to pay the money that he was supposed to be
paying.
I: Did he ever pay it?
P: No. The only reason that he was paying it was
because the county found out that he wasn't, so they got
a hold of him.
I: How long after the county caught up with him did he
suggest the emancipation idea?
P: Two months.... He was calling me and really
bugging me about it so that's kind of why too, I said fine,
I'll do it.
64
162. Id. at 2-3. Most of the participants listed several reasons for getting
emancipated. See also infra note 173 and accompanying text.
163. McDougal, supra note 130, at 6. Tiffany's mother explained her opposition
somewhat differently, claiming that Tiffany had not done her homework in a year,
could not spell words like "rehearsal," could not calculate math percentages, threw
her vitamins in the trash, and did no comparison shopping. Id. at 6, 8.
164. Interview with Phyllis 7-8. In 1991 a 17-year-old minor appeared at Legal
Advocates for Children and Youth, a public interest firm representing minors in San
Jose, California, asking what his "emancipation" meant. His parents had stipulated
in their divorce decree that their son was emancipated so that neither of them would
be liable for his support. The judge had signed the order submitted by the parents,
including the emancipation stipulation; the parents then delivered it to their son.
Telephone Interview with Shannan Wilbur, supra note 95.
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Another minor, who was herself a mother, explained-that "my
dad didn't want to get stuck with the [baby's] bills, so I got
emancipated." 6 '
The fear of liability by parents, stepparents, and parental
partners for minors' automobile accidents was mentioned as a
reason to cut a child loose. As one young man explained:
[My stepfather and father recommended emancipation] for
their safety reason that if I was to get in the car and hit
somebody or something like that,... his restaurant and
my step-dad's business wouldn't be liable for it.
... I thought that I would be helping them by, you
know, by them not being liable for me. 6
In another case, antagonism between the parent's boyfriend
and her teenaged daughter took the shape of cars and driving:
[My mom's boyfriend] was basically glad to have me out of
the house, and ... he was saying that he was worried
about my mother because I was driving my car. He was
thinking that I would get in an accident and that she
would get sued because I wasn't emancipated yet....
... He was just trying to make up stuff that would
make my mother angry towards me I guess.6 7
Tension between the teenager and his parent's new spouse
or partner was often a factor contributing to the emancipation
decision. Recall that twelve of the minors lived with parents
who had remarried or had partners identified by the minors as
a parent's "boyfriend" or "girlfriend." Triangular conflicts and
loyalties were mentioned frequently. One girl described "[t]he
pressure from my mom, 'you're making me decide between my
husband and you and I don't like that.'"'6 8 Another girl,
165. Interview with Vicki 1.
166. Interview with Andre 3, 13.
167. Interview with Judy 9.
168. Interview with Jane 1. Another boy explained that "I wasn't getting along
with my stepdad, my mom was really strict about the house, like don't wear earrings
in the house, don't wear make-up, there was just a lot of conflict . . . ." Interview
with Andre 9. Andre must have been hard on everyone: "[M]y curfew was ridiculous,
I had just turned 16 and my curfew was like 12 o'clock, come on!" Id. at 7.
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who had been arguing with her mother's boyfriend, remem-
bered that "[when] my mom came back from work,. she was
on his side, which surprised me."169
Of course, the fact that a parent or stepparent is benefited
by an emancipation does not necessarily undermine character-
ization of the emancipation decision as child-initiated. Getting
out of a tension-ridden household may benefit both the
departing teenager and the remaining parent. 7 ° Similarly,
parents may benefit financially from emancipation, whether
or not they desired or encouraged their child to file a petition.
For example, several minors sought emancipation in order to
reduce the financial obligations of their parents in cases where
there appeared to be no overt pressure from the parents to do
so. One boy expressed a kind of independence morality:
My parents weren't ever responsible for me. They really
weren't and it would be unfair for them to have to, you
know, to be legally responsible for me because they aren't
and they haven't been for a long time.' 7 '
Another emancipated minor, receiving public assistance from
the county for herself and her baby, was aware of parental
reimbursement statutes. She explained that her mother had
a new business and a new boyfriend:
I didn't want her to be stuck with paying for me when I
wasn't even living with her. ... I kind of wanted to help
my mom out in a way.'72
As the previous discussion shows, minors' reasons for
emancipation can be sorted into discrete categories. But our
attempts to isolate and organize their reasons may be too
orderly and may obscure what in many cases was a jumble of
reasons. Most of the minors gave multiple reasons. Laura's
case is an example. It combines parents, cars, liability, and
169. Interview with Judy 2.
170. We know that in general the psychological well-being of parents often
improves when children grow up and leave home. See Lynn White & John N.
Edwards, Emptying the Nest and Parental Well-Being: An Analysis of National Panel
Data, 55 AM. Soc. REV. 235, 241 (1990).
171. Interview with Brian 4.
172. Interview with Phyllis 16.
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bravado. Laura had learned about emancipation at age fifteen
from a TV movie and became emancipated two years later at
seventeen:
I: ... So what happened in between the time of the
movie and the time [of your emancipation]? Did it just
keep coming up or did you just put it away?
L: No, I had finally left home for the last time. I had run
away a couple times before that and I stayed with a friend
of mine. And I wanted my car back but [my parents]
wanted me to have it to where they weren't responsible for
it if I left it at anyone's house. So they [called a lawyer]
and said they'd pay for [an emancipation].
I: Who recommended the [emancipation, your parents or
the lawyer]?
L: My parents.
I: Okay, and was it having to do with the car, or were
there some other reasons?
L: Basically the car.
I: ... I'm not clear on what exactly it was you'd been
wanting for a long time.
L: To be emancipated, living out on my own, away from
my parents.
I: What was your expectation about what emancipation
would do for you ... ?
L: Well, there wouldn't be police after me if I had the
car. Because I know they had put out an APB or a
warrant or something like that for the car.'73
c. Decision Making Within the Family-Like Laura,
nearly every minor articulated both free-standing, kid-
centered reasons for emancipation, as well as reasons reflect-
ing the interests of the parents.'74 As mentioned above, the
parents do not necessarily undermine the characterization of
emancipation as child-initiated. But the minors' descriptions
173. Interview with Laura 1-2, 5-6.
174. One girl explained that, in addition to more freedom and a driver's license,
she wanted "to look for my real parents because I was adopted and my mom didn't
want me to do that. She didn't want to help me but I needed to be 18." Interview
with Jane 1.
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of how the emancipation decisions were made add to the
impression of strong parental influence.
Thirteen of the eighteen participants reported that, within
their own families, the decision to file the emancipation
petition was theirs and not their parents'. Yet as the follow-
ing exchanges suggest, parental influence seems to have
played a greater role than many of the participants were
aware of or willing to admit. The following excerpts are
representative of many of the interviews.
I: OK, so did your stepmom suggest [emancipation] to
you?
V: She went down and did it.
I: She went with you?
V: No, she just went down and got the papers and had
me sign them and had my mom sign them. That's it.
I: How much did [your parents] influence you [to seek
emancipation]?
V: I made my own decision.
175
I: So it sounds like the decision to get emancipated
involved your mom, and your [already emancipated older]
brother?
... How much did each of them influence you?
S: Not really that much. They just informed me more
except my mom,... she influenced me pretty much. I
would have gotten emancipated if I could of anyways. 176
Another participant was clearer about what he called being
"persuaded into it": 7
7
I: So was it your dad or stepdad that suggested [emanci-
pation]?
A: I believe it was my dad who came up with the idea. I
think it was as much for their own personal reasons as well
as my own but they made it sound that it was for mine.
175. Interview with Vicki 1, 4.
176. Interview with Steve 5-6. Several of the minors explained that while getting
emancipated may have benefited someone else, they would have done it anyway.
177. Interview with Andre 1.
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... They both came to me at the same time and said okay
we are going to go see a lawyer about this emancipation
so that you will be on your own and we won't be able to
tell you what to do. 7 '
Pride, or perhaps being "dared," also seemed to play a part.
As one girl explained:
[My mother] basically said that I'd be running back to her
after a few months because I wouldn't make it .... That's
probably what made me want to be [emancipated] even
more. 
179
Such challenges came not just from parents:
I: ... [W]hy did [your attorney and probation officer]
recommend [emancipation]?
C: Because I was such a little pain in the butt, if you
don't like [juvenile court supervision], then go get emanci-
pated, was how it came to me. And that's when I started
thinking, well, I'll do just that.'
3. The Emancipation Process-This section presents
findings on how the minors experienced the emancipation
process. The interviewer asked the participants about the
logistics of emancipation: the details of getting the necessary
papers, obtaining signatures, receiving a ruling, and filing
their declaration. This discussion casts light on both the
legitimizing and child-initiated aspects of emancipation.
a. Getting the Process Started-Eight of the subjects
negotiated the entire process of emancipation themselves.
More often than not, however, adults-usually parents or the
178. Id. at 1, 3. Another girl explained that her father "has a lot of influence on
me.... [E]ven if I didn't want to do [it] I probably would have done it." Interview
with Phyllis 7. Earlier she had explained in somewhat lukewarm fashion that "I
thought that [emancipation] would be [a] good idea for myself because I really don't
keep in contact with my parents that much and if I needed to sign something I would
want to do it myself." Id. at 2. Compare this explanation with her earlier description
of the clear economic motives of her father. See supra note 164 and accompanying
text. She also reported that in the end, "[the emancipation] was useless to me
because things I wanted to do, I couldn't. I'm not really happy with it at all."
Interview with Phyllis 2.
179. Interview with Judy 3.
180. Interview with Courtney 2.
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boyfriends of girl petitioners-initiated the process by obtain-
ing the necessary forms, providing the fee or transportation,
and in some cases by hiring an attorney to facilitate the
process.'18 In one case a high school counselor got the forms
and accompanied the minor to the hearing. 8 2
Although the Act contemplates no attorney participation, 83
seven of the participants were represented by counsel. With
the exceptions of one minor who found her attorney's name in
the telephone directory and another who went to a local law
school clinic, parents had contacted and retained the attorneys.
The quality of representation as described (though not as
characterized) by their minor clients appears to have been
inadequate and unprofessional. The attorneys performed two
formal tasks, filling out the petition and attending the hear-
ings. Not surprisingly, these were performed adequately; the
forms were designed for use by fourteen-year-olds and the
hearings consisted essentially of affirming that everything on
the petitions was true. What the lawyers did not do was
inform their clients about the meaning or consequences of
emancipation. As one minor explained, "I just kind of let him
do whatever he was going to do and signed whatever I had to
sign, and that was that.""s
b. The Hearings-The impressions of the legal process
most frequently reported were fear, speed, and confusion.
Several participants described the process in much the same
way:
I thought I would have to see the judge, I was scared.
And I walked in and sat down and then the lady asked
what I wanted and I gave her the paper work and she
took it back to the judge and she came back and said,
"Here you go." It was only like ten minutes and I went to
get it filed and it was over with.8 5
181. For example, one girl's boyfriend helped her with the emancipation
procedure: "I: How did you know where to go? J: My boyfriend made a bunch of
calls. He's good at phone calls; he likes that." Interview with Judy 1.
182. Interview with Peggy 2.
183. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 70 (West 1982).
184. Interview with Laura 3.
185. Interview with Barbara 4.
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[W]hen I went in, I didn't even know what was going on.
They just called me in, and I could hear the judge and all
of a sudden he said, "Okay!" and banged the javelin [sic],
and I guess I was emancipated. And this lawyer walks up,
and said, "Do you know what was going on?" and I said,
"No." So he told me [where I was supposed to go and file
the emancipation papers]. 18
It was a little bit rushed for me. I would have liked to look
into it a little bit more .... I thought what they should
have done down there [in court] was to clarify exactly what
it meant to be emancipated. It seemed like they were just
kind of assuming, whatever, sign the papers.
... I didn't know any of the legalities of it. 8 '
Half of the minors had no hearings at all:
I never saw the judge or anything so I never actually saw
any court proceedings. Mostly I just signed the papers.'88
Instead of a judge, court personnel-often referred to generi-
cally as "the lady'"-appear in several accounts:
All I did was fill out that form, my mom signed it, went up
to the judge, and there was no one up there ... the lady
just took it back there and came out with it signed, and
stamped it ....
Those who did see a judge reported only brief interactions in
which little about themselves was discussed. As one partici-
pant, the very model of a modern emancipated minor, reported
with pride:
I gave the judge a business card and told him that I was
already in business and that I already had a [business]
186. Interview with Peggy 3.
187. Interview with Steve 6.
188. Interview with Laura 3.
189. Interview with Steve 5.
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license and I wasn't even eighteen. He signed the papers,
didn't ask any questions.' 90
The hearings, which lasted between five and ten minutes,
consisted mostly of the judge asking if everything on the
petition was true. While the participants answered this
question affirmatively in court, the following exchange
suggests something less than complete candor.
I: Was everything on your form correct?
J: Yeah, most of it was but I mean what it sounded like
was not the same thing that it was.19'
Indeed, "the way things were" as opposed to "how they
sounded" sometimes went to the heart of the requirements for
emancipation. For example, few participants were living away
from home prior to emancipation except in the most technical
sense. Several moved out in order to comply with the letter of
the law:
I: How was it you moved out of the house?
C: Because I talked to the lawyer .... and he said yeah,
you have to prove that you are' completely independent.
And he asked if I was living, you know, at home .... [So
I asked] one of my mom's friends.., would you consider
me, would you take me in .... It was really it was lucky.
It just worked out at the right time.... [Y]ou know
because I would not have been able to move out and ...
rent a room or something like that. I wouldn't be able to
afford it. And because, I don't know, I would be too
scared. Because I am only sixteen .. 192
190. Interview with Brendan 2.
191. Interview with Jake 21.
192. Interview with Colleen 9.
Pop singer Tiffany's departure from the family home also occurred only the day
before she filed for emancipation:
The teen-age millionaire with the red hair and blemish-free face left her
mother's Norwalk apartment March 8. She was on her way to [her manager's]
North Hollywood recording studio to lay down some tracks for the sequel to her
debut MCA album, "Tiffany."
But Tiffany never came home that night. Instead, she had her attorneys file
a court motion under Section 61 of the California Civil Code, calling for her
emancipation from her mother.
McDougal, supra note 130, at 7.
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Representations on the petitions concerning the minor's
management of financial affairs, another requirement intended
to substantiate actual independence, were also misleading.
One young man informed the judge he was supporting himself,
but explained later in his interview that the source of support
was the $150 sent to him monthly by his father.'93 After the
hearing the father paid the son $50 "for being good in the
court."194 In this case, the minor was well aware that his
answers were untrue:
I: What was that whole process like? You know, going to
the court house with your dad?
A: It wasn't really a problem. We just went, my dad paid
some fee and we went ... in to see a judge and he asked
me a few questions and I lied a little bit, I remember that
I lied a little bit because he asked me if I was still in
school, which, I dropped out of school as soon as I left the
house. "
Occasionally the judges questioned the minors or their
attorneys about the minors' school or work prospects. In a few
cases, the judges seemed alert to potential or apparent
discrepancies between declarations on the petition and other
facts. For example, after one petitioner requested a waiver of
the $150 filing fee, the judge appropriately questioned the boy
further about his asserted self-supporting status. 196 Only
after the petitioner was able to detail a work history did the
judge grant the emancipation.' 97 Another judge wanted to
know how long the minor had been supporting herself:
I had to prove to him, I had to show him the papers, check
out my work and papers signed by the lady I live with
saying that I have been living with them and paying rent,
and that was all he wanted to know really.198
193. Interview with Andre 4. The only statutory requirement regarding income
is that it not be derived from crime. CAL. CIV. CODE § 64(a)(4) (West 1982 & Supp.
1992). However, income based on voluntary parental payments puts the minor at
tremendous risk should parents decide to stop paying.
194. Interview with Andre 4.
195. Id.
196. Interview with Brian 3-4.
197. Id.
198. Interview with Peggy 3.
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In another case, the minor's attorney reported that the judge
had signed the declaration only after the attorney had assured
him that he wasn't letting some "drug pusher out in the
streets."199
Judicial suspicions were also raised in connection with the
voluntariness of the petition. But as the following excerpt
reveals, the hearing provided an inadequate forum for candor:
I: [I]t sounds like the judge was asking you about that.
Wondering if it really was your decision? Would you have
felt comfortable saying, my dad was kind of bugging me to
do this for two months?
P: No, I wouldn't of, I wouldn't have said anything
because my dad was there with me.2
4. Quality of Pre-Emancipation Home Life-Not all
families of emancipated minors were entrenched in conflict as
this description makes clear:
We all get along great. My family is really close .... I
love my brothers and sisters, I adore my mother. I love
my Dad a lot, I really respect him. I mean we get along
really well our whole family does.2"1
For most of the participants, however, conflict played a
significant role in family relationships. The central conflict in
fourteen of the eighteen families was the appropriate degree
of parental control over the adolescent. The complaints may
sound familiar:
[L]ike on weekends I wanted to stay out with friends and
watch a movie and [my mother] didn't want me to do that
.... because she would have to wait up self-consciously in
her sleep to be awake to make sure I got home all right.
But she still knew where I was and everytime I came
home I always knocked on the door to say I was home.20 2
199. Interview with Laura 4.
200. Interview with Phyllis 8.
201. Interview with Colleen 9. This participant had been erroneously advised by
her high school guidance counselor that emancipation would qualify her for college
loans without consideration of parental income. In this case, conflict arose because
the daughter wanted to become emancipated against the wishes of her loving parents.
In two other cases, minors from homes in which no tensions or hostilities were
described had to cajole parents into signing the petitions.
202. Interview with Jane 2.
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Another participant described his pre-emancipation days:
[S]econd semester of my junior year school was sliding, I
wasn't getting along with my family, everything was going
downhill, I wasn't worried about stuff, I was getting into
the punk scene, I was going out and partying and stuff...
I wasn't around much, when I was it was hostile.2 °3
Conflicts sometimes included physical violence:
A: I was threatened a lot by my stepdad.
I: What do you mean threatened... ?
A: Physically ... as [in] I'll beat the shit out of
you.
20 4
5. Impact of Emancipation-Two constraints complicate
evaluation of the impact of emancipation. The first concerns
differences between the minors' subjective evaluations of
emancipation's impact2. 5 and objective measures of well-
being such as income, job stability, or levels of education. The
second concerns time. The reported impact of emancipation
may differ when taken over the short- versus the long-term.
How, for example, does one balance the immediate benefit of
leaving home for a teenager struck by her stepparent against
the future, unknown consequences of her departure? The
approach here is not to quantify these variables but simply to
recognize and account for them. We attempt to do this in
several ways. The first is to present both subjective and
objective measures of emancipation's impact. A second is to
identify causation as best we can. For example, while drop-
ping out of school may have occurred for reasons independent
of emancipation, where an emancipated minor reports that he
dropped out in order to support himself, we accept the
explanation.
The participants were asked about their postemancipation
lives in such areas as their friendships, sources of income, and
resources for getting help.20 6 Their lives appeared to vary
203. Interview with Alex 7.
204. Interview with Andre 10.
205. See J. MERRILL CARLSMITH ET AL., METHODS OF RESEARCH IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 74 (1976) (noting the difficulties in relying upon subjective reports in
social research).
206. See Appendix B.
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greatly with regard to the quality of economic and psychologi-
cal stability.2 7 At the top end was Brendan, prudent and
successful. He explained that:
[A]ctually, I didn't expect [my life] to get as good as it has
gotten.... I'm just trying to take it easy and not bite off
more than I can chew. Just me and my [business] partner
liv[ing] together and trying to keep the bill[s] in check, I
could probably [have] a girlfriend living with me... but I
have tried to keep myself from biting off more than I can
chew because business can go up and down. But I never
expected it to get this good and I'm just pleased .... 20
Like Brendan, half the participants reported feeling more
mature than their age peers. But only a third experienced the
anticipated lessening of legal hassles with jobs, school, and life.
The overall level of coping with the demands of independent
living was minimally adequate. An important factor in how
well the participants were doing was whether or not a benefi-
cent other was available to provide support. For example, a
friend's mother provided a stable babysitting job; a kindly
employer provided a place to live; and a sympathetic grand-
mother lent money for rent.2 9
The principal direct impact of emancipation was an increase
in economic stress. Of the eighteen participants, twelve
reported greater economic stress than they had experienced
before becoming emancipated, and six were continuing (either
on their own or with help from family or the government)
about the same as before. Only five reported having a current
job.210 A few participants were in fairly stable situations,
such as working for a relative, or running their own busi-
nesses. Others were working in jobs such as sandwich-making
207. Using five point scales (zero to four), the coders rated the participants' success
in establishing stable adult lives in three areas: getting money to support themselves,
establishing a stable pattern of daily life, and finding supportive relationships.
208. Interview with Brendan 9.
209. One participant explained that: "My grandmother has helped me out a lot,
she's been there if I needed to borrow some money.... And when I borrow money
from her it's not like for drugs, it's usually for rent. Because that is one of my biggest
problems that I have . . . ." Interview with Andre at 5. Not all grandmothers were
reported as kindly. One objected to her emancipated granddaughter's leaving her
own baby with a babysitter and called child protective services to have the baby put
in foster care. The minor was able to get her child back. Interview with Vicki 9-10.
210. Some who reported working were not: "I: [Alt your job that you have now,
what are you doing? S: Construction, labor, I'm not working because they don't have
any houses right now." Interview with Steve 18.
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("foodcraft") or sales. But most of the participants were not
working, and several had changed jobs frequently following
their emancipations.
In ten of the eighteen cases, and more characteristically of
girls than of boys, the minors depended either on non-parental
adults or public welfare assistance. Several minors were
living in temporary situations or had temporary sources of
income outside their own control. The precariousness of both
housing and income was related to the participants' depend-
ence on others. 1' One participant told of several moves
with her boyfriend and baby:
I: [S]ince the time you were emancipated, how many
times have you moved?
V: Six.
I: Have you changed jobs; are you working outside?
V: No, I'm not working.
I: [D]o you have any income?
V: Yeah, . . . . [w]elfare and social security.
I: [D]oes your boyfriend contribute [money]?
V: Um.2 12
Another significant consequence of emancipation was a high
rate of school dropout. Of the eighteen emancipated minors,
four had graduated from regular high school after their
emancipations. Another received his Graduate Equivalency
Degree (GED). Many of the participants expressed great
dissatisfaction with their high school experiences before
emancipation. Nonetheless, a main reason given for dropping
out was money:
[A]t first I didn't have to quit school but then I had to get
a job. We needed the work, me and my brother .... [My]
dad wouldn't pay any kind of child support .... 
213
211. Dependence on others did not always indicate instability; one very successful
emancipated boy lived with his business partner, an older man. Interview with
Brendan 9.
212. Interview with Vicki 14-16. Emancipated minors are not entitled to any
welfare benefits they would not receive were they unemancipated. CAL. CIrV. CODE
§ 67 (West 1982). However, several of the girls were receiving Aid to Families with
Dependant Children on behalf of their own children and one was receiving welfare
herself.
213. Interview with Steve 18.
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Several regretted not having finished high school:
See, I regret not having my education now. I don't have
my driver's education. I don't have my school education
and it is still kicking me in the butt.214
Homelessness may be another serious problem for newly
emancipated teenagers. The interviews revealed that many of
the subjects were living ("bunking") with friends or a series of
friends. The proximity of homelessness for those who are
dependent on friends or relatives for a place to live is apparent
from studies of other homeless populations.215 Another
factor that suggests homelessness as a consequence of emanci-
pation is that despite vigorous, systematic searches, we were
unable to find a large number of the minors who were emanci-
pated.216 Within a year of their emancipations, they had
become untraceable, no longer available at or through their
own or their parents' addresses. While this fact alone might
not warrant a conclusion of homelessness, independent
evidence from the state of Michigan lends support to the
inference. Reports from social workers in the state's runaway
shelters revealed that a large number of teenagers using the
shelters had been emancipated by their parents under
Michigan's former statute.2 7 The discovery led to the over-
haul of the Michigan emancipation statute, which now
requires proof of housing.218
Despite these various difficulties, nine of the eighteen
reported that, as a result of emancipation, they felt more
mature and independent, more able to take care of themselves
214. Interview with Courtney 19.
215. The condition of homelessness may apply beyond those people literally
sleeping on the streets. Alternative definitions have suggested that having no
address and living in a series of temporary places more accurately describes what it
means to be homeless. See MARJORIE HOPE & JAMES YOUNG, THE FACES OF
HOMELESSNESS (1986) (suggesting a definition which includes an intent to stay of less
than 45 days); Leanne G. Rivlin, A New Look at the Homeless, 16 Soc. POLY 3 (1986)
(considering fewer than 30 days of secure sleeping as constituting homelessness). See
generally JONATHAN KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN 10-11 (1988) (discussing the
difficulty of counting the homeless population because of the practice of "doubling up"
with other people and families).
216. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
217. See HOUSE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS SECTION, EMANCIPATION OF MINORS HB
5253 & 5254, at 1 (1988).
218. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.4c(2)(e) (West Supp. 1991).
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than their old friends. One participant proudly explained that
he had started his own business in electrical repairs:
I didn't graduate from high school and I basically dropped
out and went to work.... I got my G.E.D. last year....
[I have just been] working and getting a trade ... of my
own, it has been really fun.... And I'm really good at
what I do.219
Still, many interviews reveal a disillusionment with life in
the adult world. Despite the assessment of themselves as
better able to handle problems than their unemancipated
peers, several reported that if they could do it over, they
would not again choose emancipation.22 °
The minors repeatedly gave two reasons for their second
thoughts. The first was disappointment that particular
benefits anticipated and desired were not in fact available.
For some, this was because they had misunderstood the legal
consequences of emancipation in regard to working, driving,
and juvenile court:
Some stuff like [not being able to tend bar even though
emancipated] kind of makes you feel that you wasted your
money.22'
[W]hat emancipation means is that you have the legal
right to live on your own, bottom line! [I]t doesn't mean
that you are going to go ahead and get your license.222
[I]f I get sent to court, it's still pretty much see, I'm a
minor, see still a minor, still have no rights as far as they
are concerned.... [T]hey can charge me with an adult
219. Interview with Brendan 5-7.
220. One participant explained: "If it was all up to me I think I would have had
it better if I hadn't gotten emancipated because I had it good at my dad's house."
Interview with Vicki 16.
221. Interview with Courtney 20.
222. Id. at 18.
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crime, right, . . . how come they can't give me the same
privileges as an adult?223
For others the disappointment, perhaps something closer to
annoyance or disgust, resulted not from their own misappre-
hensions, but because the adults with whom they had to
deal-employers, the DMV, the telephone company, county
welfare offices, schools, and attorneys-had no clue what
emancipation was or signified. As one exasperated but
resigned young woman explained:
[L]ike when I went to the DMV, they were insistent that
someone sign my paper to get my name changed after I
got married saying, yes, you were a minor before you got
married and you are an adult now. No, I was an adult
before I got married and I am an adult now. I was
emancipated before, so I am able to sign my own papers.
And they were insistent that someone would sign for me,
so finally my husband did. They wouldn't accept that I
could sign my own papers.224
Another participant who wanted to work overtime took his
emancipation papers to his employer:
The way I [understand it],... if I get emancipated, you
know, I'm legally eighteen .... My employers said well
you know it doesn't matter.
[T]hey say you've got to bring in a work permit because
I was sixteen. And I would say well I'm an emancipated
minor and they would say it doesn't matter, you're under
eighteen.225
223. Interview with Jake 13-14. This sense of unfairness was repeated by
another participant who was taken to juvenile hall for committing a robbery after his
emancipation: "M]y emancipation was exempt. But if I get hurt in Hillcrest [the
county juvenile detention center], if anything happens to me there, I'm responsible,
not my parents and I'm responsible for my own medical bills up there also."
Interview with Steve 15.
224. Interview with Peggy 24.
225. Interview with Steve 6-7. Another participant wanted her name in the
telephone directory but found out that "they wouldn't allow me to unless I was of age
18. And I don't know if it was just the service person, if it was just naive, them being
naive, or if they weren't allowed to." Interview with Ann 3.
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The second reason emancipation dimmed in retrospect was
the simple recognition that life was harder on one's own. One
boy put it this way:
[L]ike I said, I wouldn't have done it [again] because I
struggled to extreme.226
At the end of her interview, one subject, one of the more
"together" participants-no arrests, no prior out-of-home
placements, and a loving relationship with parents who did
not want her to move out-explained:
I've really learned, I mean I really was scared of the fact
that what if I can't make it financially, I might not be able
to do it in college. Because it's hard enough now but
college, I'm only in high school.... And what's going to
happen if, you know, I'm already trying to support myself
now and I'm just like looking ahead to the future. It's
like, you know, I have to do this for the rest of my life, do
you know what I'm saying?
2 7
Comparisons between unemancipated and adult lives
revealed an ambivalence about the personal benefits of
maturity and the economic benefits of nonemancipated life.
Unemancipated peers were often described with a combination
of jealousy and longing:
The way I see students my age, I feel they are very naive
about, I mean they are still in that environment where
they have all their friends at school and everything is
peachy keen. They don't have their bills and everything
else.228
This participant seemed to miss not only the lives her friends
were living but also the friends themselves:
Once I was emancipated, I really didn't have the same
friends I had in school. They were still in school and I
226. Interview with Andre 11. Andre was living no place; he said he had "changed
locations" twenty to thirty times since his emancipation, changed jobs five to eight
times, and had many romantic partners.
227. Interview with Colleen 14.
228. Interview with Ann 10.
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was working full time and trying to go to school through
this adult education so I really didn't have the time to see
them.229
Dropping out of school thus implicates losing not only long-
term economic status, but enduring more immediate and
intimate losses as well.
Finally, one participant poignantly expressed a fatigue and
a longing for a form of childhood:
I: Is there anything else you want to tell me about how
the emancipation process worked for you?
S: Uh, I don't know. The best thing about it for me
really was before I was emancipated.
I: Why?
S: The last few nights before I got emancipated [I was]
just thinking about being eighteen.
I: .... Was that exciting?
S: Yeah, then it was. I don't really want to turn eighteen.
I: How come?
S: I don't want that responsibility anymore. I've had it
since I was fourteen now. I'd rather not have it.
I: What's it?
S: Adult responsibility. See, what I missed out on was
being able to be a teenager without having to work,
having my mom living at home, like a family instead of
having everything all broken up and you know. This
whole family has been kind of shattered and shit for a
while.23 °
229. Id. at 12. Another participant compared himself to his unemancipated peers
this way:
I would say [I am] a lot more mature, social wise than what [people my same
age] are because most of my friends still go to school, they are in college and
they don't pay rent. If I didn't have to pay rent I would be in college right now.
I would have finished my high school already, I would probably have a car by
now.... [I]f I knew what I know now, I wouldn't have moved out because I
know that my parents could not force me out of the house until I was 18.
Interview with Andre 12.
230. Interview with Steve 20.
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6. Summary-The following statements summarize the
accounts of the minors interviewed:
1. Their decisions to become emancipated are influenced
by adults and by perceptions about the concerns of
adults in a majority of cases.
2. Adults-parents, police, boyfriends, counselors-
frequently initiate the idea of emancipation.
3. The process of becoming emancipated is quick, simple,
and involves no significant investigation of the minors'
living circumstances or best interests.
4. Significant conflict between minors and their parents
prior to emancipation is common.
5. Life after emancipation is often precarious and lonely,
and the decision to become emancipated is regarded
with ambivalence.
In reporting these conclusions, we recognize that the number
of minors interviewed is small in comparison to the number of
minors in the sample from which the participants were drawn.
The minors we were unable to locate, those who did not
respond to the letters or telephone calls, may be doing well;
this is a possibility we cannot definitively rule out. It is
reasonable to think, however, that the participants in our
subsample are in some ways the better-off among the group.
We know, for example, that they are still in touch with their
parents, at least to the extent of picking up mail and messages.
This is in some ways disheartening, for it suggests that their
reports of home life before emancipation and life in general
afterward are perhaps the best or happiest accounts.
Studying the uses and consequences of a legal process that
enables minors to "take off" reveals the difficulties of tracking
children or others without steady home bases.23' We recog-
nize this initial effort as exactly that-a preliminary investi-
gation. Yet even as a starting point, the study offers certain
observations about the actual use of the emancipation process.
Returning to the themes of legitimization, child-initiation, and
nonadversarialness, we found first that more often than not
231. A practitioner's version of this problem has emerged for lawyers representing
homeless youth who are unable to find a named plaintiff because the populations in
the shelters change so frequently. See Sherman, supra note 15, at 13.
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emancipation did not legitimize the minor's actual status.
While some participants were living apart from their parents
at the time the petition was filed, many more still were living
at home, moving out at the last minute just to satisfy the legal
requirement. Second, though the minor is necessarily the
petitioner, to describe emancipation as child-initiated over-
simplifies the interaction between teenager and parent. Minors'
decisions to become emancipated frequently were influenced by
adults and by concerns for the needs of adults. Finally, the
characterization of emancipation as nonadversarial is true
primarily in form. Although treated within the judicial system
as a nonadversarial procedure, emancipation often was used
to resolve parent-teenager conflict through the somewhat
drastic measure of ending the relationship altogether.
III. DISCUSSION
How is it that a statute intended to empower minors
sometimes is used to dislodge them from their positions,
however unsatisfactory, within home and family?232 At least
five factors contribute to emancipation's susceptibility to the
uses described. These include the substantive and procedural
advantages of the process, particularly to families in conflict;
uncritical judicial assumptions about family relationships; the
uneven application of the statute county to county; and
informal misconceptions about the official consequences of
emancipation. Finally, the political context in which emanci-
pation was enacted, specifically the proximity to the deinstitu-
tionalization of status offenses, requires attention. This
section looks at each of these factors, alone, in various
combinations, and in comparison with other legal procedures
used by families to negotiate domestic conflict.
232. Other legislation intended to secure fair treatment for children has not
worked out quite as intended. See, e.g., Carol K. Dillon et al., In re Roger S.: The
Impact of a Child's Due Process Victory on the California Mental Health System, 70
CAL. L. REV. 375, 398-400, 405-06 (1982); Alice Shotton & Marcia Henry, Despite
Statutory Mandate, Child Welfare Hearings Are Rare, 12 YOUTH L. NEWS, Sept./Oct.
1991, at 1, 3-4.
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A. The Advantages of Emancipation
The interviews show that minors and their parents acting in
some sort of concert sometimes choose emancipation as a
means of dealing with a living situation each regards as
impossible. The choice is not surprising in view of emancipa-
tion's clear substantive benefits and procedural simplicity.
First, and perhaps foremost, emancipation provides parents
with two financial benefits otherwise unavailable until the
child reaches majority. It ends the parents' support obligation
and limits their legal liability for their child's conduct.233
That is, emancipation relieves parents not just of the child's
presence but of the expenses of raising her altogether. No
other form of out-of-home placement provides equivalent
financial relief.234  Placements in a boarding school or
mental hospital are costly and so are available only to the
affluent or well-insured,235 and parents whose children live
in state residential facilities remain liable to the state for the
costs of that care.236 Even running away, a common and
233. CAL. CIV. CODE § 63 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
234. One state recently removed this parent-friendly financial consequence of
emancipation. The recently revised Michigan statute does not provide that
emancipation relieves parents of the costs of supporting their emancipated child.
Indeed, "[tihe parents of a minor emancipated by court order are jointly and
severally obligated to support the minor. However, the parents of a minor
emancipated by court order are not liable for any debts incurred by the minor during
the period of emancipation." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.4e(2) (West Supp. 1991).
This aspect of the Michigan statute creates a muddle, for the statute also provides
that an emancipated minor has the rights of an adult for the purpose of applying
"for other welfare assistance, including general assistance . . . ." Id. § 722.4e(1)(l).
The muddle was perhaps intentional; when the apparent conflict of holding parents
financially liable for support but also authorizing general assistance was raised in
a legislative analysis of the bill, the response offered was that "[t]he list of rights
and the expression of the parental obligation to support a child would offer the
opportunity for case workers to raise issues with the probate court and to obtain
judicial solutions to individual problems." HOUSE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS SECTION,
supra note 217, at 3.
The relationship between the two sections might also be viewed as a parental
reimbursement provision. If an emancipated child applies for and receives general
assistance, the parent then will be responsible to the state for the amount of
support. The Act also provides that an emancipation may be rescinded if "the minor
is indigent and has no means of support." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.4d(3)(a)
(West Supp. 1991).
235. See Weithorn, supra note 5, at 814-20.
236. See County of San Mateo v. Dell J., 762 P.2d 1202, 1213-14 (Cal. 1988)
(finding that county may seek reimbursement from the parents of a minor child
declared a ward of the court under California's delinquency statute for the reasonable
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informal form of out-of-home placement, does not relieve
parents of the duty to support. If the running away is either
temporary or reasonable, not an act of total defiance, parents
remain responsible for their runaway's support, including the
costs of care provided by a state shelter."7 Indeed, not even
termination of parental rights in consequence of a dependency
hearing necessarily ends the parental support obligation.3 8
Only emancipation, like some legal wonder-bromide, brings
about something close to absolute relief.
A second benefit to parents is the removal of parental
vicarious liability.239 That emancipation does not fully or in
every instance absolve the vicarious liability of parents may
matter less than the perception that it does.24 ° Minimizing
liability by emancipating one's child may be a version of what
economists have labeled the "microeconomic model of house-
hold choice."24' That model suggests that a household may
choose to invest in dispute prevention activities, such as
costs expended for the support and maintenance of the minor while placed outside the
family home); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 903 (West Supp. 1992); see also Terry
Demchak, Parents Must Reimburse Group Homes, Says California High Court, YOUTH
L. NEWS, Nov./Dec. 1988, at 12 (discussing the case).
237. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 208 (West 1982) (noting that parents are not required
to reimburse others for care provided to children who "unjustly abandon" their
homes). To some extent then, parental financial responsibility for runaways
therefore hinges on whether the child ran away wrongfully (an "unjust abandonment"
and so no liability) or whether the child ran away in response to parental misconduct
(continued support obligation). But the line between runaways and pushouts is often
too thin to make sense. In many cases, running away is a preemptive strike against
getting kicked out. See Richard H. Cornfield, Emancipation by Eviction: The
Problem of the Domestic Pushout, 1 FAM. L. RPTR. 4021 (BNA 1975). Emancipation
takes the risk out of the characterization of the child's departure by its absolute
termination of the support obligation.
238. See In re Marriage of O'Connell, 146 Cal. Rptr. 26, 31 (1978) (finding that
CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 order does not terminate court's power to issue a support
order).
239. Parental concern over liability for their children's potential car accidents was
mentioned repeatedly by participants as a problem emancipation would solve. See
supra note 166 and accompanying text.
240. The general abolition of parental liability is followed by a fatal "provided-
that" clause: emancipated minors are considered as being over the age of majority
"[flor the purpose of ending all vicarious liability of the minor's parents or guardian
for the minor's torts; provided, that nothing in this section shall affect any liability
of a parent, guardian, spouse, or employer imposed by the Vehicle Code, or any
vicarious liability which arises from an agency relationship." CAL. CIV. CODE § 63(h)
(West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added). The legislature intended "to leave intact the
preexisting Vehicle Code provisions and case law on which minors, parents, victims,
and insurers have come to rely." Bull, supra note 10, at 252.
241. Frank M. Gollop & Jeffrey Marquardt, A Microeconomic Model of Household
Choice: The Household as Disputant, 15 LAW & SOC. REV. 611, 611-14 (1983).
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repairing hazardous broken steps, after it assesses the
probability of injury, the probability of a lawsuit, the time
required to make repairs, the opportunity costs of household
242time, and risk preference. Of course, in most cases "house-
hold" means "parental," and here the household has identified
teenagers, not steps, as the likely source of liability.
Heightened parental concern over vicarious liability may be
a consequence of a statutory trend in the late 1980s increasing
the number of ways and the number of areas in which parents
became accountable for their children's behavior.243  In
addition to traditional rules of liability imposed on parents for
their children's negligence, states are now holding parents
responsible for their children's gang activities,244 for school
nonattendance, 245  for curfew violations, 246  and for their
children's unsupported children.247  The liabilities imposed
include criminal sanctions,24" reduced welfare benefits,249
242. Id. at 625.
243. See generally Michelle L. Casgrain, Note, Parental Responsibility Laws: Cure
for Crime or Exercise in Futility?, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 161 (1990) (discussing the recent
rash of liability law enactments and the social and legal ramifications of such laws).
244. See Seth Mydans, Mother Is Charged Because a Son Is California Street Gang
Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1989, at A18 ("Using a new state law intended to hold
parents responsible for the criminal acts of their children, the police here [Los
Angeles] have arrested the mother of a 17-year-old suspect in a rape case on the
ground that she condoned his membership in a street gang."); California's Street
Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20-.27 (West
Supp. 1992).
245. See Judge Restores a Truancy Program Tied to Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
1990, at A10 (reinstating Wisconsin program reducing families' benefits from Aid to
Families with Dependent Children if teenage children are truant).
246. See Ronald Smothers, Atlanta Sets a Curfew for Youths, Prompting Concern
on Race Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1990, at Al (reporting that parents whose
children breach 11 p.m. curfew are to be charged with a misdemeanor).
247. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 49.90(1)(a)2 (West Supp. 1991).
248. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1992) (providing for one-year jail
sentence for parents); Truant Student's Parents Are Threatened with Jail, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1990, at A33 (concerning a 15-year-old who missed 80 out of 180 days of
school); Toni Weinstein, Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The Legality of
Criminal Parental Liability Statutes, 64 CAL. L. REV. 859 (1991).
249. While federal law has not conditioned participation in the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program on school attendance, a substantial number of
states have. See Paul Taylor, Welfare Policy's 'New Paternalism' Uses Benefits to
Alter Recipients' Behavior, WASH. POST, June 8, 1991, at A3. For the history of such
restrictions, see Margaret K. Rosenheim, Vagrancy Concepts in Welfare Law, in THE
LAW OF THE POOR 187, 232-37 (Jacobus tenBroek ed., 1966). States may also evict
families from public housing if a child within the family uses or sells drugs. Joseph
P. Shapiro, When Parents Pay for Their Kids' Sins, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 24, 1989, at 26; Lisa Weil, Drug-Related Evictions in Public Housing: Congress'
Addiction to a Quick Fix, 9 YALE L. & POLY REV. 161, 178-82 (1991) (arguing that
punishing entire family by eviction misunderstands the complex causes of juvenile
criminal activity).
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and financial responsibility. ° Indeed, some have explicitly
urged the use of emancipation statutes to secure parental
protection from minors' torts in cases where "a child's abusive
behavior causes serious family conflict and she/he refuses to
conform to parental expectations."25'
A third advantage of emancipation over other forms of out-
of-home placement is its unintrusiveness. Minors and parents
decide on emancipation, and in most counties they need not
persuade a judge, probation officer, or social worker about the
wisdom of the decision.252 Indeed, other than signing a form,
the parents themselves need not participate at all. In con-
trast, parental nonparticipation is not always an option for
minors under juvenile court jurisdiction. In California, the
juvenile court judge may order parents into counseling with
the minor, 2" a form of mandatory togetherness not desiredby all families . 4 This differs from emancipation, where the
250. See Michael A. Axel, Note, Statutory Vicarious Parental Liability: Review
and Reform, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559, 565 n.41 (1982) (listing all parental civil
liability statutes).
251. Dana F. Castle, Early Emancipation Statutes: Should They Protect Parents
as Well as Children?, 20 FAM. L.Q. 343, 361 (1986). The argument is that "[t]he
rights of parents, as those rights relate not to protection of the parent-child relation-
ship but from that relationship, have been ignored." Id. at 372. Authorizing parents
to petition for emancipation would cure the predicament of "the parent who uses an
eviction tactic [and thereby] places himself in a tenuous legal position." Id. at 367.
Connecticut's emancipation statute approaches this outcome. It provides that
parents, as well as minors, may petition for emancipation and that emancipation may
be granted if the court finds that "it is in the best interest of either or both parties."
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-150b(4) (West 1986).
252. See supra notes 115-25, 185-200 and accompanying text.
253. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 727(c) (West Supp. 1992) ("When counseling or
other treatment services are ordered for the minor, the parent, guardian, or foster
parent shall be ordered to participate in those services, unless participation by the
parent, guardian, or foster parent is deemed by the court to be inappropriate or
potentially detrimental to the child.").
See generally James L. Framo, Family Theory and Therapy, 34 AM. PSYCHOL. 988,
990 (1979) (discussing several broad findings regarding family therapy); Galan M.
Janeksela, Mandatory Parental Involvement in the Treatment of "Delinquent" Youth,
30 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 47, 49 (1979) (arguing for increased parental responsibility for
the treatment of juvenile behavioral problems); Thomas F. Johnson, Treating the
Juvenile Offender in His Family, JUV. JUST. 41, 43-44 (Nov. 1973) (discussing the
familial factors courts consider in determining treatment for juvenile offenders);
Donna K. Ulrici, The Effects of Behavioral and Family Interventions on Juvenile
Recidivism, 10 FAM. THERAPY 25, 32 (1983) (suggesting that family involvement in
therapy is not enough and advocating the "strategic use of behavioral techniques to
change family interaction").
254. The efficacy of court-ordered family therapy is sometimes reduced by
superficial parental participation. Robin Sanders Millstone,An Analysis of the Policy
Rationale for the Texas Family Code Provision Allowing Courts to Compel Families
of "Delinquent" Youth to Participate in Therapy, 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 169, 176 (1984).
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court can grant or deny the petition, but cannot condition its
decision by requiring family members to talk to one another.
The process is unintrusive in another way-it restricts the
involvement of third parties. No lawyers or helping profes-
sionals of any kind are required. In sociolegal terms, there is
no "audience."255 One consequence of limiting a dispute to
just the parties involved is that "the power to transform a
dispute in desired ways may be limited by the lack of a
relevant public or audience."256  Earlier research has sug-
gested that to avoid an expanding audience, "middle-class
individuals are less likely than others to bring law into their
strictly personal affairs, i.e., their dealings with relatives,
friends, neighbors, and acquaintances." 257  Emancipation
seems a new application of this phenomenon.
A fourth advantage of emancipation is that the process is
relatively stigma-free, for both parents and child. Unlike
delinquents, status offenders, runaways, or mental patients,
the emancipated minor is neither bad, disobedient, nor crazy;
he is mature. Thus, in contrast to institutionalization 2 8 or
Individual or family resistance to therapy is demonstrated by "being late for or not
showing up for appointments; refusing to say anything during the session; making
statements to the effect that they will not do anything in therapy; and showing
confusion over why they have been referred." Alan Belcher & Connie S. Salts, The
Family Therapist and the Juvenile Court Referral, 12 FAM. THERAPY 273, 277 (1985).
Studies of family mediation suggest that children can also thwart progress in
family sessions. Both parents and children are "more likely to be angry and less
likely to cooperate in joint sessions," and children in particular are "much more likely
to be withdrawn, silent, or not interested in joint sessions. ... " SALLY ENGLE MERRY
& ANN MARIE ROCHELEAU, MEDIATION IN FAMILIES: A STUDY OF THE CHILDREN'S
HEARING PROJECT 86 (1985) (observing that private mediation sessions are necessary
to overcome the power differential between parent and child and are "crucial in
involving the child in the process").
255. Lynn Mather & Barbara Yngvesson, Language, Audience and the Transfor-
mation of Disputes, 15 LAw & Soc. REV. 775, 782 (1981).
256. Id.
257. M.P. Baumgartner, Law and Middle Class: Evidence from a Suburban Town,
9 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 3, 4 (1985) (emphasis added); see also Jeffrey Fitzgerald &
Richard Dickins, Disputing in Legal and Nonlegal Contexts: Some Questions for
Sociologists of Law, 15 LAw & Soc. REV. 681, 695 (1981) (suggesting that in many
primary group relationships the parties go to great extremes to avoid "washing dirty
linen" in public).
258. In partial explanation of the skyrocketing admission rates of adolescents to
mental facilities, Weithorn notes that the "medicalization" of the problem fits into
the current cultural ethic approving the provision "[of] solicitous care and treatment
[for] troublesome children and other dependent persons who may manifest problems
.... " Institutionalization is socially acceptable under this ethic. Weithorn, supra
note 5, at 823. She suggests that "[tihe 'illness' designation makes parents the
objects of sympathy and compassion, rather than the objects of blame as allegedly
inadequate parents." Id. at 821. We question first whether there is such a prevailing
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a parent-initiated petition that confesses inability to handle a
child who is "beyond control," emancipation does not officially
implicate the child-rearing abilities of the parents.2"9 Eman-
cipation may avoid, or at least provide a pretext for avoiding,
the more public and pejorative aspects of labeling.
A fifth benefit is that unlike other sanctioned out-of-home
placements, statutory emancipation is almost always perma-
nent.26 ° With foster care or institutionalization, for example,
parents must anticipate the child's return and the eventual
possibility of continued conflict.26' Informal placements tend
to be temporary as well. Most runaways return262 and when
teenagers are taken in by friends or relatives, the arrange-
ment is often agreed to only to ease a temporary crisis. When
the spare room is needed, when the school calls to verify the
student's residence, when the kid stays out too late once too
often, he may be sent home.263  Emancipation removes the
legal requirement that home still be available.
cultural ethic and second, whether institutionalizing one's child really transforms the
negative views of relatives and neighbors into compassionate ones. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has characterized the mental hospital admissions process as
"embarrassing" and has used this characterization to support its position that a
parental decision to institutionalize a child should have been impeded by the
attention procedural due process would generate. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605
(1979). Nevertheless, parents who institutionalize a child are surely regarded as less
at fault than parents whose child is jailed.
259. Court-ordered family therapy threatens to label as well as to intrude.
Indeed, many parents resist participation in therapy precisely because "requiring
their presence implies that their child's behavior is both their responsibility and their
fault, and they do not wish to accept either responsibility or blame." Thomas F.
Johnson, Therapeutic Interventions in Delinquency, in HELPING FAMILIES WITH
SPECIAL PROBLEMS 103, 115 (Martin R. Textor ed., 1983).
260. While the statute provides grounds and procedures for setting aside an
emancipation, of the 90 petitions that were examined, only one was revoked. See
supra note 134.
261. Institutionalized minors are returned home when they are cured; however,
their "cure" sometimes coincides with the depletion of their insurance coverage. See
Peter Kerr, U.S. Study of Mental Care Finds Widespread Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
1992, at Cl.
262. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 80 (1980) (estimat-
ing that around twenty to thirty percent of runways do not return home).
263. Statutory emancipation may be more permanent than emancipation created
by marriage or military service, for return to single or civilian life may reinstate the
legal dependencies of minority. See supra note 86. There is some older evidence
suggesting that many married young couples never leave home in the first place:
persons who married young were twice as likely as others to continue to reside with
their relatives after marriage and four times as likely to receive parental financial
assistance. Rachel M. Inselberg, Marital Problems and Satisfaction in High School
Marriages, 24 MARRIAGE & FAM. LIVING 74, 75-76 (1962).
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A final benefit is that, at least in some California counties,
emancipation is easily available. In the two counties studied,
each of the ninety petitions filed over a two-year period was
granted. To be sure, approval of emancipation petitions may
not be automatic in every county.2"4 Why policies vary
county to county is a subject for future study. The point here
is simply that emancipation's ready availability in some
counties enhances its attractiveness.
In sum, emancipation now may operate as the out-of-home
placement of least procedural resistance and greatest substan-
tive practical advantage. It differs from the traditional forms
of out-of-home placement such as foster care or institutional-
ization in that only minors may officially invoke it. 265  But
that difference is offset by a larger similarity: whatever its
form, the placement of a child outside the family often reflects
conflict or dysfunction within the family.266
Emancipation thus fits into established patterns of inter-
action between law and intrafamily conflict. As courts and
legislatures have curtailed the availability of juvenile court
jurisdiction and dispositions (such as juvenile detention
facilities or reform schools), parents have moved down an
"intervention hierarchy" to less restrictive mechanisms that
still bring about some form of out-of-home placement. This
hierarchy began in the late 1960s with the extension of adult
due process standards to juvenile delinquency proceedings.267
As procedural safeguards in criminal proceedings made
264. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (describing the practice in
San Francisco County). In the five northern California Bay Area counties canvassed
for this study, two (Santa Clara and San Mateo) had "open" procedures where every
petition was granted; one (San Francisco) permitted essentially no emancipations;
and the remaining three (Marin, Sonoma, and Santa Cruz) granted some petitions
and denied others. Since the study was completed, San Francisco has changed its
procedures and now grants nearly all petitions filed. Why petitions may be granted
as a matter of course is discussed infra notes 315-27 and accompanying text.
265. Most out-of-home placements for adolescents are initiated either by the state
(juvenile delinquency, neglect, and foster care) or by parents (voluntary placements
with the juvenile court, in foster care, in private or public institutions, in boarding
schools, or with relatives).
266. See, e.g., Jan C. Costello & Nancy L. Worthington, Incarcerating Status
Offenders: Attempts to Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 41, 45 (1981) (noting that most cases involving
juvenile status offense jurisdiction have an element of family conflict); Weithorn,
supra note 5, at 798-808 (arguing that rising rates of adolescent mental hospitaliza-
tion are due in part to coping problems within families).
267. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that juvenile proceedings that
could result in incarceration must meet certain due process requirements).
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juvenile detention less available, parents turned increasingly to
incorrigibility statutes as a means of invoking state authority
to help control their teenagers. 2 8  The 1974 Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act then conditioned the states'
receipt of certain federal funds on the deinstitutionalization of
incorrigibles or status offenders.269 Gradual state compliance
with the federal standards removed detention as a disposi-
tional alternative in many cases.27 ° Status offenders then
tended to remain with their families or in local community-
based programs, when such programs were available.2
Some parents then proceeded along the continuum to the
procedurally uncomplicated institutionalization of minors in
state mental facilities. 7 2  By the mid-1970s, states began
reporting huge jumps in the numbers of juveniles diverted into
the mental health care system following the prohibitions on
detention in secure facilities.2 73 Recent studies indicate that
currently the most popular out-of-home placements may be
private schools and hospitals, which still are immune from due
process restrictions. 4  While access to them is frequently
268. See Comment, Status Offenses and Status of Children's Rights: Do Children
Have the Legal Right to Be Incorrigible?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 659,660-65 (describing
parents' use of incorrigibility laws to gain control of their children).
269. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415,
§§ 223(a)(12), (13), 224(a)(2), (3), 88 Stat. 1109, 1121-1123 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5601 (1988)).
270. The "carrot" of federal funds for states in compliance with deinstitutional-
ization may not have been very powerful. In assessing the process of reform in
California, David Steinhart concludes that the eventual passage of deinstitutionaliza-
tion legislation was accomplished more as a result of competing interests within the
state than by the promise of federal money. Steinhart, supra note 66, at 821-22. In
addition, see Richard Johnson & Timothy Mack, Deinstitutionalization in Utah: A
Study of Contrasts and Contradictions, in NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES, supra note
66, at 419, 420 (explaining that Utah did not comply with the federal law until 1978
because until then incoming federal funds were not worth the costs of compliance).
271. Johnson & Mack, supra note 270, at 420.
272. See James W. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of
Children to Mental Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REV. 840 (1974); Ira Schwartz, Out-of
Home Placement of Children: Selected Issues for the Future, 9 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 189,
192-95 (1991). But see Dillon et al., supra note 232, at 373 (arguing that the
outcomes for minors receiving commitment hearings remain relatively unchanged).
273. Costello & Worthington, supra note 266, at 61.
274. See Weithorn, supra note 5, at 808-13 (discussing the lack of procedural
barriers to the institutionalization of minors). There have been unsuccessful
attempts to secure procedural protections for juvenile placements even in private
institutions. See, e.g., Michael McGuire, Questioning Minors' Rights in Institutions,
PENINSULA TIMES TRIB., Mar. 6, 1988, at Al (describing a habeas corpus petition
against private psychiatric institution in Santa Clara County by a teenage girl
admitted by her parents).
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limited to the children of either wealthy or insured par-
ents,275 private institutions appear to be serving a population
of adolescents who resemble earlier juvenile delinquents,
status offenders, and voluntarily institutionalized teenage
patients. 76  Sometimes it is as difficult to characterize the
nature of the admitting institution as it is to characterize the
problem of the patient/pupil/prisoner. 27
The argument is not that all children of identical character-
istics have been reassigned, or "transinstitutionalized"278 as
Lois Weithorn puts it, from one category to another as
procedures surrounding each have tightened. There still are
adolescents who commit crimes, or will not obey their parents
in drastic measure, or who might benefit from residential
mental-health care. There is, however, little disagreement
that each of these placements is frequently chosen not because
of its therapeutic potential, but because it does the essential
job: it gets the adolescent out of the home.
Against this backdrop, the use of emancipation suddenly
makes sense. The process combines the best of several worlds.
It is authorized by the state, yet has almost none of the usual
procedural or practical disadvantages present with incorrigi-
bility, foster care, or institutionalization. Compared with
275. See Weithorn, supra note 5, at 814-20 (discussing economic incentives for
institutionalization caused by a combination of insurance policies favoring inpatient
services and a rise of for-profit hospitals); Ira Schwartz, Hospitalization of
Adolescents for Psychiatric and Substance Abuse Treatment: Legal and Ethical
Issues, 10 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 1 (1989) (discussing marketing campaigns
by private institutions to increase admission rates). A 1992 Defense Department
study of 500 psychiatric patients admitted under a federal insurance program for
military families found that in 64% of the cases-most of which were teenagers and
children-the patients "never should have been admitted, were kept longer than
necessary, or had medical records for which their hospitals could not justify
treatment." Kerr, supra note 261, at C1.
276. See Weithorn, supra note 5, at 792. "Although some proportion ofjuveniles
in [juvenile psychiatric units] are psychotic or seriously emotionally disturbed, many
more appear to be troublemakers, children reacting to disturbed or inadequate family
situations, or adolescents experiencing nonpathological turmoil, rebellion, or identity
crisis." Id.
For comparisons of runaways and other troubled children, see Loving P. Jones, A
Typology of Adolescent Runaways, 5 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 16 (1988);
Robert Johnson & Madeline M. Carter, Flight of the Young: Why Children Run Away
from Their Homes, 15 ADOLESCENCE 483 (1980).
277. For example, the private Provo Canyon School in Utah was described by a
federal district court as "not a school in the traditional, ordinary, or classic sense.
It does offer classes .... [but] Provo Canyon School is also a correctional and
detention facility [and it] is also a mental health facility .... " Milonas v. Williams,
691 F.2d 931, 935 (10th Cir. 1982).
278. See Weithorn, supra note 5, at 805.
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other forms of out-of-home placements, emancipation is quick,
cheap, private, available, respectable, and final.
But the very features that make emancipation appealing and
efficient for parents may provoke hard consequences for
adolescents. The whole point of emancipation is to transform
independent teenagers into adults ahead of schedule. This is
sometimes problematic because the timing is off: this adult-
hood is not part of the usual normative transition. Leaving
home in America, like other rites of passage such as graduat-
ing from high school, going to college, getting one's first real job,
and getting married, most often occurs between eighteen and
twenty-two years of age. From a developmental perspective,
leaving home usually is associated with such markers as a
consolidation of ego identity, increased responsibility, and a
more mature relationship with parents. Feelings of insecurity
and even abandonment that result from the transition into
adulthood are offset by the freedom of the new status, the new
address. Emancipation, in contrast, is an "off-life" event,
occurring outside the scheduled time that leaving home usually
occupies. Because it constitutes a premature leave-taking, its
impact on the adolescent may differ then from that of other
standard departures like graduation from high school.279
In the present study, for example, many of the minors
experienced their promotion into adulthood as abrupt and
confusing, due in part to the speed and efficiency of the
emancipation procedure. Although chronologically premature,
emancipation is nonetheless a form of leave-taking or rite of
passage, but nothing in the hearing commemorates the event.
In none of the accounts, for example, did a minor report being
congratulated on his or her emancipation. Instead, they were
surprised, slightly stunned, and unsure of what to do next,
where to file the declaration. This lack of ceremony ignores
the symbolic and emotional significance that emancipation
might have for the participants. Emancipations may be like
divorces in this respect: while "'routine' from an institutional
279. For adolescents still in the process of identity formation, normative events,
such as menstruation or getting taller, are experienced more easily when they occur
on time; that is, they happen to them when they happen to their friends. Maryse H.
Tobin-Richards et al., The Psychological Impact of Pubertal Change: Sex Difference
in Perceptions of Self During Early Adolescence, in GIRLS AT PUBERTY: BIOLOGICAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 127,131-33 (Jeanne Brooks-Gunn & Anne
C. Petersen eds., 1983); Donald Weatherly, Self-Perceived Rate of Physical Maturation
and Personality in Late Adolescence, 35 CHILD DEV. 1197, 1206-09 (1964). In this
respect, adolescents may not be so different from the rest of us.
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perspective, they often are not routine from the viewpoint of
those whose careers and lives are profoundly influenced by
the results."28 °
B. Emancipation's Use by Families
The focus here shifts from the characteristics of the process
to the characteristics and circumstances of the people who use
it. This next section looks at why emancipation may be
particularly attractive to conflict-laden families.
1. Parents and Teenagers-Adolescence, the transition
from childhood to adulthood, has been described as "a period
of widened possibilities and of experimentation with alterna-
tives, before the individual narrows the range of what is
possible by making those commitments which will define
adulthood."2"' In consequence of both the experimentation
and the possibilities, some conflict between parents and their
teenage children occurs in most American families. 2  Much
of it is low-level, culturally expected, and understood as an
inherent part of the process of individuation.
Individuation and the accompanying identity crises are
normative processes. They usually occur during the quite
unalarming, noncrisis, sounding period of the "morato-
rium,"283 or what Frank Zimring calls the "learner's permit"
280. Lee E. Teitelbaum & Laura DuPaix, Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Divorce: Natural Experimentation in Family Law, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1093, 1116
(1989).
281. KATHERINE DALSIMER, FEMALE ADOLESCENCE 5 (1986).
282. See James Hall, Parent-Adolescent Conflict: An Empirical Review, 22
ADOLESCENCE 767, 767 (1987).
283. ERIK H. ERICKSON, IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE 119-20 (1980). While the
"moratorium" vocabulary is twentieth-century, the concept is older. As an example,
in a study of children's lives in eighteenth-century America, Ross Beales concludes
that:
[I]n colonial New England, childhood was not succeeded by "miniature
adulthood" but by "youth," a lengthy transitional period preceding adult status.
During this "chusing time," when the young were expected ... to "putt away
Childish things," the youth remained dependent on his elders for his education,
for his choice of and training in a calling, and for the material means, usually
land, which would support a family. While this dependence carried with it a
measure of parental control, it also provided a moratorium, a freedom from
adult responsibilities, during which the elements of a youthful "culture" might
emerge.
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stage of life.2" 4 During the moratorium, adolescents experi-
ment with different roles and beliefs without having to
commit irrevocably to any.2"5 Thus, adolescence has been
described in terms of "pervasive ambivalence," as teenage
views, opinions, and preferences are sometimes fiercely held
and then abandoned.218  But, normative or not, life with
teenagers is not always simple or satisfying. Individuation
is played out against real parents, with real disagreements
about dress, curfews, car keys, music volume, and foreign
policy. 2 7 A body of popular advice literature now exists to
guide parents through the period.8 8
Two circumstances prevalent within the families of the
minors interviewed reveal the conflict experienced as
Ross W. Beales, In Search of the Historical Child: Miniature Adulthood and Youth
in Colonial New England, in GROWING UP IN AMERICA 7, 22-23 (N. Ray Hiner &
Joseph M. Hawes eds., 1985).
284. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 89-96
(1982).
285. JOHN J. CONGER, ADOLESCENCE AND YOUTH 224 (1973).
286. KENNETH KENISTON, YOUTH AND DISSENT 8 (1971).
287. Adolescent opinions and dissatisfactions result in part from a new capacity
for thinking, a shift in emphasis in thought from the real to the possible that occurs
during what Piaget has identified to be the period of "formal operations." BARBEL
INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING 334-50 (1958). This
new ability has consequences for the adolescent's view of self and family. Because
adolescents are better able than younger children to imagine other kinds of adult
behavior and other ways they themselves could be, unhappiness with their lives and
families is sometimes heightened by the clarity with which they can envision
different ways of living: "[this] new awareness of the discrepancy between the actual
and the possible also helps to make the adolescent a rebel. He is always comparing
the possible with the actual and discovering that the actual is flagrantly wanting."
David Elkind, Cognitive Development in Adolescence, in UNDERSTANDING ADOLES-
CENCE 128, 152 (James F. Adams ed., 1968).
As the narrator of the novel Metroland explains:
They say that adolescence is a dynamic period, the mind and body thrusting
forward to new discoveries all the time. I don't remember it like that.
Things never changed for you. That was one of the first rules. You talked
about what things would be like when they did change: you imagined marriage,
and sex eight times a night, and bringing up your children in a way which
combined flexibility, tolerance, creativeness and large quantities of money; you
thought of having a bank account and going to strip clubs and owning cuff-
links .... But any real threat of change induced apprehension and discontent.
BARNES, supra note 2, at 52, 62.
288. See, e.g., MICHAEL DE SISTO, DECODING YOUR TEENAGER (1991); LARRY
DUMONT, SOLVING ADOLESCENCE (1991); ADELE FABER & ELAINE MAZLISH, HOW TO
TALK So KIDS WILL LISTEN AND LISTEN So KIDS WILL TALK (1980); HAIM GINOTT,
BETWEEN PARENT AND TEENAGER (1969); CARYL RIVERS ET AL., BEYOND SUGAR AND
SPICE (1979).
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especially severe and sustained. First, parents and children
had been fighting for years. The kind of conflict frequently
described was not only over typical annoyances such as TV
programming, hairstyle, or the occasional late night out. In
six separate cases, tension centered around an arrest, running
away, or pregnancy. Seven of the minors had lived outside
their homes at least once prior to the emancipation-with
relatives, in a group home, or after running away. Emancipa-
tion as a means to effect a separation did not appear to be a
"first-use" tactic, but something closer to a last resort.
The second common circumstance was the presence of a
stepparent or other nonparental adult within the family. A
developing literature suggests that adolescence is a time when
"the child is particularly vulnerable to the effects of family
reorganization and changes in family functioning due to
divorce and remarriage. " "' Explanations relate in some
degree to adolescent development. For example, "[t]he need
for [adolescent] autonomy comes at a time when the adult
members of the new stepfamily may ask for or imply that
demonstrations of commitment to the new unit are essen-
tial."29 ° Yet this is the very time when the beginnings of
separation from parents are expected and necessary. Another
explanation is that adolescents, "who are themselves 'coming
of age' sexually[J ... may be embarrassed or confused by the
demonstrations of affection and sexuality between their parent
and stepparent."291  The experience of one emancipated
minor provided a particularly tense and complex example,
combining sexuality, competition, and family roles: both
daughter and stepmother were pregnant at the same time; the
stepmother ordered the girl to leave the house each day and
come back only at night when the father returned.2
2. Cultural Context and Consequences-In addition to
the psychological dynamics, cultural expectations about
growing up and moving out may affect the emancipation
decision. Parents can present emancipation to their children
as a good, grown-up, almost patriotic thing to do, relying in
289. Kay Pasley & Kathy L. Healow, Adolescent Self-Esteem: A Focus on Children
in Stepfamilies, in IMPACT OF DIVORCE, SINGLE PARENTING, AND STEPPARENTING ON
CHILDREN 263, 264 (E. Mavis Hetherington & Josephine D. Arasteh eds., 1988).
290. Id. Parents themselves may be in a transitional developmental stage, either
because of divorce or remarriage or just because they are growing older. See Harry
Prosen et al., The Life Cycle of the Family: Parental Midlife Crisis and Adolescent
Rebellion, in ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 170 (Sherman C. Feinstein et al. eds., 1981).
291. Pasley & Healow, supra note 289, at 265.
292. Interview with Vicki 12.
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their presentations (even if subconsciously) upon well-rooted
cultural resources. Leaving home, especially when couched in
terms of responsibility, self-sufficiency, and independence, is
not just what pop-star Tiffany's mother's lawyer described as
"every [teenager's] fantasy: [t]ell[ing] your parents to go to
hell and becom[ingi an independent grown-up overnight."293
Self-reliance within American culture differs from bravado. In
their study of individualism and morality in contemporary life,
Robert Bellah and his coauthors observed that "[w]hile it
sometimes appears to be a pitched battle only the heroic or
rebellious wage against the parental order, more often the
drive to get out in the world on your own is part of the self-
conception Americans teach their children."294 Social science
data record a trend beginning in the 1960s in parental value
preferences away from obedience and conformity in their
children and toward autonomy and self-direction.29
But if self-reliance is what Americans are so much
about,296 what is the harm in emancipation's slightly prema-
ture leave-taking? Even the harder, sadder cases described
here might be characterized simply as exemplars of the school
of hard (but in the long run worthwhile) knocks. We cannot
know now what the lives of these emancipated minors will be
like. We do know, however, that there is a paradox in two
competing cultural values: leaving home and sustaining close
family relationships. As the Habits of the Heart authors
conclude, "The idea we have of ourselves as individuals on our
own, who earn everything we get, accept no handouts or gifts,
and free ourselves from our families of origin turns out,
ironically enough, to be one of the things that holds us
together."297 A participant in the study explained his
parents' approval of his emancipation in exactly such terms:
[M]y parents were really agreeable to [my emancipation]
because they both headed out in life at the soonest
293. McDougal, supra note 130, at 8.
294. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 57 (1985). For many they
talked to, "the family seemed to reinforce the importance of self-reliance as the
cardinal virtue of individuals." Id. at 62.
295. See Duane Alwin, Changes in Qualities Valued in Children in the United
States, 1964-1984, 18 SOC. SCL RES. 195, 203-14 (1989).
296. See BELLAH ET AL., supra note 294, at 62.
297. Id. The authors continue: "Like other core elements of our culture, the ideal
of a self-reliant individual leaving home is nurtured within our families, passed from
parent to child through ties that bind us together in solitude as well as love." Id.
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possible point for them and they say that is the only way
that you can get anything done so there was no bad
feeling about my moving.298
But while "accepting no handouts," "heading out," and
"freeing oneself' may be unifying cultural mottos, they are
best achieved-sociologists and psychologists are here in
agreement-when linked to familial cohesiveness: "Self-reliant
and independent notions of the self show up prominently in
precisely those families whose offspring report the greatest felt
continuity between their parents and themselves."299 Some
of the minors interviewed, like the young man just quoted,
reported such continuity with their parents 3 ° and over time
others may renew or develop such relationships. 3 1' But
many felt cut off from their parents-abandoned rather than
self-reliant. °2
The shaky quality of independent life for the participants
may not seem particularly startling. The end of any intimate
relationship, even one desired or planned by both parties, may
result in intense feelings of loss. 3 °3 But emancipation differs
from romantic break-ups in several respects: parents and
adolescents do not each enter the relationship voluntarily; the
298. Interview with Brendan 4.
299. BELLAH ET AL., supra note 294, at 57.
300. Each participant was asked, "If you were laid off or seriously hurt in an
accident, who could you count on for help?" See Appendix B.
301. John Boswell has observed that while societies commonly establish
chronological limits for parental authority, "few seem to imagine that the parent-child
relationship actually terminates: 'Is there an age at which one ceases to be a son?'
(Seneca the Elder, Controversiae 3.3)." BOSWELL, supra note 33, at 27 n.54. The
modern version is perhaps less eloquent. See William Leventon, 28, Living at Home,
and Not Neurotic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1988, at A19.
A participant in the present study put it this way: "Some people use [emancipa-
tion] to get away from their parents ... [but] I don't really see that ever happening."
Interview with Brendan 11. The authors of Habits of the Heart agree: "Though the
issues of separation, individuation, and leaving home come to a head in late adoles-
cence, they are recurrent themes in the lives of Americans, and few of us ever leave
them entirely behind." BELLAH ET AL., supra note 294, at 57.
302. In his history of the abandonment of children in Western Europe, Boswell
defines the term "abandonment" to mean "the voluntary relinquishing of control over
children by their natal parents or guardians, whether by leaving them somewhere,
selling them, or legally consigning authority to some other person or institution."
BOSWELL, supra note 33, at 24. Under this definition, modern emancipation is not
an abandonment; the very process transforms "child" to adult. Modern emancipation
might more accurately be regarded as a voluntary relinquishment of control over
children to the children themselves.
303. See WALLERSTEIN & KELLEY, supra note 18, at 193 (describing the sense of
loss some divorced individuals feel long after the divorce).
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relationship is almost always one of asymmetrical dependence;
and parents and child are at different stages of emotional
development in ways that are quite different from whatever
emotional imbalances may exist in relationships between
adults. In this regard, emancipation differs not only from
divorce, which governs the separation between married adults,
but from other official forms of parent-child separations such
as adoption or termination of parental rights. In those two
cases, either the parent gives up the child voluntarily3. 4 or
the state seeks to end the relationship because the parent is
considered unfit.0 5 But in both adoption and termination
cases, multiple checks have been placed around the processes
of separation. In adoption, the mother's consent is inspected
for signs of coercion3 6 and is protected by cooling-off
periods 3°-mechanisms designed to underscore to her the
importance of the decision to give up a child. In abuse or
neglect cases, the state must make "reasonable efforts" to help
parents overcome the family's problems.3 8 Only if such
efforts, often expensive and long-term, do not work can the
state proceed with termination proceedings.
These safeguards reflect the importance of family ties within
the legal system. Their disruption, whether voluntary,
unilateral, or forced, is taken seriously. There are, however,
exceptions to this, all premised on parents acting in the
interests of their children and in ways that do not sever the
parent-child relationship legally. For example, parents may
lodge their children with other family members without state
approval. 0 9 Similarly, decisions by divorcing parents about
the custody and residency of their children are approved by
courts as matter of course.310 Even where the child's new
304. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.20 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring parental consent
to adoption).
305. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1992) (providing for termination of
parental rights in certain cases of abandonment, abuse, and neglect).
306. See JOAN H. HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.11[2]
(1988).
307. See id. § 2.11[7][a].
308. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(7) (West Supp. 1992) ("The court shall make
a determination that reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parents
... to overcome the problems which led to the deprivation or continued loss of
custody and that despite the availability of these services, return of the child to the
parents would be detrimental to the child.").
309. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 87007(a)(10) (1992) (exempting relatives
from foster care licensure).
310. See Sally G. Sharp, Modification of Agreement-Based Custody Decrees:
Unitary or Dual Standard?, 68 VA. L. REV. 1263, 1264 (1982).
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placement is not with a family member but in an institution,
the Supreme Court has made clear that "our precedents
permit the parents to retain a substantial, if not the dominant,
role in the decision .... "'3u
Where then does emancipation fit-conceptually and
practically-in the scheme of parent-child separations? It is
like adoption and parental termination in that it ends the
primary legal obligations between parent and child, though
in each of those instances responsibility for the child is
reposed in some other adult or in the state.312 In contrast,
emancipation releases the minor from parental control but
substitutes no other guardian. This is all the more curious
in that, unlike adoption or termination, the requirements for
emancipation are minimal on the face of the statute and in
some counties are close to nonexistent in practice. The
following section discusses why this may be so.
C. The Disadvantages of Emancipation
1. Judicial Rubber Stamping-Emancipation is supposed
to legitimize the status of a minor who is already living as an
independent adult. If emancipation changes nothing more
than a legal designation, limited judicial oversight of the
process may be reasonable and appropriate. The emancipation
process is not totally perfunctory when compared, for example,
with California's summary dissolution which authorizes
divorce solely "on the papers" with no hearing at all.313 The
311. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979).
312. By "adoption," I have been referring to the surrender of the child by her
natural mother to adopting parents. There is, however, a second way in which the
adoption process comes into play in thinking about separations between parents and
children. Adoptive parents sometimes "return" adopted children through the process
of abrogation or "set-asides." In California, set-asides are permitted within five years
of the adoption if the child has a defect unknown to the parents at the time of the
adoption that has since revealed itself. CAL. CIV. CODE § 228.10 (West Supp. 1992);
see also Adoption of K.C., 278 Cal. Rptr. 907, 915-17 (1991) (finding that adopted
child has no fundamental liberty interest in her family relationship). This second
permissible surrender of the child is premised on a notion that the care of some
children exceeds what parents thought they were undertaking and so may have
something in common with emancipation. See generally Elizabeth N. Carroll,
Abrogation of Adoption by Adoptive Parents, 19 FAM. L.Q. 155 (1985).
313. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4550-4556 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992). Recall, however,
that the Santa Clara and San Mateo County emancipation processes involved only
perfunctory hearings. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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Emancipation of Minors Act at least requires the judge to find
that the affirmations on the petition are true and that emanci-
pation is not contrary to the minor's best interests.314
Yet the minors' descriptions of their hearings indicate that
judges make that finding neatly, relying primarily on the
declarations on the petition. One explanation for this is the
nonadversarial nature of the proceeding. As with routine
judicial approvals of parental custody agreements, courts are
hard pressed to justify investigating further when there is no
dispute before them.315 The emancipation hearings seem to
resemble at least some judicial hearings on teenage abortion
petitions-not "a careful individualized assessment, but ...
instead a rubber-stamp, administrative operation."316  As
Robert Mnookin has pointed out, "the rubber-stamp nature of
authorization is perhaps not so surprising. After all, the
proceedings before the judge are not contested, and the judge
has no independent source of information."31 v Still, there
are reasons to think emancipation might be granted less freely
than abortion. Unlike abortion, there is no constitutional
right involved in a minor's claim for adulthood. Moreover,
the consequence of denying an emancipation is simply a
postponement of the status-there is no irremediable harm,
no opportunity lost forever. 318  Although the absence of
314. CAL. CIV. CODE § 64 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
315. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 955 (1979).
316. Robert H. Mnookin, Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, in IN THE INTEREST OF
CHILDREN 149, 263 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985). In addition, see the statistics of
abortion hearings in Minnesota as reported in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926,
2940 (1990) (noting that of 3,573 judicial bypass petitions filed, all but 15 were
granted). But see Isabel Wilkerson, Michigan Judges' Views of Abortion Are Berated,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1991, at A19 (reporting that although statute authorizes judge
only to decide if minor is mature enough to make the abortion decision, several
judges announced that they will not comply: "If I had to sign a paper for an abortion,
even once is too much").
317. Mnookin, supra note 316, at 263 (noting that each of the 1300 teenage
petitions filed in Massachusetts between April 1981 and February 1983 was granted;
all but five by the trial court). Of course, the fact that many teenage abortion
petitions are granted does not mean that teenagers should be required to petition for
the procedure. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
PROJECT, SHATTERING THE DREAMS OF YOUNG WOMEN: THE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES
OF PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT LAWS (1991) (opposing parental involvement laws).
318. Permanence of harm has measured into judicial determinations regarding
teenage abortion, see Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) ("A minor not
permitted to marry before the age of majority is required simply to postpone the
decision.... A pregnant adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibility
of aborting.... ."); teenage marriage, Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 630 (S.D.N.Y.
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these considerations could be expected to remove pressure
from granting emancipation petitions, that is not the case.
Petitions in the counties studied are granted as a matter of
course.
All the emancipation petitions studied were accompanied by
parental signatures, thus presenting an overtly unified
familial position. Once the parents had signed, emancipation
was guaranteed.319 This suggests that judges may rely on
the parental signatures as much as on the minor's stock
declarations. Judges may regard the parental signature as a
meaningful and satisfactory assurance that emancipation is
not contrary to the interests of the child.320 This hypothesis
was confirmed by an interview with a Santa Clara Superior
Court judge.32'
California judges also may be using the parental signature
as a proxy for an independent, best-interest determina-
tion.322 If so, they follow a well-established tradition of
judicial deference to parental decisions about where their
children live and who will have control over them.
1981); and certain teenage political preferences, Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731,
737 n.16 (7th Cir. 1985) ("It is this factor-the finality of the decision and its grave
and potentially irreversible consequences [teenager returned to the former Ukraine
against his will]-that makes this case analogous to the Supreme Court decisions in
which a minor's right to obtain an abortion over the objections of her parents was
affirmed.").
319. Because all 90 of the petitions studied were filed with parental signatures,
we cannot predict whether they would have been granted without parental signature,
solely on the child's request. Curiously, the recently-revised Santa Clara Superior
Court emancipation procedure has a well-developed protocol for processing petitions
contested by a parent. Interview with Judge Donald Clark, supra note 120. Such
cases are to be referred to the Family Conciliation Service. Id. But there have been
and are likely to be few such cases, in part because, as this study reveals, parents
tend to promote, not contest, their teen's emancipation.
320. The actual signing by the parent may have great significance for the minor
as well as the judge. For example, one participant explained:
Then I finally got [my mother] to sign the paper which basically she was
admitting that I was grown up and that I could handle my own life. So I don't
know, just the fact that she agreed to do it is what made me emancipated....
And the paper was important legally but it wasn't to me. It was the fact that
she had signed it.
Interview with Judy 1.
321. Interview with Judge Donald Clark, supra note 120.
322. See CAL. CirV. CODE app. § 64 (West 1982) (allowing parents to give up the
right to notice and give their consent to a declaration of emancipation without a
hearing).
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Evidence on emancipations from Michigan shows the extent
to which parental affirmation of a child's status controls and
the dangers inherent in deferring to such affirmations. Until
1989, Michigan's emancipation statute provided for emancipa-
tions requested solely by parents. 323 A survey of the fifteen
largest counties in Michigan revealed that no verification of
the emancipation petition beyond proof of identity was
required by court clerks administering the process.324  The
Michigan Network of Runaway and Youth Services described
the pre-1989 process:
Currently it is possible in many areas for the parent of a
teenager to walk into a county clerk's office, sign a small
piece of paper, and walk out with no further parental
obligations to that teenager. No judge or referee considers
the implications of the action. No interview of the youth
in question occurs. Sometimes, the youth in question does
not even know what has happened.325
The practice of rubber stamping emancipation petitions is
similar to the automatic judicial approval of custody agree-
ments.326 Treating the two cases alike may not, however,
make good sense. Deference to parental agreement about
custody in divorce seems appropriate; there is little reason to
believe a judge is better able than the two parents to predict
323. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 722.4 historical note (West Supp. 1991).
324. Mary Keefe, Emancipation Task Force, NETWORK NEWS (MICHIGAN NETWORK
OF RUNAWAY AND YOUTH SERVICES), Summer 1987, at 12.
325. MICHIGAN NETWORK OF RUNAWAY AND YOUTH SERVICES, EMANCIPATION ISSUE
INVITES CONFUSION 2 (1988).
326. ' See Sharp, supra note 310, at 1279, 1281 (objecting to the practice in some
courts of hearing evidence in custody modification cases that existed at the time of
the initial order where that order was not litigated but was instead based on a
private consensual agreement). Sharp explains the logic behind rubber stamping:
"most parents genuinely love their children, and it is reasonable to assume that the
children's welfare is a vital consideration in the parents' decision to resolve their
dispute by agreement." Id. at 1280. While many factors in addition to their child's
welfare go into parental custody agreements, parents likely are more able to make
better decisions about the custody of their children than are judges.
The practice of rubber stamping parental custody agreements continues even when
the applicable state statute explicitly requires judicial scrutiny of cases where there
has been neglect, abuse, or domestic violence. See Jane W. Ellis, Plans, Protections,
and Professional Intervention: Innovations in Divorce Custody Reform and the Role
of Legal Professionals 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 65, 165-67 (1990) (studying the
implementation of Washington legislation requiring parents to complete detailed
"parenting plans" in all custody cases).
318
Emancipating Children in Modern Times 319
a satisfactory placement.327 In addition, custody case loads
are greatly reduced through consensual arrangements and the
court retains jurisdiction throughout the child's minority
should modification be necessary.
But such justifications for the automatic approval of custody
agreements do not apply as readily to emancipation. First, the
relatively small number of emancipations does not threaten
judicial efficiency. The existence of conflict between parent
and child further distinguishes emancipation from parental
agreements regarding custody. As long as no conflict between
parent and child is acknowledged, the court can accept a
parental waiver of the hearing as benign, in good faith, and
unconnected to potential conflicts of interest between
them.328 Yet our data indicate that family conflict often
underlies emancipation. As Anne Mahoney has suggested in
the context of status offenders, the "cycle of alienation"
between parents and their misbehaving teenagers may be
similar to the alienation between spouses in a dissolving
marriage, "except that there is no relief through divorce for
parents and children."329
But emancipation is quite similar to a divorce. In both cases
the parties agree to dissolve their legal responsibilities to one
another, usually because they find living with one another in
sufficient harmony impossible. Like divorce, emancipation
legally severs an intimate relationship whose content is
supplied, or at least whose gaps are filled, by state rules.
Judicial approval is necessary to give effect to the severance
in both cases.330
Of course, emancipation differs from divorce in several
important ways. First, while divorce ends the legal relation-
ship between the spouses (they are no longer married), it does
327. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 315, at 955.
328. Courts have failed to acknowledge disharmony between parents and children
even in situations where the potential for conflict between the two sets of interests
seems absolutely clear. One example is the institutionalization of minors by parents,
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-13 (1979). In that case, the Supreme Court
approved procedures that did not consider underlying familial tensions. Id.
329. Anne R. Mahoney, PINS and Parents, in BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS
OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT 161, 173 (Lee E. Teitelbaum & Aidan R. Gough
eds., 1977).
330. The speed of the hearings is another similarity. The emancipation hearings
lasted about five minutes. The average for uncontested divorce hearings is reported
at four minutes. Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah L. Rhode, Project, The Unauthorized
Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 129
(1976). The similarities in the speed of the hearings support the view that judges
consider emancipations to be uncontested.
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not necessarily end all their obligations to one another.
Aspects of dependence during the marriage sometimes justify
continued financial support between the former spouses.
Emancipation also ends essential parental obligations to
children.331 However, emancipation makes the minor's new
status completely controlling and takes little or no account of
the previous dependent relationship. Second, unlike spouses,
the legal duties between parents and children are not sup-
posed to be equally beneficial to both. Benefits go mostly to
the children who are presumed to lack the capacity to
renounce either the relationship or its benefits. Third,
because the state values the marital relationship, small
steps are taken even within the divorce process to promote
continuation of the marriage. For example, the divorce
petition itself offers the parties the opportunity for counsel-
ing services, and there is a six-month waiting period before
a divorce can become final.332 Finally, in divorce there is
at least the presumption of equality between the parties,
with efforts sometimes made to promote equality through
procedural reforms where its absence is noticed.333
Emancipation, on the other hand, requires no waiting
period and offers no counseling. It is perhaps closest to a
summary divorce, where the court proceeds on the basis of
pleadings alone.334 But even parties to a summary divorce
must be offered a brochure explaining to them, in nontech-
nical language, the "requirements, nature and effect" of the
proceedings.33 Thus, even the short, speedy version of
divorce recognizes the importance to the parties of the
impending changes in their status and obligations and
requires that notice of them be clearly given.
331. For an exception to this general rule, see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.4(2)(d) (West Supp. 1991) (leaving the responsibility of medical care costs on
the minor or the minor's parent when emancipation by operation of law occurs
pursuant to the minor's consent to routine medical treatment while in the custody of
a law enforcement agency).
332. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4514(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1992) (providing a waiting
period of at least six months); id. § 4556 (providing conciliation services where
available).
333. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545, 1559-61 (1990) (noting that custody mediation is an attempt, in part,
to promote equality in the context of custody and divorce proceedings).
334. Summary divorce is available only to parties who have no children from the
relationship, own no real property, have been married for less than five years, and
have assets under $25,000. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4550(c)-(g) (West Supp. 1992).
335. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4556 (West 1983).
Emancipating Children in Modern Times
Divorce and parent-initiated status offense petitions are
two situations in which conflict among related persons are
played out-recognized, tolerated, and supervised-within
the legal system.336 The law of wills provides a third.
Parental refusal to devise property to a child often reflects
some earlier disagreement or dispute between them.33 v
Disinheritance may not be common, but it is permitted. The
law accommodates the transfer of personal conflict to a public
forum, insisting on formulaic recitations by the testator
acknowledging that the failure to leave something to a child
is unusual, a disruption in the natural paths of parental
affection.338
Like dividing an estate or splitting up a marriage, emanci-
pation also represents a form of family conflict seeking
resolution within the legal system. The difference is that
unlike divorce or disinheritance, emancipation law fails to
incorporate the possibility of conflict into the procedure used
to resolve it. As a result, the system is less attentive to
misuse, coercion, or inappropriateness. Parental waiver of
notice of the emancipation hearing permits judges to accept
uncritically as a neutral, if not an harmonious, familial
decision what is in fact often a complex family situation. The
case of Parham v. J.R.,3  upholding parental authorization
to institutionalize children with a minimum of procedural
safeguards, 34 ° offers support for this approach. The case is
336. As is sometimes the case with divorce, the existence and extent of conflict in
emancipation is obscured by the procedure itself. As Erlanger, Chambliss, and Melli
suggest with regard to informally settled divorce cases, the informality and flexibility
of the process itself may downplay the contentiousness of many divorces, even those
settled "consensually." Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participation and Flexibility in
Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 585,
596-97 (1987).
337. See, e.g., In re Estate of Carson, 239 P. 364, 368 (1925) (upholding a mother's
disinheriting her estranged daughter and noting that the will "is a fair illustration
of the ordinary display of the operation of natural resentment by a parent of real or
fancied wrongs"); see also Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't Ask to Be Born: The American
Law of Disinheritance and a Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197 (1990) (cataloguing causes of disinheritance); Nathan Roth,
The Psychiatry of Writing a Will, 41 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 245, 247 (1987) ("The
opportunity in a will for the expression of hatred and vengefulness is too appealing
for some people to forego.").
338. In California, disinheritance may be accomplished by stating, "I have ...
intentionally and with full knowledge, omitted to provide for my heirs who may be
living at the time of my death." CAL FORMS: LEGAL AND BUSINESS § 41:411 (1985).
339. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
340. Id. at 607-08.
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premised on the assumption that "parents generally do act in
the child's best interests."341 The Court found it "curious" to
think that parents seeking "to 'dump' their children on the
state will inevitably be able to conceal their motives and thus
deceive the admitting psychiatrists ... ."342
The present study suggests that when the process does not
sufficiently examine emancipation requests, parents may well
be able to conceal motives, interest, and participation.
Identifying a conflict between parent and child is not an
attribution of fault or malice to one side or the other. It is
instead a way to force consideration of alternatives for families
who are at wit's end.
Indeed, one California court faced with a family in conflict
recommended emancipation as a means of sanctioning a
teenager's departure from his parent's home. In In re James
T.,"' the court found insufficient evidence of severe abuse or
neglect to justify the removal of sixteen-year-old James from
his mother, despite both James's own preference to remain
with his adult sister and the court psychologist's recommenda-
tion that he not be returned to his mother.344 Aware that
the result was not even close to James's best interest, the
court then commented:
Although removal of 16-year-old James from Mother was
erroneous as a matter of law, he has now lived with his
sister and brother-in-law for nearly a year and one-half
and his graduation from high school is imminent. Perhaps
Mother, sensitive to James's present needs, will realize
removal from his present home prior to his graduation
would be detrimental. Moreover, due to his age and
maturity, she may be amenable to his emancipation ([Cal.]
Civ. Code §§ 60 et seq.). 345
341. Id. at 602-03. The Court has recognized that where a father has been
abusive toward either the mother or his children, the assumption that parents make
decisions in the interests of their child may not hold. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S.
Ct. 2926, 2945 (1990) (holding that a pregnant minor seeking abortion is not required
to provide notice to both parents).
342. 442 U.S. at 611. The possibility of a conflict of interest between parent and
child may be particularly acute when the parent is seeking to remove the child from
her home or to end parental support. See Alice Bussiere, Importance of Dependency
Counsel Affirmed in State, Federal Cases, YouTH L. NEWS, July/Aug. 1990, at 11-13
n.7.
343. 235 Cal. Rptr. 127 (Ct. App. 1987).
344. Id. at 131.
345. Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
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The court further suggested that if the mother were not
amenable, then James "may be able to achieve his objectives
by establishing a guardianship where, even if Mother objects,
the less rigorous" (and clearly obtainable) "detrimental to the
minor" standard would apply. 4
In recognizing the realities of fact (a home too hard for a kid
to live in) and of law (jurisdiction established under one code
section and not another), the court in James T. invoked two
other legal mechanisms, emancipation and guardianship, to
bring about a reasonable result. Emancipation would have
worked in James's case, although it would not have applied,
for despite having supplemented his mother's income with odd
jobs, James was not managing his own financial affairs. Like
many of the minors interviewed here, James's emancipation
would have removed him from a hostile family environment,
though in this case it was James and not his mother who
wanted the separation. Unlike many of the minors inter-
viewed, emancipation would not have resulted in James's
homelessness or dropping out of school; he lived with his
sister. James's facts are better-a good student, a job record,
a secure place to live. But the shortcoming of emancipation is
not that it sometimes facilitates badly needed separations
from parents. It is rather that the cost of separating in many
cases has substantial risks, such as the likelihood of dropping
out of school or becoming homeless.
2. The Use of Emancipation and the Deinstitutionaliza-
tion of Status Offenses-This Article has focused on why
emancipation is used by a group of minors described earlier as
"unexpected users." They are "unexpected" because in many
cases they fail to match any version of an independent, self-
sufficient teenager living apart from parents. Another
approach is to ask why it is not used more frequently by the
kind of minor for whom it was intended. This requires looking
at concurrent reforms on behalf of children in the late 1970s.
Recall that emancipation was drafted by lawyers represent-
ing kids living by themselves in San Francisco. Many were
living independently with parental acquiescence, rather than
consent.47 A common complaint was that the police were
rounding them up as vagrants and placing them in secure
detention, often on Friday nights so that the minors were
346. Id.
347. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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sometimes detained until Monday morning.34 The enact-
ment of emancipation had been urged in part to prevent the
practice of detaining minors whose parents consented, even
tacitly, to their child's living arrangements.
During the late summer of 1978, at the same time that the
emancipation bill was processing through the legislature in
Sacramento, a different bill with a quite different purpose was
also making its way. The bill, AB 958, sought to restore the
secure detention for status offenders that deinstitutionalization
legislation in 1976 had removed.3 49  The deinstitutional-
ization of juvenile offenders had never been popular. As David
Steinhart explains, deinstitutionalization reforms in California
had resulted not from commitment to principle or to the federal
financial incentives but to "the tenacity of a few reform-
oriented policymakers, to some legislative horse-trading, and
to the fatigue and confusion that traditionally surround the
last two or three days of each legislative session. "3 ° When
the fatigue and confusion faded, efforts toward reinstitu-
tionalizing offenders began. This backlash took the form of AB
958 which permitted twelve hours of secure detention for most
status offenders (reduced from the proposed original of forty-
eight). Despite AB 958, the overall threat of incarceration had
been greatly reduced.35' A central problem emancipation
attempted to cure-lock-ups by police of kids on the
street-was cured or at least tempered352 through deinstitu-
tionalization. This may explain in part why emancipation has
been used less often by the kind of teenager the legislation was
meant to benefit.353
3. The Unevenness of County Practices: The Indeter-
minacy of Implementation-Disparate county emancipation
348. Steinhart, supra note 66, at 784.
349. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 207(c)-(f) historical note (West 1984)
(codifying AB 958).
350. Steinhart, supra note 66, at 799.
351. See id. at 811-12.
352. Costello and Worthington describe a variety of mechanisms used to
circumvent restrictions on incarcerating status offenders. COSTELLO & WORTHINGTON,
supra note 266, at 58-80. These techniques include bootstrapping a status offender
into a juvenile delinquent through the court's contempt power, the use of secure
mental facilities and "semi-secure" detention facilities, and alleging juvenile
delinquency on status offender facts. Id.
353. There are two factors which need to be considered in this interpretation.
First, few of our 18 were living independently; maybe the ones we couldn't find were
self-sufficient, though this seems unlikely for the reasons described above. Second,
the difference in county procedures may influence who uses the statute.
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practices 354 give rise to several implementation issues: the
significance of administrative decisions implementing legisla-
tion; the role of lower level court employees in determining
access to process; 355 the consequences of having no uniform
procedural guidelines;356 and the particularized interests of
localities in shaping legal procedures and outcomes.357
Family law offers many examples where varying local pro-
cedures and practices result in different substantive
outcomes.35 8
354. See supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text (describing disparities in
emancipation availability in Bay Area counties).
355. Practices under Michigan's former emancipation statute provide another
example. In some counties, emancipation may be accomplished by procedures that
are shockingly informal. For example, in many cases, parents can emancipate their
minor children simply by filing papers with the county clerk. Memorandum from
Representative Perry Bullard to the Michigan House ofRepresentatives (Dec. 8, 1987)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
Participation by court personnel does not always work against the interests of
minors. For example, the procedure for a judicial bypass hearing in teenage abortion
cases has been described as "operating reasonably smoothly." Mnookin, supra note
316, at 229. But, as Mnookin points out, '[tihis is no accident, but instead is the
product of the efforts of a number of people to ensure that the implementation of the
statute did not cause unnecessary harm for the young women involved." Id.
356. Nancy Thoennes et al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award
Adequacy, Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM. L.Q. 325 (1991)
(explaining that the effect of statewide uniform child support guidelines is limited
because "judges within [any] particular jurisdiction have been operating on the basis
of commonly understood yardsticks for determining child support levels").
357. In their study of outcomes of dispositions in dependency hearings in North
Carolina, Robert Kelly and Sarah Ramsey found that "in sparsely populated counties
that experienced growth in per capita indigency caseloads and expenditures in their
court system, the likelihood of immediate custody orders was reduced .... In other
words, policy factors were more important than the type of problem in determining
custody disposition." Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection
Proceedings: The Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287, 301
(1983).
358. Two such examples are emergency shelter care procedures and practices for
abused and neglected children. A 1985 study of statewide emergency shelter care
(the place a child first goes upon entering the foster care system) reported tremen-
dous differences in county practices on such matters as the number and type of staff
people who assess a child on intake, the types of shelters used, the percentage of
children placed with parents or relatives within three days, and the mean length of
stays in shelter care. THE CHILDREN'S RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA,
EMERGENCY SHELTER CARE IN CALIFORNIA, figs. 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, & 21 (1989).
Shelter care was excluded from the foster care review statute because it was intended
to be a very short-term response to a family crisis. As a result, there is little
uniformity among counties on the range of decisions that determine under what
conditions and for how long children will live in emergency shelters. Id. at iv.
Practices for abused and neglected children are also partially determined by where
they live. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, CHILD WELFARE SERVICES: A REVIEW OF THE
EFFECT OF THE 1982 REFORMS ON ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN AND THEIR
FAMILIES 20 (1985) (reporting that compliance with California child welfare services
reforms varies by county).
WINTER 1992]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 25:2
While detailed consideration of the causes of county vari-
ances in the context of emancipation practices awaits future
research, this study offers some early observations and many
questions. For example, San Francisco, long a mecca for
runaways, has no interest in attracting additional kids,
which might explain its formerly stringent implementation
of the emancipation statute.359 But at what level was that
decision made? 360  Who determines which division of the
superior court hears emancipation cases? Who decides that
probation reports, unmentioned in the statute itself, are a
good idea?
The answers matter; for when correlations between
practices and outcomes are understood, practices can be
changed. If probation reports are inappropriately burdening
the process, the statute might be revised to prohibit county
embellishment of statewide procedures and to encourage
uniformity. Of course, local constraints of budgets, of
personnel, of politics on the implementation of any statute
are powerful. This is not altogether bad; we would disfavor
the uniform implementation of emancipation along the
former San Francisco model.
Perhaps the best that can be hoped for in any attempt to
improve the lives of children through legislation is that the
drafters accurately identify the nature of the problem being
solved. The use of emancipation discovered in our study
reveals desperation among parents and children who need to
separate from one another. If that is the identified problem,
emancipation may be a solution. It should not, however, be
applied in ways that do put minors at increased risk. The
next section considers how that might be done.
359. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text. Some limited evidence
suggests that youth tend not to move more than 50 miles from their legal residences
(presumably their parents'); "[t]hus, contrary to some media depictions, at least those
youth who seek services tend not to go to large metropolitan areas." UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMELESSNESS: HOMELESS AND RUNAWAY YOUTH
RECEING SERVICES AT FEDERALLY FUNDED SHELTERS 19 (H.R.D.-90-45 Dec. 19,
1989). Nevertheless, San Francisco may well want to reduce even the number of local
teenagers seeking shelter.
360. The stringent implementation in effect at the time of this study was reversed
by 1991 so that San Francisco now follows the Santa Clara and San Mateo model.
The precipitating event for the change seems to have been the assignment of a
different judge to the emancipation calendar. Telephone Interview with Chris Wu,
supra note 140.
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IV. ALTERATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
The discovery that many minors who were emancipated had
not managed their own financial affairs or lived independently
raises several questions. First, should anything be done to
change California's emancipation process? Legislation mis-
directed from the start and misapplied thereafter might
reasonably be trashed or tightened to reduce the likelihood of
continued misuse. But are the consequences of emancipation
so bad, so predictable, or so avoidable as to justify significant
revision or abandonment of the Act? Emancipated life may be
hard, but would the consequences of remaining at home or
running away be worse? With those questions in mind, the
first part of this section evaluates possible revisions of the
statute. It concludes that the basic structure of the statute
should be retained. Indeed, if certain of its current deficien-
cies were remedied, some prospective form of emancipation
might reasonably become more available.
The second part of this section responds to a different,
perhaps harder question raised by the findings. The issue here
is not redrafting the emancipation statute but rather rethink-
ing the problems revealed by its actual use: the absence of
options for parents and teenagers in serious conflict with one
another. This section focuses on alternatives that might either
prevent the need for conflict-driven emancipations or that
might reduce the precariousness of emancipated life.
A. Better Statutes?
If the absence of preemancipation self-sufficiency helps
explain the postemancipation difficulties, should the sub-
stantive or procedural requirements for emancipation simply
be adjusted? A modified emancipation statute might, for
example, require more stringent proof of physical and financial
independence, or probation reports, or a higher burden of
proof.
Yet the real difficulty with the emancipation process, one
could argue, seems not to be drafting defects regarding
stringencies of proof, but the untrustworthiness of adolescent
consent. Under this view, the emancipation process is flawed
by its inappropriate vesting of legal authority in a class of
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persons-children-who are incapable of exercising authority
freely because they lack the maturity, the skills, and the
ability to make autonomous decisions. Under this view the
emancipation process only reveals what the law already knew
generally: children are simply too susceptible to persuasion by
their parents and other adults to make important decisions.
They are as the Supreme Court has characterized them:
vulnerable, inexperienced, and unable to make critical
decisions in a mature way.36'
Does the fact that many of the minors were influenced, even
heavily, by their parents during the emancipation process
subvert the integrity of their decisions? One way to think
about this is to consider emancipation as a waiver or the
"intentional relinquishment of a known right."362 The right
minors relinquish is the statutory entitlement to financial
support by their parents until the age of majority. 36 3
Parents of emancipated minors are relieved of that obligation
because their child has, in effect, "waived" the right to support
by choosing to become emancipated. 3' The standard re-
quirements for a valid waiver are that it be made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently.6 5 The first aspect addresses
coercion, the second comprehension, and the third some level
of competence. 66
361. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). As Gail Perry and Gary Melton
make clear, Supreme Court pronouncements about such issues are often unsupported
by social science literature. Gail S. Perry & Gary B. Melton, Precedential Value of
Judicial Notice of Social Facts: Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633, 636-43
(1983-84).
362. The classic definition of waiver is taken from criminal procedure. See
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Most waivers are defined along those
same lines, although different rules determine a waiver's validity depending on the
source of the right waived. For example, two standards (with differing degrees of
strictness regarding whether the right was "known" or not) are applied to waivers of
constitutional rights; civil law waivers are generally controlled by principles of
contract law, and waivers of statutory rights may be subject to different limitations.
See generally Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV.
478 (1981).
363. CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (West 1982).
364. Waivers remove a benefit or protection that is otherwise required. For
example, minors in California are entitled to a hearing before being institutionalized
in a mental hospital. In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1295-97 (Cal. 1977). They can,
however, waive the hearing. Id. at 1296. As one study of the hearings points out,
"[t]he use of waivers allows minors who would not qualify for [hospital] admission
under Roger S. [commitment hearing standards] to acquiesce to their parents' desire
to hospitalize them." Dillon et al., supra note 232, at 444.
365. See Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
366. Thus, the purpose of the right being waived succumbs to a different
inquiry-was the waiver valid? In the context of commitment hearings, this has
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In a constitutional setting, the courts determine whether
these criteria are met by taking into account the "totality of
the circumstances."3"7 For minors, relevant circumstances
include "the juvenile's age, experience, education, background,
and intelligence, and ... whether he has the capacity to
understand the warnings given him, the nature of his [consti-
tutional] rights, and the consequences of waiving those
rights."3"' Although children have no constitutional right to
parental financial support (or even to parents),69 the totality
of the circumstances test still is useful here. The same kinds
of factors-age, education, experience-are pertinent with
adjustments appropriate to the particular context of emancipa-
tion. For example, does the would-be emancipated minor
understand the nature of her existing familial obligations
(obedience) and entitlements (support) within the family and
the ways in which emancipation would alter these?
With that general standard in mind, we turn to the volun-
tariness of the minor's emancipation decision. Was the kind
of parental influence revealed in this study such a manipula-
tion of teenage will that the emancipation decision should be
characterized as involuntary? Was the parental involvement
coercive or simply the kind of participation in their children's
major decisions that legislatures and courts endorse and
sometimes require? In the context of teenage abortion, for
example, parental influence is meant to enhance, not dis-
qualify, the minor's decision.37 °
meant that certain "legal procedures were intended by Roger S. to screen the decision
to institutionalize. When waivers are used, however, the only screening that occurs
is the minor's competence to volunteer." Dillon et al., supra note 232, at 444.
367. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
368. Id.
369. The constitution protects parents and children already in a familial relation-
ship from termination of that relationship by the state. See Susan B. Hershkowitz,
Due Process and the Termination of Parental Rights, 19 FAM. L.Q. 245, 252-81 (1985).
But it is not unconstitutional for a parent to terminate the parent-child
relationship. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1238-39 (2d Cir. 1979)
(rejecting Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment claims by adult adopted children
that they have a right to know the identity of their natural parents); Carol Gloor,
Comment, Breaking the Seal: Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Adult
Adoptees' Right to Identity, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 316 (1980); Deborah D. Poulin, Note,
The Open Adoption Records Movement: Constitutional Cases and Legislative
Compromise, 26 J. FAM. L. 395 (1987-88).
370. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1981) ("[Parental notification]
plainly serves the important considerations of family integrity and protecting
adolescents which we identified in Bellotti I.").
Adolescent consultation with adults, professionals as well as parents, is generally
recognized as something to be encouraged. For example, the California Supreme
Court ruled that consensual sexual activities between minors under 14 was excluded
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One reason parental participation may seem so substantial
is that their actual participation greatly exceeds the modest
involvement required by the statute. Parents must receive
notification of their child's request for emancipation and this
makes sense. Parents should be informed if their children are
about to set up shop as adults in some other location, in part
because parental obligations are affected. Formal notice aside,
the Act also contemplates some parental awareness of the
minor's situation through the minor's affirmation that he is
living apart from parents with their "consent or acquies-
cence."37' The living apart requirement seems to assume
some prior agreement or discussion between parent and child
or at least that the parents have noticed that their child has
left.3 7
2
But the problem with the parental role in emancipation is
not compliance with notification requirements, but rather the
magnitude of parental participation behind the scenes. The
concern is that parents and not minors are calling the shots.
Parental influence results precisely because their participation
is not overt; as the interviews suggest, it is almost subliminal,
a background presence denied by many minors. As a Califor-
nia court noted in reversing the lower court's decision that an
agreement between a boy and his mother emancipated the boy:
"The limitations upon the minor's right to make binding
contracts with strangers emphasize the illogic of a rule that he
may bind himself by a contractual release of his parent, the
person most likely to have a strong influence upon him."373
Yet although the amount of parental influence and the risk
of coercion 374 is greater than that anticipated by the drafters
from the state's Child Abuse Reporting Law in part because its inclusion would deter
sexually active minors from seeking health care and contraceptive advice and services
from responsible adults. Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 361, 371-73 (Ct. App. 1986); see Tom A. Croxton et al., Counseling Minors
Without Parental Consent, 67 CHILD WELFARE 3 (1988) (reviewing benefits to adoles-
cents-and practical lack of risk to professionals-of counseling minors without
parental notification).
371. CAL. CIV. CODE § 64(a)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
372. Bull, supra note 10, at 250-51.
373. County of Alameda v. Kaiser, 48 Cal. Rptr. 343, 344-45 (Ct. App. 1965).
374. The "totality of circumstances" approach triggers consideration of not just
'who?" but "where?" in assessing the voluntariness of the decision. The very location
of the emancipation decision-home-may tilt toward involuntariness. The place a
decision is made and the decider's relation to the place are of great importance. For
example, the consent of patients in nursing homes to Directives to Physicians [Do Not
Resuscitate Orders] is given extra scrutiny because the nursing home is regarded as
inherently coercive, a closed environment where patients are essentially dependent
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of the Act,"' the minors interviewed were not simply
ciphers. In most cases, they gave multiple reasons for seeking
emancipation, reasons that reflected their own interests as
well as their parents'.376 In many cases living apart from
one another seemed a common goal of parent and teen. As
has been observed in the context of status offenders, "[p]er-
haps one of the most healthy and sensible things some
adolescents can do is to leave parents whose lives and rela-
tionships are confused, who are out of touch with reality, or
who attempt to use the youths to meet their own emotional
needs."377 In much the same way and for much the same
reasons, it is hard to say that the minors interviewed here,
though influenced by their parents, made the emancipation
decisions involuntarily. 78
on staff to meet all their needs. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187 (West
Supp. 1992). Most of the minors interviewed were living at home immediately prior
to their emancipations, and to some extent, a child's home shares traits with other
inherently coercive situations. Indeed, in characterizing a juvenile defendant's
interest in freedom from "institutional restraints" (jail) as "undoubtedly substantial,"
the Supreme Court held that "that interest [freedom] must be qualified by the
recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody." Schall
v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (using minors' familiarity with the permanent
custody of home life as one factor in justifying keeping minors in jail before trial).
375. According to one of the Act's principal authors, Peter Bull, the drafters had
simply never imagined parental manipulation as a factor in implementation.
Interview with Peter Bull, supra note 42.
376. Minors, like other people, may choose an alternative that favors another
(here a parent) over themselves because they want to please or benefit that person.
Such a choice may not be in a minor's best interest but still may be a rational choice
made as freely as any other decision. The choice to benefit another does not mean the
decision has necessarily been made involuntarily. In some instances, however, like
childrens' preferences in custody disputes, the legal system may not permit the choice
because of perceived potential psychological detriment to a child forced to choose. See
Tari Eitzen, A Child's Right to Independent Legal Representation in a Custody
Dispute: A Unique Legal Situation, A Necessarily Broad Standard, The Child's
Constitutional Rights, The Role of the Attorney Whose Client Is the Child, 19 FAM.
L.Q. 53, 70-72 (1985). Under this view, making a child's preference dispositive can
be "the cruelest and most inappropriate of solutions. The child may respond out of
fear [of parents] or he may respond to what he perceives as his parents' needs and
not his own." Id. at 56.
377. Mahoney, supra note 329, at 173-74.
Another potential category of perhaps unwise but not unreasonable decisions are
decisions by unmarried teenage girls to become or remain pregnant. Taken in the
context of lives where attention and success are hard to come by, teenage pregnancy
may result from "the teens' contradictory pursuit of romance, security, status,
freedom, and responsibility within the confines of their immediate surroundings."
Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 560 (challenging the view
that black teenage pregnancies are necessarily irresponsible acts).
378. A frequent problem in making a determination about a minor's capacity is
that if the decision maker agrees with the minor's decision, she is more likely to find
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Studies on decision-making abilities in the area of medical
treatment of adolescents provide some basis for understanding
competence, the second element of a good waiver.379 Those
studies suggest that adolescents age fourteen and over appear
to make decisions in a manner and with results similar to
adults: "In general, minors aged 14 ... [demonstrated] a level
of competency equivalent to that of adults, according to four
standards of competency (evidence of choice, reasonable
outcome, rational reasons, and understanding) .... 0
Fourteen is recognized as an appropriate age for the minor's
opinion to be given at least some weight in other areas, such
as custody and institutionalization 38 1 and so seems appropri-
ate here, though we note that no fourteen-year-olds were
found in our study.
The real problem with many emancipation decisions was not
with voluntariness or competence, but rather with the
requirement that the waiver be made knowingly.382 Inter-
view after interview revealed that many minors simply did not
understand what they were getting into. As one court
the minor had the maturity or capacity to make it. See Ramsey, supra note 357, at
317 (discussing the risk of lawyers finding minor client has capacity when minor's
and lawyer's views on child's best interest coincide).
Gary Melton goes further and suggests a normative standard regarding the
minor's decision is often at work in capacity determinations. He argues that courts
tend to find the necessary capacity in cases where the minor has done what society
would want him to have done, for example, confessed to criminal conduct. Gary B.
Melton, The Clashing of Symbols: Prelude to Child and Family Policy, 42 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 345 (1987).
379. See generally Catherine C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors' and Adults'
Pregnancy Decisions, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446 (1981); Lois A. Weithorn &
Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed
Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1590 (1982).
380. Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 379, at 1595. To be sure, teenage decisions
result not only from cognitive development, but are formed by social and emotional
factors as well: "The primary cognitive changes of adolescence may not be changes
in capacities as they are traditionally measured by, for example, Piagetian or IQ
measures, but rather, something closer to 'savvy.'" Catherine C. Lewis, How
Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy
Implications, 52 CHILD DEV. 538, 539 (1981). Lewis examined such features of
decision making as "imagining risks and future consequences, recognizing the need
for independent professional opinions in certain situations, and recognizing the
potential vested interests of professionals in providing certain information." Id. at
543. See also Beverly Balos & Ira Schwartz, Psychiatric and Chemical Dependency
Treatment of Minors: The Myth of Voluntary Treatment and the Capacity to Consent,
92 DICK. L. REV. 631, 644 (1988) (suggesting from a review of studies that minors 15
and above have not only satisfactory cognitive abilities to comprehend treatment
information but have "the abilit[ies] to use that information in a practical manner").
381. In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1298 (Cal. 1977).
382. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
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unsympathetically observed, "With emancipation comes a
metamorphosis. It transforms a minor, however inexperi-
enced, into an adult, however unsophisticated."
38 3
The problem is not that minors lack the capacity to under-
stand their statutory rights or the consequences of waiving
them, but that no one told them about any rights or conse-
quences. Emancipation, unlike many less vital activities such
as smoking a cigarette, buying on credit, or walking through
a metal detector, comes with no mandatory warnings alerting
consumers to the likelihood of risk, loss, or harm. Indeed,
under a waiver analogy, a waiver of parental support should
be ineffective unless the minor was fully informed of the-
existence of the right, its meaning, and the effect of the
384waiver.
Securing such information before becoming emancipated is
crucial. Requiring notice to minors of the meaning and
consequences of emancipation enhances the likelihood that the
decision will be made knowingly without rejecting the auton-
omy of minors to make the decision in the first place. Notice
should specify the nature of a minor's legal status within the
family before emancipation and what it will be afterward.
383. Gore v. Stowe, 231 Cal. Rptr. 492, 493-94 (Ct. App. 1986).
384. See Hittle v. Santa Barbara County Employees Retirement Ass'n., 703 P.2d
73, 82 (Cal. 1985) (setting out standard of waiver for statutory right).
On the other hand, emancipation as a waiver of the parental support obligation
may be invalid regardless of the quality of the notice. Not every statutory right can
be waived, and the benefits of a law enacted for the protection of the public generally,
as opposed to the benefit of individual citizens, cannot be waived at all. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3513 (West 1970). For example, because provisions regulating the work hours
of women and children were enacted for a public purpose, they could not be waived
by individuals. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 713 (1945) (finding
that it is against public policy to work for less than-to waive-the minimum wage).
Is the parental support obligation for minor children enacted for a public purpose?
California courts have held repeatedly in the context of divorce that one parent
cannot bargain away support owed by the other parent to the child. Hunter v.
Hunter, 339 P.2d 247, 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) ('A child's right to support cannot be
barred by a property settlement agreement between the parents."). And while child
support benefits individual children, it also has a public purpose: "one reason for
imposing [the parental obligation of child support] is to prevent the child from
becoming a public charge." County of Alameda v. Kaiser, 48 Cal. Rptr. 343, 345 (Ct.
App. 1966) (holding mother liable for the cost of county care provided to her
unemancipated son); see In re Marriage of Shore, 139 Cal. Rptr. 349, 352 (Ct. App.
1977) ("[T]he enforcement of child support rights involves not only a matter of private
or local concern, but poses an important question for the federal and state govern-
ments as well."). Thus, even if satisfactory notice were provided in a sensible way,
teenage waivers of support might be invalid on the grounds that the parental support
obligation benefits the public by keeping the costs of raising children within the
private sphere.
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Along these lines, the Michigan emancipation statute now
requires each petitioning minor to establish that "the minor
understands his or her rights and responsibilities under this
act as an emancipated minor."385 Indiana requires the court
to find that the child "understands the consequences of being
free from parental control and protection."386  And the
Oregon statute provides that "the Court shall advise the minor
of the civil and criminal rights and the civil and criminal
liabilities of an emancipated minor. This advice shall be
recited in the decree of emancipation."387
Minors also should be informed about the emancipation
procedure-its speed, costs, the nature of the hearing. The
notice further should specify what emancipation does not do,
as misconceptions about juvenile court jurisdiction and
vicarious tort liability contributed to the decisions made by
several of those interviewed.8 8 For example, the Indiana
statute makes clear that emancipated minors are still subject
to compulsory school attendance,389 and Oregon specifies that
emancipation has no effect on age requirements for purchasing
alcohol or getting married.39 °
Notice does more than just perfect a waiver. By standardiz-
ing information about the process, notice may equalize the
power between parent and teenager. Many parents misunder-
stood, misrepresented, or minimized the effects of emancipation
in discussing it with their children.391' The flow of bad
information was sometimes two-directional, such as the
parents who signed their daughter's petition only at her
insistence that emancipation would make her eligible for
financial aid for college. Where both parent and teenager have
the same and accurate information, the decisions may be less
often based on false hopes or threats, whether conveyed
innocently or intentionally by one or the other party.392
Notice also may serve to slow down or prepare the family for
the emotional and practical consequences of emancipation.
For example, while it is probably unrealistic to think that a
minor will buy her own health insurance once she understands
385. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.244(4c)(2)(f) (Callaghan 1992).
386. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-15.7 (West Supp. 1991).
387. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.560(4) (1989).
388. See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
389. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-15.7 (West Supp. 1991).
390. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.555(2) (1989).
391. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
392. While equal knowledge of the law may not rule out other inequalities in
private ordering, it may serve to even the field somewhat.
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that she is no longer covered on a parent's policy, knowing
that mom's or dad's coverage ends may give some pause to the
emancipation life decision. Knowing that he may be emanci-
pated within a week may alert a minor to the abruptness of
the change and prompt a more cautious pace. Braking
adolescent enthusiasm and confidence is sometimes useful. A
manual on emancipation available at Legal Services for
Children in San Francisco emphasizes that judges "will look
closely at a minor's finances" and will be concerned with
"whether the minor really will have enough income ... to
afford adequate food, clothing, and housing.. .. ""'
Teenagers would benefit particularly from knowing that
there are some alternatives to emancipation. A good example
of such information is the bright (turquoise and purple) Legal
Services for Children brochure called Choices: When You
Can't Live at Home. 394  The title alone is useful; it takes
seriously the teenager's perception of family life and character-
izes it as a problem for which solutions exist. The brochure
describes the five options available in San Francisco County
(guardianship, emancipation, voluntary foster home, ward of
the court, and emergency shelter), explains what each is, how
one gets it, the likelihood of getting it, and what numbers to
call.395 Each alternative has limitations, but, in any given
393. EMANCIPATION MANUAL, supra note 95, at 6.
394. LEGAL SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, INC., CHOICES: WHEN YOU CAN'T LIVE AT
HOME (1988) [hereinafter CHOICES]. The brochure is available in both English and
Spanish.
395. Id. at 2. In addition to alerting teenagers to the existence of alternatives, the
brochure conveys other messages. For example, it states in capital letters at the
bottom of the page: "PLEASE CONTACT AN ATTORNEY BEFORE MAKING A
DECISION ABOUT ANY OF THE ABOVE CHOICES-EVERYBODY'S SITUATION
IS SPECIAL." Id. The message seems right in two regards. First, it is the absence
of feeling special that plagues many of the teenagers for whom living away from home
seems imperative. A different booklet, "So You Want To Drop Out of School...: A
Handbook for Students Who Are Thinking of Leaving School" has a similar tone.
Each section starts out in bold face with the message that "Your School Cares," "Your
Parents Care," even "The Military Cares" whether the student drops out or not.
NATIONAL DROPOUT PREVENTION CENTER, So You WANT TO DROP OUT OF SCHOOL...
YOU OUGHT TO KNOW THE FACTS! 1-4 (n.d.).
Second, minors often do not understand legal consequences of running away, filing
for emancipation, or staying at home in a state of determined disobedience. While
the brochure engages in some overkill by insisting that an attorney always must be
consulted, some knowledgeable adult aware of the needs, desires, and intentions of
teenagers to live away from home should discuss the choices and their consequences.
It is, of course, essential that whoever does this counseling knows his stuff; several
of the private attorneys used by the minors in the study knew little about emancipa-
tion and less about alternatives. In addition, the lawyer must recognize the minor,
not the parents, as the client.
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case, any one may be more suitable than emancipation. For
example, if the need to get out of the house is triggered by
physical assault, a short-term solution such as an emergency
shelter may provide a better answer than the permanent
reordering of the parent-child relationship.
The call for detailed, clear notice is made with some
skepticism. In other areas of law, we know that notice
sometimes makes legal process seem fairer with or without
changing the outcome. 96 Thus, the recommendation here is
made from a perspective that combines two kinds of realism.
The first is an awareness that notice may not change outcomes
or prevent misuse. The second is that it may. If the inventive
use of emancipation harms children because they are some-
times unaware of what emancipation does, improved notice
may help some minors and is unlikely to harm any.
Other statutory modifications are also plausible. The first
is simply to raise the age of emancipation eligibility from
fourteen 397 to sixteen. The revision is not prompted by
uncovering legions of fourteen-year-olds emancipating
themselves-most of the petitioning minors were near their
seventeenth birthdays and none were fourteen. Neverthe-
less, granting authority to choose emancipation at fourteen
is somewhat out of sync with other California age-graded
statutes. 398  The greatest number of activities (including
396. Dillon et al., supra note 232, at 373.
397. CAL. CIV. CODE § 64(a)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
398. A review of California's age-graded statutes reveals that minors may voice
a preference regarding parental custody at 10, CAL. CIV. CODE § 234 (West 1982); sell
newspapers in the street at 11, see CAL. LAB. CODE § 1298 (West 1989); consent to
medical treatment for communicable or infectious diseases, CAL. Cirv. CODE § 34.7
(West 1982), including AIDS, at 12, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.27(a)(1)
(West 1990); ride unsecured in the back of trucks at 13, see CAL. VEH. CODE § 23116
(West 1985); be held responsible for criminal acts crimes at 14, CAL. PENAL CODE § 26
(West 1988); drive at 14, CAL. VEH. CODE § 12513 (West 1987); and donate blood at
15, CAL. CIV. CODE § 25.5(b) (West 1982). At age 16, minors can insure themselves,
CAL. INS. CODE § 10112 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982), and possess "safe and sane"
fireworks, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 12689(b) (West 1991). With parental
consent, at age 17 minors may enter military service, 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (1988); and
use a stun gun, CAL. PENAL CODE § 12651(d) (West Supp. 1992), or teargas, id.
§ 12403.8.
After investigating why particular California statutes are keyed to particular ages,
the director of a legal resource center reported that:
Although I had initially believed that age designations in statutes would follow
societal age thresholds of passage and maturity-12 or 13, 16, 18, and 21 years
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the most dangerous-those involving weapons and military
service) are permitted at age sixteen or seventeen and then
only with parental permission. To the extent that the statutes
present a pattern, sixteen seems the age for increased decision
making. Authorizing emancipation which terminates the most
important aspects of minority altogether at age fourteen
(without parental permission) seems to fall far outside the
scheme.
A second revision might be the appointment of counsel for
the minor, as other states have done.399 In California, the
court may appoint legal counsel to represent the interests of
the child in cases "where there is in issue the custody of ... a
minor child."400 This would seem to describe emancipation:
the petitioner is a minor (at least until the hearing is over)
and the very point of the process is to free the minor from
adult custody.
But appointment or retention of legal counsel does not
necessarily ensure greater protection for the minor. The
standard problem for lawyers representing minors, whether
in custody cases, delinquency actions, neglect proceedings, or
civil commitments is what model of representation should be
used: advocating the child's wishes; determining the child's
of age-our search of law review articles, case law, legislative committee reports
and discussions with legislative staff revealed no such logical pattern or
rationale ....
Letter from Shane Kramer, Director, Victim's of Crime Resource Center, to Margaret
Hanson, authors' research assistant (Dec. 12, 1988) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Many of the age determinations appear less
related to consensus that adolescent judgment is essentially trustworthy at 14 or 16
than to other more practical and political concerns. For example, the ages for which
blood donation were established "were selected solely for the purpose of increasing
the number of available blood donors in the hope that donations of blood would
increase." Id. The justification for the age requirements set for electroconvulsive
therapy "was a 'political compromise' necessary at the time the bill was enacted." Id.
at 2. Sometimes fairness, rather than politics or necessity, contributes to a particular
age determination. Lowering of the age of majority from 21 to 18 resulted in great
part because "society felt it was unfair to have [boys] serve and die [in Vietnam] and
yet not have the rights and privileges of adults." Michael P. Rosenthal, The
Minimum Drinking Age for Young People: An Observation, 92 DICK. L. REV. 649, 653
(1988).
399. The Maine and Texas emancipation statutes authorize counsel for the child.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3506-A(1) (West Supp. 1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 31.04
(West 1986). Virginia provides that the court may appoint counsel for the minor's
parents. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-332 (Michie 1950). Michigan provides for appoint-
ment for the minor and for his parents, if they are indigent and oppose the
emancipation. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.4b(b), (c) (West Supp. 1991).
400. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4606(a) (West 1982).
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best interests and advocating those; or presenting options to
the court as a neutral fact finder.4 ' It would seem reason-
able for an emancipation lawyer to follow the model advancing
the client's wishes;4 °2 the very point of emancipation is to
confirm the client's status as an adult.4 °3 Of course, if the
lawyer finds that the declarations on the petition are not true
or that the client does not want to be emancipated (after the
lawyer has explained what it means), her duties alter.
However, an attorney's obligation to the minor client is not
altered because she has been retained by the parents:
"Although the minor's parents usually finance the attorney's
services, the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of a
client cannot be directed by someone who is paying for the
services."4"4 The chief obligation of a would-be emancipated
minor's attorney is to provide information about emancipation
and its alternatives.4 5
The importance of continued schooling suggests other
possible revisions. Fourteen of the eighteen minors we
interviewed had dropped out of high school. Many of the
participants had other characteristics associated with dropping
401. Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child:
Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce,
87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1146-47 (1978) (reporting that even where attorneys representing
children in custody cases claim one or the other role, they frequently fall into the
behavior of a disclaimed alternative). See Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a
Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 CAL. L. REV. 681, 693-705
(1987) (arguing that an attorney should advocate the position desired by her client
if the court decides that the child possesses sufficient maturity).
402. The professional guidelines that "the authority to make decisions is
exclusively that of the client" is modified by the supplementary rule that "[the
responsibilities of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence, experience, mental
condition or age of a client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7,
7-11 (1982) (emphasis added).
403. Ethical consideration 7-7 clarifies that the nature of a particular proceeding
can also vary the responsibility of the lawyer. Id. at 7-11. Thus, it is argued that
where the risk to a minor client is particularly great, the attorney may properly
position his own judgment above the child's. Ramsey, supra note 357, at 292-95.
Emancipation would seem a procedure where the consequence to minors (the loss of
childhood) is potentially great, even if it is desired.
404. Gary A. Ahrens, Advocacy Ideals and the Representation of Children, 35 U.
FLA. L. REV. 464, 465 n.9 (1983).
405. As Jan Costello has pointed out in the context of other juvenile placements,
"[i]t cannot be overemphasized how often such investigation of resources and
obtaining of information concerning the client's needs will be the primary services the
attorney can perform." Jan C. Costello, Ethical Issues in Representing Juvenile
Clients: A Review of the IJA-ABA Standards on Representing Private Parties, 10
N.M.L. REV. 255, 271 (1980).
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out of high school, such as high family conflict,4"6 poor
grades and dislike of school,40 7 and in the case of the girls,
pregnancy.408 While emancipation may not have been the
only reason participants dropped out of school, the need to
earn money after emancipation frequently was mentioned.4 s
Because the failure to graduate from high school is a steady
indicator of later poverty,410 greater investigation by the
court regarding the minor's school status seems justified. This
is all the more reasonable in light of the recent revision of the
California Education Code making high school attendance
mandatory until age eighteen.41' Inquiry into the minor's
plans for school as well as his current educational status
might enable the court to make its "not contrary to the best
interests" determination more accurately than they now do.
In Montana, for example, emancipation may be granted only
if the court finds that "the youth has graduated or will
continue to diligently pursue graduation from high school,
unless circumstances clearly compel deferral of education."412
School status is just one area in which further information
might heighten judicial awareness of the possible consequences
of emancipation. For example, the data suggest that a minor's
conclusory recitations about self-sufficiency (as reflected on the
petition) do not necessarily reflect his true situation.4 3
406. Lisa Beck & Joseph A. Muia, A Portrait of a Tragedy: Research Findings on
the Dropout, 64 HIGH SCH. J. 65, 66 (1980) ("Perhaps the primary characteristic of the
high school dropout is an unsatisfactory relationship with his family.").
407. See James P. Markey, The Labor Market Problems of Today's High School
Dropouts, 111 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 36, 38 (1988).
408. Twenty-three percent of girl dropouts gave pregnancy as one reason for their
decision to drop out. Id.
409. Other factors play into the decision to drop out. In a study of nearly 400
dropouts in Los Angeles, subjects gave five types of reasons for dropping out:
"boredom with school; school activities and classes were considered a waste of time;
failure in accumulating necessary school credits; poor grades; and numerous home
and family responsibilities." Romeria Tidwell, Dropouts Speak Out: Qualitative Data
on Early School Departures, 23 ADOLESCENCE 939, 952 (1988).
410. See Beck & Muia, supra note 406, at 69. Other reported consequences of
dropping out in addition to unemployment are low-status jobs, less advancement,
greater likelihood of receiving public assistance, and likelihood of early marriage and
divorce. See id. at 69-70.
411. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West Supp. 1992). The revision to age 18 may
well reflect the concern that even a high school education does not guarantee
competence in basic market place skills. See NABEEL ALSALAM & NEVZER STACEY,
EMPLOYER TRAINING OF WoRK-BouND YOUTH: AN HISTORICAL REVIEW AND NEW
RESULTS 2354 (1989).
412. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-408(2)(f) (1985).
413. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
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Other states use more direct techniques to ensure that the
independence on which emancipation is premised is really in
place. For example, Michigan requires declarations from the
minor indicating that he or she has "demonstrated the ability
to manage his or her financial affairs"414 and "personal and
social affairs."1 ' This is something quite different from
California's checked boxes. In Michigan, managing financial
affairs includes "proof of employment or other means of
support" 16  and managing personal and social affairs
includes proof of housing.1 7 In addition, the petition must
be supported by an affidavit from one of thirteen listed profes-
sionals (including a doctor, nurse, social worker, school
counselor, law enforcement officer) declaring their personal
knowledge of the minor's circumstances as well as their belief
that under those circumstances emancipation is in the minor's
best interests.418
Detailing the types of information the court should consider
is a good idea. Lists of specific factors like those found in
custody "best interest" statutes are designed to alert judges to
circumstances the legislature has identified as pertinent to
decision making in this context. 19 Such instruction seems
particularly useful in the emancipation context. In the
counties studied, emancipation was assigned to the general
Civil Law and Motion Division of the Superior Court. °
Judges commonly rotate in and out of the division and are not
necessarily familiar either with emancipation (as a legal or
social process) or with teenagers (as legal or social beings).
Legislative guidance on the meaning of "not contrary to the
interests of the minor" in the form of a list of relevant factors
might cause judges to consider requests for emancipation more
contextually. Even the notice provision recommended above
for minors and their families would help situate emancipation
for a bench uninformed or unfamiliar with the dynamics and
414. MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 722.4a(1)(e) (West Supp. 1991).
415. Id. § 722.4a(1)(f).
416. Id. § 722.4c(2)(d) (excluding from the definition of"other means of support"
general assistance or Aid to Families with Dependent Children).
417. Id. § 722.4c(2)(e).
418. Id. §§ 722.4a(2)(a)-(m).
419. See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the
UMDA's Best Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2259-60 (1991) (discussing
guidelines as a sensible limitation on judicial discretion).
420. In Santa Clara County, emancipations have since been moved to Probate
along with adoptions. Interview with Judge Donald Clark, supra note 120.
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dimensions of conflict between parents and teenagers. On the
other hand, armed with statutory standards, judges might
tend to substitute their subjective judgments for those of
informed minors, a development we would oppose.42' The
object here is not to undercut a minor's autonomy by substitut-
ing a judge's view for that of the minor. Instead, judicial
awareness of the circumstances surrounding many emancipa-
tions might serve to enhance a minor's authority by making
sure the minor's request is informed and voluntary.
An alternative to educating law and motion judges would be
the assignment of emancipation to a division of the superior
courts that already deals with family law matters, such as
juvenile, family, or probate divisions. The reassignment would
affirm the reality of what presently goes formally unno-
ticed-that the emancipation process is at heart a family
matter. Court judges who may have training and experience
in the complexity of family relationships might be more alert
to the possibility of family conflict underlying the emancipa-
tion request and more aware of less drastic alternatives. 2
Of course, studies of judicial decision making regarding the
custody of children in nonemancipation contexts such as
divorce 423 or civil commitments 424  suggest that extra-
statutory values, biases, and concerns often influence the
outcome of cases as much as legislative standards. While such
infirmities probably should be accepted as inevitable, assign-
ing emancipation to a more specialized law division still
makes better sense than its current haphazard lodging on the
undifferentiated civil calendar.
421. Because outcome often is related to who makes the decision, part of the
question has to be whether one particular decision maker is likely to be better at the
job than another. In discussing judicial hearings for foster children, Chambers and
Wald explain that "[t]here is little reason to believe that nationwide the substantive
rules would lead in fact to wise decisions for children or that in general hearing
officers would make wiser decisions than caseworkers. Very little is known about
what is best for children in any given case." David L. Chambers & Michael S. Wald,
Smith v. OFFER, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 67, 124 (Robert H. Mnookin ed.,
1985).
422. Optimism about specialization within the family law bench may be
unrealistic. In Santa Clara County, for example, the newest members of the bench
traditionally have been assigned to the family division; as judges become more senior
they receive more grown-up or high-prestige assignments. Interview with Santa
Clara County Superior Court Judge LaDoris Cordell, formerly Supervising Judge of
Family Court, Stanford, Cal. (October 14, 1991).
423. Jeffrey Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and
Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 3 (1984); Jessica Pearson & Maria A. Luchesi-Ring,
Judicial Decision-Making in Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703, 704 (1983).
424. Dillon et al., supra note 232, at 373.
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In counties with emancipation practices similar to those of
Santa Clara and San Mateo, the result of these suggested
reforms might be fewer petitions granted. Truly independent
minors would continue to meet standards applied more care-
fully. But what about those minors, their representations to
the court notwithstanding, who are not independent or self-
sufficient? Many of the teenagers we interviewed probably
would describe themselves in the terms of the Legal Services
for Children brochure-kids who "cannot live with [their]
parents."425 What happens to minors who cannot meet these
standards or those in counties like San Francisco where, until
recently, emancipation has been essentially unavailable?426
Many will not be able to stick it out at home, as the congruity
of characteristics between adolescent runaways and the
minors studied here suggest. 2 7  The recent evidence from
Michigan also suggests a relationship between emancipation
and runaways.
425. See CHOICES, supra note 394, at 2.
426. We have some information about what happens when a particular legal
process becomes unavailable or inaccessible. For example, in states where minors are
required either to inform their parents or to receive judicial permission before
obtaining an abortion, birth statistics suggest what happens when they choose to do
neither. Studies from Massachusetts indicate that girls who chose not to participate
in the "judicial by-pass" scheme often went to the less restrictive state of Rhode
Island for abortions. Virginia G. Cartoof & Lorraine V. Klerman, Parental Consent
for Abortion: Impact of the Massachusetts Law, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 397, tbl. 2 at
399 (1986) (concluding that "the major impact of the Massachusetts parental consent
law has been to send a monthly average of between 90 and 95 of the state's pregnant
minors across state lines in search of an abortion"). Similarly, minors who are unable
to leave home legally through emancipation simply may run away.
427. Gerald R. Adams et al., Homeless Adolescents: A Descriptive Study of the
Similarities and Differences Between Runaways and Throwaways, 20 ADOLESCENCE
715,718-21 (1985); Julia A. Soyars-Berman, Note, A Proposed Alternative to the New
York State PINS System: Who Is Looking After the Best Interests of the Teenage
Child?, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1401, 1433-43 (urging New York to enact statutory
emancipation legislation as a sensible alternative for status offenders whose primary
offense is often running away from home). An early supporter of statutory
emancipation predicted it might be used as the possible "salvation of many runaway
children" because an emancipated minor was entitled to establish a residence
different from the parents', thereby reducing the liability of shelters in taking in
stray kids. Francis Cady, Emancipation of Minors, 12 CONN. L. REV. 62, 75-76
(1979).
428. See Keefe supra note 324, at 12. The relationship among children, parents,
and homes suggested by the Michigan findings is paradoxical in the context of the
traditional relationship of the three. Parents always have been required to provide
homes for their children; the failure to do so has been a standard ground for a neglect
petition. The problem of homelessness has modified that requirement in some
jurisdictions. In California, for example, a child can no longer be found "dependent"
by reason of the family's lack of emergency shelter. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
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Might emancipation be used to facilitate separations without
putting minors at risk? As this study has revealed, emancipa-
tion is useful to both parents and teenagers who want and in
many cases need greater independence from one another. If
that fact were recognized explicitly, a reformed emancipation
process might satisfy and protect both parents and teenagers.
The changes need not be dramatic.
First, the law simply could conform to its actual use and
substitute prospective tests of separation and independence for
the retrospective ones now in place. That is, the law could
acknowledge that emancipation may be appropriate for minors
who successfully demonstrate that they could, though do not
already, live separately from their parents.
Several states follow this approach. Indiana, for example,
provides that emancipation is proper if the child wishes to be
free from and no longer needs parental control and protection
and "has an acceptable plan for independent living."429
Michigan requires that the minor demonstrate "the ability to
manage his or her financial affairs, including proof of employ-
ment or other means of support."430 Nevada, North Carolina,
and Oregon also substitute a plan or proof of ability for
California's requirement of actual experience.43'
The states that use a prospective test recognize the relation-
ship between emancipation and families in conflict. A petition
for emancipation in North Carolina, for example, must contain
both the minor's plan for "meeting his own needs"432 and his
reasons for requesting emancipation, 433 but no dissembling
about the quality of existing family life is necessary. In ruling
on the petition, the judge is authorized to review such specific
factors as the extent of family discord, the minor's rejection of
parental supervision, and the quality of parental support or
supervision.434 California and other states should consider
§ 300(b) (West Supp. 1992). Yet as the present study suggests, emancipation may
precipitate homelessness or at least the precarious dependency that leads up to its
door. Thus, it seems that while a child cannot be removed involuntarily from his
family by virtue of homelessness, he can become homeless by virtue of a voluntary
departure from his family.
429. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-16(e)(5)(d) (West 1979).
430. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.4c(1)(d) (West Supp. 1991).
431. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 129.080-.140 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-718(6) (1989);
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.565(1)(c) (1989).
432. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-718(6) (1989).
433. Id. § 7A-718(5).
434. Id. §§ 7A-721 (5)-(7).
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adopting a similar mechanism for facilitating the teen's
departure even while recognizing the underlying conflict.
B. Better Alternatives?435
Like recommendations at the end of other articles concerned
with the well-being of children, suggested alternatives are
often experimental, expensive, politically devalued, and legally
problematic. Nonetheless, other approaches either might
bring a complete separation, or make one unnecessary.
Guardianships are the most sensible alternatives to emanci-
pation. Traditionally guardianships provided court approval
for parent-appointed, substitute parents on the death of the
natural parents.436 The California statute now provides that
a minor fourteen or older may himself file for the appointment
of a guardian.437 The guardian then has "care, custody, and
control of, and has charge of the education of, the ward."43
Guardianship may provide the right mixture of formality and
informality, permanence and flexibility to satisfy the minor or
ward, the guardian, and the minor's parents. In urging
guardianships as an early alternative to foster placements,
Hasseltine Taylor explained its unique attractions for prospec-
tive guardians:
The [guardian] enjoys the dignity of being in law as well
as in fact a substitute parent subject only to the control of
the court appointing him. He is not a foster parent whose
role is contingent upon continuous supervision by a child
welfare agency or juvenile court probation officer....
435. To be sure, even in its worst-case applications, emancipation has certain
advantages over other dispositions such as running away. See MARK-DAVID JANUS
ET AL., ADOLESCENT RUNAWAYS 6-13 (1987). Emancipation is a recognized, relatively
unstigmatized status and may signify taking control over one's life. Most of the
participants here reported a sense of accomplishment, sometimes pride, in what they
had done. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. Emancipation also removes
most of the disabling restrictions on minors working and living away from home. See
supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
436. See 35 CAL. JUR. 3D GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP § 300 (1988).
Guardianships sometimes are used when one parent has died and the grandparents
dispute the custody of the surviving parent.
437. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1510(a) (West 1991).
438. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2351(a) (West 1991).
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... Many suitable prospective guardians may not be
economically secure ... enough to deliberately want to
undertake such a responsibility [as adoption]. Others
may feel that prior commitments or obligations are all
that can be met comfortably. In some cases guardianship
may provide a more satisfying emotional reward for both
parties than adoption which is, regardless of legal effects,
still a substitute for a natural relationship.439
Used in the mid-1960s as alternatives to institutional, group
home, or foster care, guardianships offered limited financial
responsibility, less supervision than foster care, and a less
comprehensive commitment than adoption. Guardianships are
similarly attractive in the early 1990s as alternatives to
emancipation. Because minors seeking emancipation are
usually sixteen, the relationship is finite in duration. Because
the minor can choose the guardian, there also may be a
greater sense of the cooperative nature of the deal. Although
parents may to some degree view guardianships as an
admission of parental failure, they may find sufficient relief in
knowing that the child is both gone and cared for to balance
that dissatisfaction.
Guardianships resemble the novel disposition introduced
unsuccessfully in the California legislature in 1975-the
"minor in need of placement."44 ° The definition of a minor
in need of placement was any person over the age of fourteen
who "without regard to fault either of the minor or his
parents, exhibits anxiety, depression, hostility, or other
emotional problems caused or exacerbated by his relationship
with his parents and who expresses or otherwise manifests a
desire to be separated from his parents.""' The definition
is perhaps predictably Californian in its psychological orienta-
tion, but it comprehends the circumstances of many teenagers
for whom living at home has become unworkable.
A second alternative is reflected in programs designed to
prevent separations by restricting the parent-child relation-
ship under the same roof. The Children's Hearing Project
(CHP) from Massachusetts is an example of this model. An
439. Hasseltine B. Taylor, Guardianship or 'Permanent Placement' of Children, in
THE LAW OF THE POOR 417, 419-20 (Jacobus tenBroek ed., 1966).
440. See supra note 55.
441. AB 1819, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. (1975).
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initial goal of the Project was to show that the much-criticized
status offense category could be "replaced by a voluntary,
family-centered service separate from the coercive control of
the state."4
2
The essence of the Children's Hearing Project is family
mediation.443  Teenagers brought to the juvenile court as
status offenders and their families were diverted by the court
from the regular judicial process to the Project. The mediation
was designed to "encourage[] structured negotiation about
concrete issues of family life in which mutual small agree-
ments serve cumulatively to change patterns of family
functioning."4 4  Its purpose was not to "probe deeply into
feelings or the dynamics of family relationships," 5 but
rather to develop contractual agreements on the subjects
causing greatest conflict between parent and teenager.
Intervention focused on solving specific problems-"curfews,
chores, staying out late, the child's social life, and school
attendance."446  Trained community volunteers helped the
parties learn to "sidestep their domestic conflicts" and to shift
from "arguing, getting angry, violence and punishment" to
talking and negotiating."
7
These same goals seem equally appropriate and may be
more attainable for families who use emancipation as their
method of "sidestepping" domestic conflict. Both types of
442. MERRY & ROCHELEAU, supra note 254, at 198.
443. Id. Because the juvenile court did not dismiss the cases referred to CHP, it
could not be learned whether the referrals actually reduced the court caseloads. See
also Christine Rinik, Juvenile Status Offenders: A Comparative Analysis, 5 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 153, 204-09 (1982) (describing the Massachusetts project).
A similar program of family mediation designed to make daily life between parents
and teenagers livable is Homebuilders. See Edward C. Hinckley, Homebuilders: The
Maine Experience, CHILDREN TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 14, 15 (discussing Maine's
home-based, family-oriented program which strives to enable the child to remain at
home for at least one year following the termination of services); Jill McCleave
Kenney et al., Homebuilders Keeping Families Together, 45 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 667 (1977).
444. MERRY & ROCHELEAU, supra note 254, at 200.
445. Id. at 93.
446. Id. at 88.
447. Id. at 142, 148. Another technique taught was to learn at times to avoid
conflict by "leaving the room or ignoring things." Id. at 142. The stress in CHP on
shifting from arguing and punishment to talking and avoidance may suggest a
difference in the pre-intervention methods of dispute resolution used by the CHP and
emancipation families. The emancipation families seemed to use avoidance
frequently, though their use of it was not part of a solution to improve family
functioning and seemed to lead to eventual blow-ups.
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families have high levels of internal conflict; disputes fre-
quently center on control over the minor's social life, school
attendance, and behavior at home; and the parents are
desperate either to get control or to get rid of the child.4"
Conflicts with parents in both groups centered on "emerging
autonomy: the teenager's working, allowance, and concerns
with money and clothes, his or her privacy, privileges of
television or phone use, and patterns of drinking or drug
use."" 9  Family mediation may be especially suitable for
emancipation families; because the emancipation candidates
are older, the contracts negotiated would have a shorter
lifespan than the four or more years often faced by the CHP
families.
Emancipation families may be reluctant to enter family
mediation because the process requires sustained engagement
with the enemy and involves third parties.450 But mediation
along the CHP model may differ sufficiently from family
therapy to be tolerable. For example, by using both private
and joint sessions, parent-child interaction under the CHP
model avoided stubborn "family meetings" which replicated
existing parent-child power structures and tended to silence
children.451 Preventive mediation aimed simply at establish-
ing a domestic truce would seem a reasonable approach to
families of minors who might otherwise become emancipated
only because no other satisfactory mechanism for establishing
a truce is apparent.452
448. One difference is that unlike the emancipation study, the CHP cases rarely
mentioned problems associated with driving. The probable explanation is that
because the average age in the CHP study was 14 years, the group was simply too
young to drive. Id. at 40.
449. Id. at 112.
450. The 51 cases studied averaged 4.1 months in mediation. Id. at 37.
451. Both parents and children were 'more likely to be angry and less likely to
cooperate in joint sessions and more likely to offer suggestions in private sessions."
Id. at 86.
452. Another program specifically-tailored for the adolescent population, the
Federal Independent Living Initiative, attempts to create self-sufficiency for
teenagers at a later chronological point, and is currently limited to those in foster
care. Independent Living Initiative, 42 U.S.C. § 677(a)(2) (1988). The congressional
purpose behind the program is to "prepare [participants] to live independently upon
leaving foster care." 42 U.S.C. § 677(d) (1988).
The legislation provides general guidelines about the kinds of services appropri-
ately included within state programs, such as encouraging high school or vocational
training, counseling, and training in daily living skills. Id. The states have responded
to these guidelines with different degrees of practical and theoretical specificity.
Florida, for example, provides assistance to adolescent foster children to "develop skills
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CONCLUSION
The uses and consequences of emancipation described here
are not simply problems about legal process; rather, they
reflect a familiar problem to which neither law nor society has
offered clear or helpful answers: what to do when parents and
teenagers need to separate. Incompatibility and irretrievable
breakdown are not concepts limited only to the marital
relationship.
Emancipation fills the gap with unintended brilliance. It
provides an efficient solution to the problem of serious conflict
between teenagers and the adults with whom they live. The
supporters of emancipation simply were unable to foresee or
to control the complexity and interrelationships of factors
which contribute to emancipation's development as a mecha-
nism for familial dispute resolution, such as power dynamics
within families, judicial rubber-stamping practices, and the
particular attractiveness of the procedure for families in
conflict.
Other family law scholars have identified the limitations of
law in solving the problems families face. For example,
Michael Wald and David Chambers draw attention to the
inability of judicial decisions to make multiple changes
simultaneously, so that one reform is accompanied by others
that will tend to assure overall success. They conclude that:
[M]any of the "ideal" reforms require altering several
parts of the system at once. For example, it may make
sense to strengthen the rights of foster parents in a
system that limits the need for placement and helps
biologic parents regain custody. However, unless changes
can be made simultaneously, just strengthening foster
parents' rights may actually make matters worse. Legis-
lators can make simultaneous changes; courts rarely can
or do.453
that will contribute to a successful transition to adulthood," such as "education and
vocational training, homemaking skills, money management, social skills training, and
developing personal support systems." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.165(4)(a) (West 1992).
Florida's program sketches the kinds of skills and goals child welfare people consider
necessary for successful adulthood in modern America. Similar transitional programs
would benefit emancipation candidates tremendously by offering a transitional
exit-as opposed to an emergency one-from childhood.
453. Chambers & Wald, supra note 421, at 130.
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But while legislatures can do this, the present study
suggests that often they do not. One reason may be an
inability to see interconnections between the different parts of
a problem, especially when as here the family is not operating
within the context of an already-identified "system" such as
foster care. Another reason may be the inability to see the
problem at all, as here where the problem solved (parent-teen
conflict) is not the one legislators meant to solve (the contrac-
tual incapacity of independent minors). Attention has been
given in the context of judicial decision making to the problem
of "empirical questions without empirical answers. " "' The
problem here is not that social science has no answers, but
that neither courts nor legislatures are posing questions. As
Jane Ellis has observed in studying the implementation of the
State of Washington's new custody law:
We pass laws based on unexamined assumptions all the
time and don't return to examine the result. Where the
laws affect economically sound adults, this is less of a
problem. The system is self-correcting to the extent the
adults can afford to appear in court to litigate the inter-
pretation or application of the new statute. When the law
affects parties and nonparties who have little or no
resources (i.e., children and many divorcing parents of
both genders), the state has more responsibility for
tracking the result of what it has imposed and correcting
problems as they come to light.455
The problem that has come to light here has been the
adaptive use of emancipation to facilitate separations between
teenagers and their parents. But to the extent that emancipa-
tion attends to the need of teenagers and parents to separate
from one another, it ignores the factors necessary for secure
separations-such things as economic self-sufficiency, educa-
tional success, and emotional security.
That many adolescents cannot remain with their families, or
cannot do so without restructuring their relationships with
some external intervention, is nothing new. That many
teenagers cannot live independently without adequate and
454. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without
Empirical Answers, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 569 (organizing legal questions into categories
to which social science can reasonably respond).
455. Ellis, supra note 326, at 180-81.
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appropriate educational, emotional, and economic support is
no surprise. We have to take these facts seriously when
designing social, legislative, and institutional regimes able to
take on the complexities of contemporary adolescent and
familial life. Until now, the law has not been up to this task
in any direct or explicit way. Until it is, families will continue
to use what law is available not to solve their problems but to
approximate solutions.
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APPENDIX A: LETTER TO EMANCIPATED MINORS
SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
April 25, 1988
[I]
Dear []:
We are professors at Santa Clara University studying the
emancipation process. We are trying to learn more about
emancipation by talking with people who have actually been
involved with the process. In going through the public records
at the courthouse we learned that you had filed for emancipa-
tion. We are writing to ask if you would help us.
The specific purpose of our research is to understand how the
emancipation process is used and what it is like to go through
it. To do this, we are contacting everyone who was emanci-
pated in local counties in 1985 through 1987. We would like
very much to speak briefly with you about your experiences
with emancipation, and we would also like to speak with other
people who participated in your emancipation process-your
parents and officers of the courts.
If you decide to help us with this project, you will be talking
with Valerie Houghton, a third year law student who is doing
the interviewing. We may request interviews with others who
had a role in the process. In doing these interviews, we will
be following the university's research guidelines. One of these
guidelines is the protection of your privacy through a policy of
not discussing our conversation with you with anyone at all
other than the research staff.
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One of our assistants is attempting to reach you by phone in
hopes that an interview can be arranged at a time and place
convenient for you. We are unsure of your current phone
number so if you have not heard from us but would like to
help us you can call us. You can reach us by calling the
Psychology Department secretary, Rosa Antoine, at
(408) 554-4493 or the interviewer, Valerie Houghton, at
(408) 244-7942.
We want to understand how emancipation is working and how
it might be improved. We hope you will participate in this
research project and we will be happy to answer any questions
you might have. We look forward to hearing from you.
Most sincerely,
Eleanor W. Willemsen, Ph.D.
Psychology Professor
Carol Sanger, J.D.
Law Professor
EWW:CS/dk
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS IN SEQUENCE
I. Preliminary
1. Let's start with how you found out about emancipation[.]
a. When was that?
b. Did you know what it was?
c. Who recommended it? Why?
2. After you heard about it, what did you do next?
3. How long after you first heard about it did you start the
emancipation process?
a. How did you know where to go?
b. Ever been there before?
c. How did you get there?
d. How did you get the fee?
e. What was it like for you?
II. The Decision
4. Let's back up for a minute to the decision to become
emancipated. How did that happen?
a. Who was involved in the decision?
b. How much did they influence you?
5. How did the people close to you react to the decision?
a. Were they supportive of you?
b. Did your parents think it was a good idea?
c. If they didn't like the idea, why did they sign any-
way?
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6. Did your parents agree with each other?
7. Is there anyone else who had a special reaction?
8. After the decision was made, how did you react to it?
III. Family Relation
9. May we talk for a minute about the relationship between
you and your family?
10. When was the last time you lived with one or both of
your parents ([for example, did the minor] split before
the emancipation or via an alternative living situation)?
11. Who was living in your home at this point?
12. How did everyone get along with each other[?]
13. How would you describe your relationship with each
member of the (family or household)?
a. Parent figures
b. Sibling figures
c. Any family members who weren't living in the house
with you?
14. Who listened to you in your family?
15. Often, people in families don't agree on everything. How
did your family handle that?
16. If your (key parenting figure) were here, what would
he/she tell me about how you got along with the family
before the emancipation process began (homework,
outside job, schoolwork)?
IV. Expectations and Outcome
17. What about since then, were your parent's/parents'
expectations met?
WINTER 1992] Emancipating Children in Modern Times 355
18. In comparison with other people your age, how do you
see yourself handling everyday problems that normally
arise (maturity and confidence levels)?
19. What does the word "emancipation" mean to you today?
20. At the time you began the emancipation process, what
were your expectations?
21. Since the time of your emancipation, have you moved?
Changed jobs? Changed partners?
22. How do your old expectations fit with what's happening
now in your life?
a. physical (job, home, income)
b. emotional (partner, friends, family)
23. If you were laid off or seriously hurt in an accident, who
could you count on for help? (Inject supportive state-
ment)
24. Given the wisdom you have now from your experience,
if you could go back to the time before you were emanci-
pated, would you want to?
V. Closing
25. Is there anything else you'd like to tell me at this point
about the emancipation process and how it worked for
you?
26. Do you have any suggestions of how you would like to
see the process changed to be more effective or helpful?
Thank you
P.S.
Need to insert at some point, the question "Was everything on
your form true?" and "How much of what was on your form
was 100% true?"

